The experimentation, adaptation, and change demanded by Force Design are a service-wide modernization effort that has only just begun.1 The implied task to all Marines is to aggressively innovate and adapt to prepare for future conflict.
Marine Special Operations Command (MarSOC)—initially spurred by the war on terror—has not yet been maximized, partially because of misperceptions that MarSOC drains talent from the rest of the force and members of the command lose their identity as Marines. To overcome these issues, the Marine Corps must address these misperceptions to mitigate any tribalism. In addition, the service must educate the overall force on the mutual benefits that MarSOC and the greater service already generate, such as diversification, technological innovation, and the integration and interoperability of special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces.
Addressing Misperceptions
The largest misperception about MarSOC is that it drains talent from other Marine Corps formations. Interwar periods have commonly seen increasing contention between SOF and conventional forces because of constrained budgets, resources, and manpower. In his 1978 book Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, Eliot Cohen explains the SOF/conventional force peacetime clash occurs for multiple reasons, but he argues the largest is that “elite” units take talent that could be better used in the conventional forces.2 This argument has persevered, evidenced as recently as 2019 in a Heritage Foundation article referencing talent drain when recommending the disestablishment of MarSOC.3
Cohen’s characterization, however, disregards MarSOC’s talent-management benefits. Marines are drawn to MarSOC because they are given the opportunity to conduct unique missions, such as what happens when a Marine lateral-transfers to a different occupational specialty. Without MarSOC, these Marines might leave the service to serve in a SOF capacity in either another branch of the military or the interagency environment. MarSOC is retaining talented Marines that may otherwise leave the service. Keeping talented Marines on the team is the priority, regardless of what position they play.
Another false notion that could degrade the relationship between MarSOC and the conventional force is that MarSOC service members lose their identity as Marines. MarSOC Marines—also known as Marine Raiders—are different from other Marines in the same way a machine gunner is different from an administrative specialist: They see problems differently and likely have different personality traits. Every community has its own quirks because of the personalities and interests of the Marines who were drawn to it. It does not make anyone less of a Marine; rather, it demonstrates strength in the diversity of the force.
The Marine Corps has rightfully earned a reputation as an elite force, and MarSOC is a SOF that is a part of that elite force, not a separate entity. Marines fight and win together, and it is the duty of MarSOC and the conventional force to maintain that bond and prepare for future conflict together. Esprit de corps permeates the Marine Corps, all the way down to tactical units. However, there is a fine line between esprit de corps and unproductive competition. Marines at all levels, both in MarSOC and the conventional force, are responsible for maintaining that balance and eliminating tribalism that can block productive and collaborative progress.
The Ability and Need to Collaborate
The 2022 National Security Strategy emphasizes integrated deterrence, with specific requirements to coordinate, network, and innovate so the capabilities of the United States are seamless and postured to deter any potential adversary.4 Collaboration between the greater force and MarSOC is one way to ensure integrated deterrence and posture. Throughout the past 20 years of countering violent extremists, SOF were often supported by their conventional counterparts. In the next fight, the roles likely will be reversed, and SOF will support conventional forces such as a Marine air-ground task force. If conventional Marines need SOF support, there are benefits to having that support provided by fellow Marines with a common ethos, heritage, and warfighting foundation.
While the Marine Corps is aggressively pursuing Force Design initiatives, the current U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCom) Vision and Strategy involves “prioritizing modernization efforts to encompass a holistic future force design and experimentation process that integrates the elements of doctrine, organizations, training, matériel, leader development and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.”5 The Marine Corps and USSOCom have aligned priorities for the future and, as a result, MarSOC and conventional Marines are positioned to collaborate and enhance preparedness.
In their 2020 Marine Corps Gazette article, “The Joint Force–SOF Relationship,” Marine Lieutenant Colonel Brandon Turner and Major Paul Bailey astutely identify that MarSOC “serves both SOCom and the Marine Corps as a laboratory of innovation to test new equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures.”6 Every opportunity to capitalize on this relationship needs to be pursued, as it produces positive effects for overall military readiness.
In the 2023 Force Design Annual Update, General David H. Berger communicated that the Marine Corps had completely self-funded its innovation, experimentation, and reorganization, but to ensure accelerated delivery of capabilities while maintaining current readiness levels, additional budget resources may be needed.7 MarSOC’s access to Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding as a part of SOCom is an indirect resource for the greater Marine Corps to gain insight into emerging technologies at zero cost; the only requirement is open lines of communication with MarSOC. Recent Marine Corps procurements at the tactical level—such as higher-cut helmets, ear-muff radio headsets, and Polaris MRZR lightweight tactical combat vehicles—were all fielded first in MarSOC under MFP-11 funding, allowing the service to observe their utility before making a forcewide procurement decision.
