November 1934—In “An Evaluation of the Tactical School,” Marine Brigadier General J. C. Breckenridge writes: “In our efforts to learn from the experiences of the past we gravely set up rules, doctrines, and principles . . . all of which we teach without analysis as to their causes. . . . It has systematically taught the military mind to place an all but universal faith in the efficacy of judgments that were once successful, but without reasoning whether they are equally applicable at a later date. . . .We are trained to copy, to repeat a lesson, and to follow blindly. . . . Tactics is an art, but technique is a trade.”
November 1954—In “The Art of Being an Executive Officer,” Navy Captain W. J. Catlett Jr. writes, “The first thing an executive officer has to do is gain the complete confidence of his commanding officer. He has to be convinced beyond any shadow of doubt of your moral integrity, your will to assume responsibility, and your force to accomplish the policy you recommend for his approval. . . . This is a most difficult period in the executive officer–commanding officer relationship. Sometimes the adjustment is accomplished in minutes; sometimes it takes several days, but the sooner the mutual confidence pact is worked out, the better for all the officers and men.”
November 1974—In “The Few, the Proud—But at What Cost?” Captain Richard W. Palermo, U.S. Marine Corps, writes, “The demanding world of U.S. Marine Corps recruiting duty forces leaders to place their subordinates in ethically compromising situations. A zero-defect atmosphere and high incidence of micromanagement combine to create an unhealthy environment—‘accomplish the mission or else.’ Recruiters are ordered to make their assigned goals no matter what the cost. . . . The drive to succeed lures too many Marines down an unethical path, ultimately leading to their relief for cause and a bad reputation for the recruiting service.”