“This is the TAO, launch the Alert-60, AEW, side 603!”
It is 0300 local time in the southern Red Sea. We have 60 minutes to get airborne. Awakened from a dead sleep by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower’s (CVN 69’s) tactical action officer (TAO), we begin our well-briefed and by now well-practiced groundwork to launch our E-2C Hawkeye into the night. With only an hour to prepare, the crew splits up to accomplish the myriad tasks required to catapult the aircraft off a floating airfield to meet the enemy. I am the mission commander this morning. I lace up my boots and knock down some caffeine. The TAO repeats his call for our launch and that of a dozen other aircraft. As my crew suits up and walks to the aircraft, I swing by the Carrier Intelligence Center to see what we are launching into. This morning, a Houthi drone swarm is attacking a civilian merchant vessel. I hurry up the ladder to the flight deck. Taking my center seat in the back of the E-2C, I brief the crew on the situation and delineate responsibilities as we taxi to the catapult. With the plane shaking just before the catapult stroke, I look to my left and see symbols begin to plume on my display as more and more Houthi drones are detected. A sudden lurch throws us back in our seats and off the deck.
“Good shot,” the pilot says through the strain of the G-forces. The plane climbs, and I look at my watch: 0343.
Operational Philosophies
As we launched into the darkness that morning, it quickly became clear that the tactics we had practiced during our workups were designed with a peer adversary in mind. The Houthis were a different kind of challenge—one that required us to adapt our approach on the fly.
During Operation Prosperity Guardian, Hawkeye crews found themselves acting as air control units for fleet air defense missions, controlling dedicated coalition large-force strikes, coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to develop dynamic targets of opportunity, and deconflicting military from civilian aircraft within the battle management area. We adapted on the job, and while we ultimately were successful in degrading the Houthis’ capability to attack merchant shipping through the Bab el Mandeb Strait, if we had trained for adaptability rather than fixed tactics, we would have been more effective.
This experience underscores the need for a shift in the U.S. Navy’s predeployment training. Rather than limiting training to rigid, scenario-specific tactics, workups should aim to develop skills that can be tailored to diverse and unpredictable environments.
Air Defense Adaptation in Action
Air defense is a fundamental mission of a carrier strike group. To be a deterrent, the carrier must first be able to defend herself. Sending a strike group to a coast is a challenge to an adversary: “Make us move.” This year, the Houthis failed at that challenge. On 9 March, they launched a swarm of more than two dozen one-way attack (OWA) drones at the Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Hawkeye was airborne to track the incoming threats, work with warfare commanders to ensure that positive hostile identification and rules of engagement were met, and commit defensive counterair Super Hornets to engage the Houthi drones.
While these actions reflected a soundly drilled tactical response, they also showed the need to train for adaptability. Predeployment workups had prepared us for a peer threat from manned fighter aircraft. Defending against a swarm of drones, we had to recalibrate our approach and innovate in real time. Engaging manned fighter aircraft typically involves fewer, higher-value targets with distinct behavior patterns, but drone swarms present a dispersed threat with unique detection and tracking challenges. Air defense principles remain the same, but they must be tailored to this asymmetric threat.
In this scenario, the Hawkeye crew fused information to direct fighter aircraft to the right piece of sky to find and engage the enemy. The Hawkeye also coordinated fires with the cruiser-destroyer (CruDes) warships to facilitate targeting off-axis OWA drones, reducing the potential for friendly fire. Through the E-2’s tactical networks, the crew had awareness of which targets the CruDes planned to engage. This gave air battle managers in the Hawkeye the highest situational awareness of any platform or watchstander in the battle, allowing them to precisely direct targeting decisions.
Coordinating kill counts, remaining threats, fighter fuel states, and weapons remaining back up the chain, the Hawkeye delivered information from the air battle to the air and missile defense commander, the carrier air wing commander, the strike group commander, and the combined forces air component commander simultaneously and without delay, allowing these commanders to make quick and informed decisions. The result was the engagement of two dozen OWA drones with no damage to coalition forces or merchant vessels.
This experience reinforces the need for predeployment workups to emphasize adaptive problem-solving skills. While it is crucial to learn and rehearse specific tactics, it is equally important to develop the ability to adjust those tactics in response to the unexpected. Flexibility and quick thinking often make the difference between success and failure. Training that prioritizes these attributes would better prepare crews for unpredictable challenges in the field.
Adapting to Dynamic Targets in Houthi-Controlled Yemen
As Carrier Strike Group 2 (CSG-2) intensified its operations to counter Houthi actions in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, emergent targets of opportunity demanded swift, precise responses. These missions often involved neutralizing cruise and ballistic missiles before they could be launched at civilian shipping. The E-2C Hawkeye was the nerve center for these operations.