MarSOC experimentation and development of organic ground precision strike, small unmanned aircraft systems, and ground robotic capabilities has led the Marine Corps to adopt programs of record, with a feedback loop of tactics, techniques, and procedures continually flowing between MarSOC and conventional formations. The nature of the Marine Corps, its mission, and Force Design initiatives already require SOF-like adaptations, and the technology developed through MarSOC provides valuable insight to Marine commanders on emerging capabilities they may wish to pursue.
The strength of the Marine Corps is its Marines, and diversity of experience is essential for innovation and growth. The experiences Marines assigned to MarSOC bring back to the rest of the force provide direct benefit. Within MarSOC, there are four categories of personnel. The first two categories are critical skills operators (CSOs) and special operations officers (SOOs), who—once they join MarSOC—serve in a SOF capacity for the remainder of their careers. The third and fourth categories, special operations capability specialists (SOCSs) and combat service support (CSS) Marines, deploy with Marine special operations teams and companies but ultimately return to the conventional force.
Effectively, SOCS and CSS are part of an open-loop system that rotates approximately 70 percent of MarSOC personnel back to the conventional force. This allows them to bring back lessons, operational experiences, and invaluable interagency connections. They receive advanced training and skills while at MarSOC that provide immediate and tangible benefits on return to the conventional force. These Marines are exposed to emerging technology and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures that directly relate to Force Design initiatives. Furthermore, they maintain close relationships with the CSOs and SOOs who remain within MarSOC and are able to inform the command on how it can best support the total force in the future fight.
Leaders across the Department of Defense frequently acknowledge the benefits of unified and collaborative SOF and combined force efforts, known as special operations forces–conventional forces–interdependence, interoperability, and integration (SOF-CF-I3). While this relationship already exists, a deliberate effort is necessary to preserve and enhance it.8 As the force shifts focus from countering violent extremists to the threat of great power war, this is especially important, as there is a risk of degraded SOF-CF-I3 and duplication of efforts not only in innovation and experimentation initiatives, but also in fulfilling information requirements. MarSOC currently operates in many regions of the globe where Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) could commit forces.
Maximum collaboration and communication between MarSOC and the conventional force will ensure there are no “cold starts.” Every Marine Raider has first served in the conventional force, and, as a result, can forecast and provide important information requirements as well as ensure seamless reception, staging, and integration of inbound Marine units. The permissions and authorities granted to Marine Raiders because of their SOCom unit designation allows for enduring placement and access to locations that can provide invaluable information to Marine commanders, ensuring mission success and preserving the lives of fellow Marines. The common bond as Marines will alleviate friction that would occur if a MEU required similar support from a non-Marine SOF entity.
Maximize Advantages
Every Marine must maximize all the advantages they have to prepare for and dominate in future conflict. To maximize the service’s potential, all Marines must look at one another as mutual assets rather than competitors. There are ongoing initiatives to increase the collaboration and integration of MarSOC and the conventional force, such as including a SOO as the deputy director of the Infantry Officer Course and assigning MarSOC personnel to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.
It is imperative, however, that Marines independently seek more opportunities to integrate and provide bottom-up refinement. Expanding MAGTF warfighting exercises with a more robust and consistent MarSOC element is an example of a straightforward solution. More controversial concepts—such as temporarily integrating portions of Marine Corps aviation into MarSOC to drive innovation and experimentation—should also be considered.
Marine Corps leaders at all levels of command, from both MarSOC and the conventional force, should be encouraged to develop relationships and, most important, communicate. Marines who wish to serve at MarSOC should be encouraged. Colonel Peter Ortiz, a Marine Corps officer who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), is one of the nation’s most decorated World War II veterans, including two Navy Crosses. After his death in 1988, the headline of his obituary in the New York Times did not mention his specific job, specialty, or that he spent the war in the OSS. It simply read, “Col. Peter J. Ortiz, Legendary Marine Officer.”9 This should stand as a reminder that throughout history, Marines have been called to serve in multiple capacities, and it does not affect their identity as Marines.
1. Gen David H. Berger, USMC, Force Design 2030 Annual Update (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, U.S. Marine Corps, 2023), 18.
2. Eliot Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, vol. 40 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978): 54–57.
3. Dakota L. Wood, Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Marine Corps, Special Report, 211 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2019), 41.
4. White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), 22.
5. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, SOF Vision and Strategy 2023 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, n.d.), 7.
6. LtCol Paul Bailey and Maj Brandon Turner, USMC, “The Joint Force-SOF Relationship: Support Roles in the Resurgence of Great Power Competition,” Marine Corps Gazette 104, no. 1 (January 2020): 12–16.
7. Berger, Force Design 2030 Annual Update, 4.
8. Jason Wesbrock, Glenn Harned, and Preston Plous, “Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces: Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence,” PRISM 6, no. 3 (2016): 87.
9. Alfonso Narvaez, “Col. Peter J. Ortiz, 75, Legendary Marine Officer,” New York Times, 21 May 1988.