The War of 2026 scenario in the December 2023 Proceedings presents a problem for U.S. naval forces that requires assistance from joint partners—the need to project force in the defense of allies within the first island chain.1 Solving this problem requires getting sufficient assets into the first island chain to demonstrate to allies that the United States will defend them with strike aircraft. To maintain this aviation presence, U.S. naval forces must master establishing temporary forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) throughout China’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ).
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly can strike stationary targets as far away as Guam and threaten far-off vessels.2 This reach significantly increases risk for aircraft on the ground at traditional airfields. History has shown that FARPs enable significant sortie generation without exposing aircraft to extended periods on the ground, and they provide options to divert damaged aircraft for critical maintenance.3 And with constraints on the available quantities of U.S. aircraft and munitions, FARPs can increase the utility of limited assets by intensifying pressure on the PLA in its own backyard.4 Finally, these temporary forward bases allow swapping-out of exhausted aircrew with rested aircrew (hot seating) to further generate more sorties. Joint training, preconflict investment, and large-scale unit exercises will prepare the U.S. military to establish fly-in and float-in FARPs in the locations most needed.
Current FARP Initiatives
FARPs are not new to U.S. forces, and, on a small scale, procedures have been established in recent years to make them sustainable within a peer-adversary’s WEZ. In the Marine Corps, FARP operations are standard practice from the squadron and amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit (ARG/MEU) levels up to highly complex evolutions at the biannual Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course.5 The Air Force has established the Agile Combat Employment concept to develop the personnel, equipment, and procedures to employ airpower within the WEZ.6 This largely seeks to expand on previous exercises in which entire FARP packages were loaded into a transport aircraft, rapidly deployed and set up to support multiple strike aircraft, and redeployed before notional enemy forces could engage the FARP site.7
Recent real-world operational FARPs were in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States maintained air and ground dominance. During these conflicts, U.S. forces could set up a site and defend it with relative ease for a prolonged period. In a western Pacific conflict, FARPs would be vulnerable to threats from various domains. As such, they would need to be dispersed, durable, mobile, numerous, and joint. Multiple dispersed sites would need to be established simultaneously to give the PLA several targeting problems and keep China guessing as to what the follow-on objectives for FARP aircraft would be. These sites would need multidomain defenses, while the service members and equipment (FARP packages) would need to be able to deploy and redeploy faster than the PLA could effectively target them.
Fly-in-FARPs
There are two ways the United States could deploy FARP packages while minimizing risk to supporting assets. The first method is via transport aircraft. As previously mentioned, the Air Force has conducted several training exercises in which they supported numerous strike aircraft from a single C-17. The Marine Corps has conducted similar exercises with 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the WTI course with KC-130s and rotary-wing aircraft.8 A joint publication should be created today that spells out the allowable configurations of FARP packages on transport aircraft. This publication would make it so that any unit, anywhere could have plug-and-play instructions for loading any U.S. or allied aircraft with the resources to conduct a successful FARP. In addition, logisticians and maintenance personnel from all the branches should more routinely train together in large-scale exercises to increase joint cooperation.
Before FARP packages could be flown in, a secure landing strip would have to be identified. With Army support, Marine littoral regiments (MLRs) could discreetly designate, secure, and defend these sites long enough to conduct FARP operations. MLRs are equipped and organized to sense PLA assets in the area while not being sensed themselves. In addition, MLRs are mobile enough to defend nearly any landing strip and then disperse when no longer needed.9 Fly-in-FARPs could deploy and redeploy rapidly, with a relatively low signature, and could originate half a world away. Challenges include limited room inside transport aircraft, that most transport aircraft would likely be committed to other operational requirements, and that transport aircraft require established airfields to land.