With its extensive communications suite, the Hawkeye maintained real-time links with diverse assets, including the dynamic targeting cell at the Combined Air and Space Operations Center in Qatar, as well as ISR drone operators in the United States. This enabled the crew to develop and refine targeting information swiftly, often securing authorization to engage before F/A-18E/F strike fighters arrived in the vicinity. This integration maximized the effectiveness of strike options and showed the value of adaptability in response to emergent threats.
These dynamic strikes, conducted daily, were crucial in maintaining freedom of navigation through this key maritime corridor. Reflecting on the operational tempo and the exigencies of these engagements, it is evident Navy predeployment training regimes need to evolve. Training for offensive air support missions in which targets are fixed or predetermined does not match the realities faced in the Red Sea. Emphasizing scenarios that require rapid decision-making and adaptation to intelligence will better prepare crews for unpredictable modern naval warfare. Enhancing training to include more complex, scenario-based exercises that mirror these real-world challenges will bolster readiness and tactical acumen.
Large Force Strike: Coordination and Adaptability in Joint and Multinational Operations
While our workup training effectively prepared us for large force strikes, it primarily focused on operations within a single-nation framework. This limitation became evident during a complex multinational operation on 24 February, when Carrier Air Wing 3 (CVW-3), alongside British forces and six other coalition partners, conducted a strike deep into Houthi-controlled territory. Targets included critical assets such as underground missile storage facilities, OWA drones, air defense systems, and a Houthi attack helicopter.
Two E-2Cs acted as a command-and-control element. Their launch ahead of the strikers and the E/A-18G electronic attack aircraft was pivotal in establishing comprehensive situational awareness. The E-2Cs acted as airborne intelligence centers, fusing data from various sensors and unmanned ISR drones, ensuring all strike elements had a clear understanding of the dynamic battlefield.
With the lessons learned from this strike and subsequent operations over the course of many months, CVW-3 was able to seamlessly integrate with our partners. Hawkeye crews had to adapt quickly to the complexities of coordinating with partners from different military cultures and operational doctrines. Until training for such operations can be incorporated into the workup cycle, training to adapt to unforeseen scenarios can prepare crews for the nuances of joint and international military operations.
Enhancing Air Space Management: Adapting to Complex Airspace for All Missions
Equally important, though less exciting, was the Hawkeye’s tasking to conduct air space management. Its three air battle managers and copilot, acting as the tactical fourth operator, continuously monitored the altitudes and locations of military and civilian aircraft transiting through the many international airways above the CSG.
During Prosperity Guardian, every U.S. or coalition aircraft was required to check in with the Hawkeye to receive a safe transit altitude and route to its desired location. As soon as the call sign “Screwtop” was heard on the radio, aircraft knew they were under the care of a Hawkeye crew. If they had an emergency, the Hawkeye was there, ready to assist. If the tanker checked in, unable to provide fuel, the E-2 was already working a contingency tanking plan to get their assets home. The Hawkeye acted as air traffic control, switchboard operator, emergency roadside service, and, sometimes, hall monitor. Although not often recognized for it, the Hawkeye community takes pride in the persistent conduct of this mission set.
Despite the critical nature of these tasks, training simulations conducted during workups often do not mimic the complex needs and dynamic nature of the actual fighter and civilian aircraft operating within such a congested airspace. Traditionally, airspace management training is isolated, focusing primarily on the Hawkeye crew without involving the fighter squadrons or other units that also operate within the battle management area. This segregation limits the ability of all air wing units to understand and practice the integration skills needed to safely and effectively operate in a multilayered airspace.
Integrating fighter squadrons and other relevant units into airspace management exercises would enhance the operational effectiveness of each unit while facilitating a more responsive air wing that can handle the complexities of modern airspace with agility and precision.
Training reinforced with comprehensive joint exercises that simulate the demands of managing busy airspace will better prepare crews for the multifaceted challenges they will face. This not only bolsters the capabilities of the Hawkeye community, but also enhances the overall operational readiness of the entire CSG, ensuring all elements are proficient in the many skills required for success in complex, multinational environments.
During the many months of combat operations against the Houthis, CSG-2 reaffirmed that the carrier strike group is the premier dynamic and strategic response option for the National Command Authority. The E-2 Hawkeye was instrumental across a range of missions in the southern Red Sea, from air defense to dynamic targeting. The experience revealed the importance of adaptability in modern naval warfare. Training programs should evolve to emphasize adaptable skills that can be applied across diverse and unpredictable environments. That is how naval aviation forces will remain at maximum operational readiness.
