The scandal known by the name of its infamous protagonist—“Fat Leonard”—continues to exact a toll on the Navy. Morally bankrupt officials not only destroyed a generation of leaders and Navy credibility, they also drove the government to restrict a wider system of flexible authorities that formerly had allowed responsive logistics in the western Pacific. Two critical errors resulted. First, the Department of Defense tried to solve a character problem through process and restrictive centralization, undermining command-level autonomy. Second, while the Navy correctly identified the moral failure, it never recognized what internal logistical failures were hidden by relying on a single vendor to arrange support in foreign ports.
The Navy’s Indo-Pacific logistic capability today “is not where we want it to be,” according to Rear Admiral Mark Melson, the recently retired Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific (ComLogWestPac).1 To get it there will require rediscovering logistical autonomy and capturing the support responsiveness from two decades ago without the addiction to a single contractor—or the intoxicated museum parties.
Whatever useful and responsive services Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) provided, the moral cost of the Navy’s relationship with the company was outrageously high. But other, less villainous agents provided similar services, and those, too, have been harmed or lost in the fallout. As the pain from the moral injury has dulled, the loss of time, flexibility, local knowledge, and relationships that facilitate on-demand services are the losses the fleet feels most. Navy readiness still suffers for it.
Time is Money—and Mission
The realignment of government rules that followed GDMA’s collapse has harmfully expanded contracting and support timelines. In 2009, for example, one U.S. frigate visiting Manila was able to obtain a straightforward but vital weld repair in about 24 hours because of relationships with local commercial port facilities and contractors. More recently, a commanding officer told the authors their ship experienced a casualty to the low-pressure air system days before a scheduled visit to Manila. Rather than seek repairs in that robust commercial port, the ship sailed 2,700 miles to Yokosuka, Japan; the support enterprise was unable to contract local repair technicians, shepherd parts through customs, or coordinate contracts to effect repairs in a timely manner.
The ship’s supply officer and husbanding service provider (HSP) should have been allowed to accomplish this simple work with local vendors, but Title 10 geographic restrictions for vessel maintenance did not permit it. ComLogWestPac achieves remarkable feats in depot-level maintenance—such as last-minute full-scale ship generator replacements in Thailand, Singapore, and elsewhere or fuel tank repairs in Guam. Structurally, however, this still does not beat the responsiveness and flexibility of delegated on-site authority for non-depot-level repairs.
Naval Supply Systems Command implemented post-GDMA guidance intended to provide administrative cover for ships’ captains and supply officers when dealing with contractors. Unfortunately, rules designed to protect commands have left them too tangled in red tape to correct emergent issues quickly. Before the scandal, supply officers dealt directly with vendors around the world, authorizing payments and cutting checks. After, the Navy shifted these responsibilities to fleet logistics centers to improve accountability and oversight, but it did not hire sufficient contract specialists for the added work. The Navy now faces a significant bureaucratic backlog that handicaps fleet support. The contracting mechanism’s lag and poor responsiveness are worsened by contract officers’ lack of familiarity with ships’ requirements, areas that would be better handled by those who know them intimately and accurately: the ship’s captain and supply officer.
Shipyards, Shipyards Everywhere
In addition to expanding support contract timelines, post-GDMA policy changes throttled the scale of repairs possible in ports outside fleet concentration areas. The deficiencies that affect in-theater expeditionary ship repair are not material—the regional maritime industrial infrastructure and professionals already exist. The Navy merely suppressed its ability to engage with this world-class maritime enterprise—and not just for repair activities, but also with the indispensable facilitators: refueling/defueling barges, oily waste transfer and hazardous material disposal servicers, translators, and local customs agents. These engagements will remain difficult to contract without revised rules.
Expeditionary teams and fleets cannot interface with local support networks without a robust regionwide network of logistics teams similar to those some local agents fielded until 2013. Such a network cannot be created overnight, nor can it function without having a variety of indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts in place ahead of time for logistics and emergent repair support.
The Navy perilously relied on GDMA as a sole-source proxy to ease the burden of solicitation. But GDMA’s collapse and the subsequent rules realignment undermined the Supply Corps’ already-lean regional relationships.
When a warship recently encountered seawater service pump motor controller issues while deployed to the western Pacific, a fully capable local vendor bid and scoped the repairs. But the material cost exceeded the ship’s credit card threshold. Contracting through the regional fleet logistics center created delays for contract approval estimated at 17 weeks. Negotiations for bids for parts from the original manufacturer ran an additional 22 weeks. Local U.S. assets lacked appropriate materials and personnel, causing further delays. Despite the captain’s willingness to hire local electricians with technical oversight by his crew, the various off-ship reviews delayed what should have been a week-long repair by nearly six months. The captain, supply officer, and local community demonstrated the ability to solve the problem. However, limitations imposed by centralized authority undermined the ship’s readiness.