Float-in FARPs
The alternate deployment method for 2026 is to float in FARPs via an ARG/MEU with Army and other naval attachments. The ARG/MEU team provides significant flexibility in where and how to establish FARPs. The ARG ships can maneuver for weeks before needing replenishment, can carry enough assets to support scaled aircraft operations, and are a challenge for adversaries to effectively target when provided effective naval attachments (escort ships, sea-based drones, etc.). The embarked MEU (with MLR support) has significant air, ground, and cyber capabilities to clear an existing PLA presence from an airfield and then defend that same airfield until FARP operations are complete. The 31st MEU conducted a combined raid/fly-in FARP in 2019 that demonstrated the rapid FARP concept is solid, but investments are still needed to ensure that scale and joint interoperability can be achieved.10
The ARG/MEU brings many capabilities, but it needs to be better equipped to conduct numerous FARPs at once. More tactical aviation ground refueling systems (TAGRS), fuel bladders, aviation ordnance equipment, the support equipment to move these assets, and more personnel trained to operate the equipment are needed.11 Probably the biggest disadvantage for a float-in FARP is that the ARG/MEU is a big, slow target. Though hitting a moving and well-defended ship is a challenge, the considerable loss of life and equipment should a single ARG ship be struck is enough to keep it away from contested zones. However, embarked landing craft, air cushion, and an assortment of tilt/rotary-wing aircraft allow for offloading while the ARG is still maneuvering well out to sea.
FARP Options
Which FARP deployment method to choose depends on the situation, but a combination of both would enable multiple operational airfields, add redundancy, and increase uncertainty for PLA targeting. In either option, naval forces (air, sea, ground, and cyber) would need to clear a path ashore for the FARP packages and screen for the deploying force. Though the Air Force and Army would provide sizeable assets ashore, the commander for these operations should be a naval officer because of the doctrine needed just to get ashore and the vastness of the maritime environment.
Even without more investment and preparation, the joint force could establish FARPs inside the WEZ. However, there would be a steep learning curve to get various service units to cooperate under naval direction. Ideally, the joint force should be training, equipping, and rehearsing now to establish FARPs. Aircraft mechanics, fuel technicians, air-traffic controllers, and other required personnel from all the services must learn the equipment they will use, establish standard terminology, and train together. This training could be conducted relatively inexpensively and could be done at a unit’s home station instead of a schoolhouse.
Surplus equipment such as TAGRS, fuel bladders, and ordnance-loading equipment would need to be purchased and prestaged with the ARGs and at Pacific airbases. Finally, major commands such as a Marine expeditionary force, a numbered fleet, a numbered Air Force, an Army corps, or a combatant commander should host large-scale FARP exercises in defending ideal airfields, deploying and redeploying FARP packages via ship and air, and conducting brutally honest in-person after-action reviews. Some of these actions are already taking place within smaller units, but the U.S. military is asking for major problems without large-scale preparations.
Naval forces can better defend allies within the first island chain with joint assistance in establishing FARPs for strike aircraft within the WEZ. Whether deployed via fly-in transport aircraft or float-in ARG/MEU teams, these FARPs are essential to increasing sortie generation, enabling the efficient use of critical assets, and recovering aircrew and aircraft.
1. CDR Paul Giarra and CAPTs Bill Hamblet and Gerard Roncolato, USN (Ret.), “The War of 2026: Phase III Scenario,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023).
2. LT James Magno, USN, “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Defending Guam Is Paramount,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022).
3. Maj Timothy Warren, USMC, “FARPs Keep Aviation in the Fight,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 150, no. 1 (January 2024).
4. CDR Graham Scarbro, USN, “Strike Warfare’s Inventory Problem,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023).
5. LCpl Courtney Robertson, USMC, “Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101 Takes on Key West,” Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, 19 March 2023; and Megan Eckstein “How to Seize Islands, Set Up a Forward Arming and Refueling Point: Marine Corps Recipes for Expeditionary Operations,” USNI News, 13 September 2019.
6. U.S. Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21: Agile Combat Employment (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, 23 August 2022).
7. LTC Robert Davis, USAF, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft,” Air & Space Power Journal 28, no. 5 (September–October 2014).
8. Robbin Laird, “An Update on MAWTS-1: 2023,” SLDinfo.com, 8 January 2024; and 1st Lt Charles Allen, USMC, “Largest Marine Aircraft Wing Kicks Off Exercise with Long-Range Strike,” U.S. Marine Corps News, 9 July 2021.
9. “Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR),” U.S. Marine Corps News, 11 January 2023.
10. Eckstein, “How to Seize Islands, Set Up a Forward Arming and Refueling Point.”
11. Maj Michael Sweeney and Maj Scott Mahaffey, USMC, “The New MEU Forward Arming Point,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 4 (April 2022).