War against China could include many U.S. Navy surface ship losses. U.S. ships crippled or sunk during surface engagements will leave many sailors stranded within range of enemy missiles. This problem has never occurred inside the missile-engagement range of a peer adversary.
It is crucial the U.S. military develop new means to safely and quickly rescue sailors on the open ocean following an engagement. Adequate preparation for sea combat must include open-ocean mass-casualty rescue and recovery efforts.
More Important than Ever
More personnel could be lost with a ship than with nearly any other military unit. Furthermore, unlike in World War II, today’s smaller Navy would mean “each loss will represent a higher proportion of the entire U.S. naval force.”1 As a western Pacific war progressed, the United States would be increasingly unable to afford such losses.
Consider an Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, the Navy’s most numerous vessel class. The destroyer’s roughly 300-person crew is among the smallest in the fleet. Conservatively, a well-qualified crew includes a commanding officer (roughly 18 years of experience and training), an executive officer (16 years), a command master chief (18 years), four tactical action officers (8 years each), four combat systems coordinators (10 years each), four officers of the deck (2 years each), and four engineering officers of the watch (10 years each). Accounting only for the major underway leaders and conservatively estimating their time in service, the loss of this team would equal more than 170 years of experience. This estimate does not include the ship’s enlisted personnel, many of whom hold critical technical qualifications. In comparison, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers with embarked air wings, against which adversaries have developed capable weaponry, have more than 5,000 sailors and officers on board.
Existing Assets Are Insufficient
While the Navy has MH-60 helicopter squadrons capable of open-ocean rescue, an MH-60S only has 11 seats. With two crewmen and littered survivors on board, available space decreases. Crews can maximize cabin room beyond this in emergencies, but not to the level that an abandon-ship scenario would demand.2 Range is also an issue. Helicopters would need to launch from a distance that keeps their mothership out of enemy weapons range. The combination of travel distance and the requirement to hover would necessitate pauses in rescue operations to refuel.
This, along with a high number of required trips because of low passenger capacity, would prolong rescue operations. In addition, when on scene, the vulnerability of a hovering MH-60 to enemy missiles increases. Squadrons have already demonstrated this gap in open-ocean rescue capability through events such as the Tarpon Springs combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) exercise.3 China’s combat power has increased relative to that of the United States, and U.S. naval CSAR assets and tactics have fallen behind. The Navy needs a different rescue vehicle and crew skills to conduct CSAR in a scenario in which hundreds might need rescue.
The LCAC Solution
Because future surface combat rescue is likely to involve long-distance blue-water heavy sealift on or over hostile waterspace, the Navy needs a craft with speed, high-lift capability, and range. During World War II, the Navy used the PBY Catalina flying boat and the PT patrol boat.4 Today, the landing craft, air cushion (LCAC), could be the best asset for the job. With a 200-mile range, a top speed of more than 40 knots, and a lift capacity of up to 75 tons, the LCAC can carry more than 100 combat-loaded Marines over the horizon to shore.5 Furthermore, it can come dead in the water at sea and drop its stern and bow ramps to launch and recover small craft. This would be ideal for an abandon-ship rescue in which survivors would likely be spread out over a large area. With the craft ramps down, rescuers could deploy small boats, recover survivors, and transfer them to the LCAC.
The craft’s high lift capacity, one of its greatest advantages over other potential maritime rescue vehicles, would enable it to carry advanced Navy or Air Force combat surgical units to and from the scene, providing care en route. In addition, an LCAC could transport Navy damage-control specialists to aid in the rescue effort.
While LCAC CSAR operations would still need to include sanitizing measures and rescue escort aircraft, the vehicle itself could counter enemy threats with chaff or other countermeasures, much as PT boats used smoke screens during World War II.6
Air Force Pararescue
Navy rescue swimmers and SAR medical technicians (SMTs) are trained for rescue at sea. Still, joint operations with Air Force pararescuemen, or PJs, who are trained for rescue and recovery in any environment and on any type of aircraft, would be beneficial. The deck of a moving LCAC could mimic that of the aircraft on which PJs work, and a group of two LCACs mirrors the PJs’ typical dual-helicopter rescue model.
