According to news reports, the Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) 27 September strike on Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah involved the employment of 80 weapons in urban Beirut. Based on Israeli Defense Ministry statements, videos, and photos, the New York Times and Times of Israel reported that the F-15I strike fighters (the Israeli version of the F-15E Strike Eagle) employed GBU-31(v)3 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) on four high-rise buildings in the strike. Reporting on the quantity of JDAMs used varies between 60 and 80 weapons, and it is unclear whether all the weapons employed were GBU-31(v)3 and whether 60 to 80 represents the quantity of weapons dropped or the overall size of the strike package (which would include some redundancy).
Regardless, to U.S. strike aviators with experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, in Afghanistan), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Inherent Resolve (in Syria), using the GBU-31(v)3 in such quantity against urban targets might raise some eyebrows.
in the attack on Lebanese Hezbollah's underground headquarters in Beirut on 27 September.
(U.S. Marine Corps/Jackson Rush)
The JDAM family of weapons are combinations of traditional unguided or “dumb” bombs of the 500-, 1,000-, or 2,000-lb class with GPS-guidance and aerodynamic kits added on. The dumb bomb bodies and the JDAM kits are cost-effective platforms that, when combined, significantly increase the range of the bombs and allow pinpoint accuracy. JDAM has been the primary weapon of choice in U.S. air campaigns for some time. The GBU-31(v)3 is a “bunker-buster” weapon, which uses a specially built BLU-109 bomb body of the 2,000-lb class, and unique fuse settings to allow the bomb to penetrate heavily fortified structures such as multi-story buildings, caves, and bunkers. The GBU-31(v)3 is the JDAM successor to the laser-guided GBU-24, most notably carried by Maverick’s strike force in Top Gun: Maverick.
Given that the buildings targeted in Lebanon were high-rises with basements and possibly bunkers below the basements, using GBU-31(v)3s makes sense as primary strike weapons. Exact settings are classified, but the bunker buster’s electronic fuse can be set for a long delay. Combined with the hardened bomb body, this allows the weapon to punch through to the heart of a structure before detonating—ideally inside a room where the explosive damage can destroy the target.
Two factors in the Israeli strike stand out. The first is quantity. According to a U.S. Air Force Central Command report on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. air forces expended a total of 24 GBU-24 and GBU-28 (4,000-lb) bunker busters in the entire conflict against the Iraqi military. Last Friday, Israel dropped up to three times as many weapons in one night. Considering the targets, however, helps explain the apparent overkill.
According to the New York Times, the targets appear to have been four high-rise buildings within a city block. These buildings are in close proximity to many others, which presumably are not Hezbollah facilities. Precise weaponeering—planning the correct number and type of weapons for a given target—must have preceded the strike and would have relied on as much detail about the target buildings’ structure as possible. Given Israel’s successful infiltration of Hezbollah’s communications and knowledge of Nasrallah’s whereabouts, it is easy to imagine Israeli intelligence collecting details on the buildings’ construction, which would be needed to plan the strike.
That this process called for a payload of up to 20 weapons per building seems surprising at first glance. But consider the following weaponeering scenario: Setting a salvo of bombs to different fuze delays would allow multiple weapons to penetrate a target building simultaneously, with each bomb detonating at different times on different floors. Imagine four bombs dropped into a high rise, one set to detonate in the top quarter, one halfway down, one near the ground floor, and the last in the basement or sub-basement, then multiply those times four—one for each corner of the building. Then repeat for four buildings. A rough calculation puts that strike at 64 weapons. Adding a similar setup in the buildings’ centers or including spare weapons as backups for malfunctions would yield an 80-bomb payload, spread across multiple F-15Is. This is a complex problem requiring precise coordinates, timing, and weapon setup, but it would certainly be possible for an air force of the IAF’s caliber.
(Credit: U.S. Air Force/Kyle Cope)
Based on my experience flying F/A-18 Super Hornets as a Navy strike lead, a strike this large in this environment still seems like it might be overkill. But in part this could be because of the F/A-18E/F’s smaller payload capacity compared to the F-15I and the stricter rules of engagement that typically govern U.S. operations. U.S. military air strikes in urban environments during OIF and OEF typically used 500- or 1,000-lb bombs without any bunker-busting capability, because the structure of the targets (unfortified low-rise buildings) and the prevalence of civilians in urban areas necessitated smaller warheads and salvos.
This leads to the second stand-out factor in the Israeli strike. The IAF (and the Israeli Defense Forces in general) seems to have taken a notably different approach to collateral damage than U.S. forces over the past few decades.
During OIF and OEF, U.S. decisions about whether to risk civilian casualties around military targets were typically elevated to the highest levels possible before approval. In my own experience, if civilian casualties were possible (the numbers were defined by multiple factors in the rules of engagement), the information would be relayed to the Combined Forces Air Component Commander, an Air Force three-star general, and sometimes higher—to the Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Pentagon, or the White House.
Given the operational environments of OIF and OEF, this process was understandable, if cumbersome. In a counterinsurgency campaign, the goal is to avoid turning the civilian population against you, so preventing civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure becomes vital. This approach led to the development of increasingly precise weapons, from the laser-guided mid-1970s-era Paveway II series, to the JDAM, to laser-JDAM dual-guidance bombs. These weapons allow highly accurate strikes and can be paired with low collateral-damage bomb bodies specifically designed to create less damage on explosion.
Israel’s military, on the other hand, seems to have a higher threshold for collateral damage in the current operations against Hamas and Hezbollah—meaning they strike even when chances are higher for civilian casualties. Israel has often preceded military action with calls to evacuate whole areas of Gaza and Beirut, and then proceeded with targeted strikes. Last Friday’s strike in Beirut was preceded by such warnings.
This strategy has been frequently criticized, and it seems to differ significantly from the U.S. approach in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are two counterpoints to this criticism. First, like all JDAM weapons, the GBU-31(v)3 is a precision weapon. Exact accuracy is classified, but with precise coordinates (i.e., latitude, longitude, and elevation), the JDAM is going to go where it is told to go. The second point is the nature of the delayed-fuse bunker buster. By penetrating the target building and detonating inside, the building may help contain the explosions, like a controlled detonation used to bring down an old building before new construction. Of course, the JDAM is not engineered for that level of explosive demolition precision. But, given that Israel’s attack on Nasrallah was a decapitation strike meant to cripple Hezbollah, and the target’s location was an underground bunker beneath several tall buildings, the use of 80 2,000-lb weapons is logical within Israel’s more permissive rules of engagement.
The current Israeli air campaign is fascinating in the ways in which it uses American-made weapons and platforms in markedly different ways than the current generation of U.S. military aviators have employed them. Israel’s tactics and effects should be studied closely for lessons.