Military-to-military relationships are necessary but insufficient for building a resilient regional force. Familiarity with Navy material and combat support requirements cannot be learned overnight, especially when contracting timelines obstruct work being performed locally. Without the bygone fleet of U.S. floating docks and craftsmen, the Navy must rely on local professionals and their skills, infrastructure, trust, and—in some wartime cases—charity. The flexibility to engage closely with the regional maritime community is about not only immediate material readiness, but also developing ahead of time the network required to deter and prepare for conflict and sustain combat operations. It also can encourage a view of the U.S. Navy as a more worthy and respectful friend than China or its agents.
Flexibility, Not Crime
Regarding the Navy’s logistics challenges in the Pacific, Admiral Samuel Paparo has urged, “We’ve got to think less in terms of maximum efficiency, and more in terms of maximum effectiveness.”2 Even in this criticism, however, the admiral is generous: Since the post-scandal realignment, the regional support structure has maximized neither efficiency nor effectiveness. Processes to engage outside vendors are cumbersome; organic capabilities such as oilers and barges are in poor repair and insufficient in number; and a region’s worth of war-critical personal and commercial relationships rot.
But there are signs that positive change driven by new vision is having effect, and more can be done to ensure an effective system to support the Navy in peace and conflict. Access to repair facilities is improving across U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has disclosed plans for private Japanese shipyards to work on U.S. Navy ships, including repairs to the USS New Orleans (LPD-18) performed earlier this year.3
This follows receipt by Indian shipbuilder Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders of a master ship repair agreement (MSRA) mentioned by President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in August 2023. To date, the western Pacific hosts 46 MSRA holders in India, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and elsewhere.
Though program growth continues, the strict requirements for MSRA and agreement for boat repair (ABR) certification hinder private-sector competition. The certification ensures applicant finances are sound and facilities retain the requisite skills and management to accomplish depot-level work. However, numerous repair, support, and logistics tasks could be accomplished by smaller-but-capable vendors who do not qualify for MSRA/ABR. IDIQ repair and logistic support contracts must show a clear business case without MSRA- or ABR-level requirements that add cost and create litigation risk for shipyards of all sizes.
In the late 1990s, the value of naval work drove local agents and businesses to anticipate demand and invest accordingly, even without the Navy providing formal requirements. To enable rapid, forward repair of deployed ships today, the Navy should create incentives for the private sector to again anticipate and invest. With the right incentives, shipyard targeting in strategic locations, and guaranteed minimum numbers of maintenance windows with defined baselines, industry will respond by improving capability and capacity. For example, over the past 13 years, ComLogWestPac has contracted multiple emergent repairs valued between $1 and $5 million each for ships deployed to the western Pacific—worth more than $80 million in total. IDIQ contracts made support cost-effective for local private contractors and service providers.
Further, to facilitate repairs in non-U.S.-based shipyards, Naval Sea Systems Command and the commander of Naval Surface Force Pacific must take calculated risks. Technical specifications tied to objective quality evidence must not hinder reasonable repairs available locally. Most ship captains would accept some level of risk from nonstandard repairs while deployed—judgment already entrusted to them with underway departure from specification approval authority. Mid-deployment, something is often better than nothing.
Supply Corps officers must be allowed to supply—as either deputized agents of fleet logistics centers or fully certified contracting officers with greater purchase limits. Such permission does not assume risk so much as fulfill the purpose of having a Supply Corps. With the support of their port engineers and HSPs, Navy commanding officers should have the authority to pay for emergent requirements for the same reasons civilian ship masters have contracting authorities, credit cards, and petty cash.
Sunlight Is the Best Disinfectant
In the dark, a desire to find ways around institutional barriers to getting the day-to-day mission done eventually turned into ethical malaise and, worse, the pursuit of personal gain. Institutional reliance on GDMA fostered laziness and the avoidance of hard, necessary institutional reforms and weakened the Navy’s moral fiber. The Department of the Navy’s institutional understanding of those requirements atrophied as that knowledge was outsourced, letting GDMA understand for it.
The GDMA scandal left enduring marks on the soul and hands of U.S. Navy support services in the western Pacific and destroyed dynamic local relationships and a system of authorities that served Navy requirements. The loss is felt profoundly by a fleet preparing for conflict.
Ultimately, institutionally blessed empowerment, autonomy, and access not only serve the needs of the fleet, but also allow its agents—in and out of uniform—to pursue the mission with flexibility and confidence while remaining in the daylight that helps keep temptation at bay. Reforms to post-9/11 flows of “free money” to defense contractors were badly overdue, but the system overcorrected. If the Navy cannot empower and trust its sailors to serve ethically and autonomously in peacetime, from where should it expect the instinct and ability to operate alone and unafraid to come?
1. Dzirhan Mahadzir, “U.S. Navy Building Robust Logistics Framework in Indo-Pacific,” USNI News, 23 February 2024.
2. Sam LaGrone, “PACFLEET CO Paparo Talks Combat Logistics, Chinese Coercion,” USNI News, 14 February 2024.
3. Alex Wilson, “Navy Warships to Be Repaired at Japanese Shipyards, Ambassador Says,” Stripes.com, 19 January 2024.