The aftermath of a lost warship would likely present unforeseen challenges, including debris fields, fires, and the need to breach an overturned hull. Rescue teams should bring the widest array of rescue skills possible. There are not currently naval personnel with a set of competencies broad enough to take on this task. In addition, because of the long transit time to and from most at-sea casualty areas, it would be nearly impossible for any naval rescue unit to deliver survivors to higher care within the “golden hour” of emergency medicine.
All PJs are EMT paramedics and trained to handle this challenge. By contrast, while Navy SAR medical technicians are aircrew-trained paramedics, the Navy cannot rely on them exclusively for open-ocean mass casualties.7 They operate in smaller numbers than PJs, and there are no dedicated SMT units. An Air Force PJ rescue squadron can scale for missions with high numbers of survivors. Because of this, Air Force rescue squadrons would be more capable of fielding enough personnel to respond to a sinking warship. SMTs do not possess the breadth of technical skills that PJs do. Thus, while naval SAR personnel would contribute to an LCAC rescue mission, until their training is broadened, the most effective rescue units for this scenario would include PJs.
Mitigating Risks
A typical LCAC crew includes an engineer, which partially mitigates the risk of mechanical breakdown. Operating in groups of two also would allow one LCAC to tow the other to safety.
Because LCACs cannot operate in high sea states, helicopters are better suited for rescues in heavy seas. That said, in calm enough waters, using LCACs could carry greater benefits.
Finally, the threat of enemy action against the amphibious ship carrying the LCACs is real, but an LCAC’s long range allows it to be deployed far from the enemy. Even if this does not keep the amphibious ship beyond enemy missile range, it would give it more time to react to an attack. In addition, LCACs also can access 70 percent of the world’s coastlines amphibiously, allowing a craft to return to land if it is within range and its amphibious ship is disabled.8
What makes joint LCAC-PJ operations feasible is that most of the assets and procedures required already exist. The novelty lies in combining preexisting pieces. Of course, the concept would depend on the military’s ability to develop procedures and identify threats specific to this structure. Tactics, techniques, and procedures already exist that could be applied to the LCAC rescue concept. Some tactics for helicopter incursion to and from enemy airspace, for example, could be useful.
The Marine Corps intends to replace LCACs with new craft under the Ship-to-Shore Connector program.9 The Navy could transition some LCACs for experimentation with rescue operations as this occurs. Alternatively, Air Force rescue squadrons could acquire them. Expeditionary fast transport ships, CH-47 helicopters, or even wing-in-ground craft also could be appropriate for such operations.
While many questions still need to be answered about the LCAC rescue concept, the Navy cannot afford a SAR capability gap in a western Pacific conflict. To preserve lives, today’s force must create a CSAR plan for surface combatants before missiles start flying. The combination of LCACs and Air Force pararescue squadrons provides a clear and achievable course of action to do this.
1. LT Ben Foster, USN, “Combat Rescue Needs a Renaissance,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144, no. 4 (April 2018).
2. George Hall, “The Perfect Rescue,” Coast Guard Aviation Association, 7 November 2023.
3. Jason Quinn, interview with Todd Coulard, Cory Hedges, and Ryan Honnoll, The Real ResQ Podcast, podcast audio, 7 November 2022.
4. CAPT George Galdorisi and LCDR Thomas Phillips, USN (Ret.), Leave No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 50; and LT Ben Foster, USN, “MH-60S Can Be Today’s PT Boat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 143, no. 9 (September 2017).
5. U.S. Navy, “Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC),” America’s Navy, 1 November 2023.
6. Foster, “MH-60S Can Be Today’s PT Boat.”
7. U.S Navy, “HM-ATF Corpsman: Hospital Corpsman Advanced Technical Field,” America’s Navy, 15 November 2023, etoolbox.cnrc.navy.mil/assets/rads/011-0516.pdf.
8. U.S. Navy, “Landing Craft, Air Cushion.”
9. U.S. Marine Corps, “Surface Connectors” Marines.mil, 1 November 2023.