As Napoleon Bonaparte once said, “The whole art of war consists of a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive followed by a rapid and audacious attack.” It is imperative that in any conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, the United States launches a swift and strong counterattack to take pressure off its allies and regain the strategic advantage. Tactical aircraft, in particular naval strike aviation, would be central to such a counterattack.
Operational Overview
As recent events in Ukraine have shown, an integrated air-defense system (IADS), or even just unorganized air-defense weapons, can deny access to airspace across the battlefield. Although the military situation and geography in the Pacific are much different than in Ukraine, the lessons from there are essential to U.S. preparations for war. Before the war in Ukraine began, most observers anticipated Russia’s air force would quickly achieve air superiority. Ukraine claims that as of February 2024, however, it had shot down nearly 350 Russian fixed-wing aircraft and another 325 helicopters.1 Likewise, Russia’s IADS has prevented Ukraine from countering with its aircraft. Without air support, the Ukrainian Army has seen its advances stall.2
China has significant antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including modern air-defense weapons, such as the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system.3 As of 2018, China’s aerial A2/AD umbrella stretched as far as 540 nautical miles from its coastline.4 The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) air-defense-capable surface combatants and mobile A2/AD capabilities in the Chinese-occupied Spratly Islands extend the umbrella farther. Recently, the PLA has fielded upgraded missiles such as the HQ-16FE, which has an estimated range of nearly 100 nm. In addition to its SAM systems, China has a host of long-range, hypersonic missiles that could strike U.S. surface combatants as well as bases in Guam.
The ongoing crisis in the Red Sea also highlights the potential for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to be used as antiship weapons. UAVs are both cheap and available in vast numbers and have the potential to overwhelm U.S. and coalition defenses in any future conflict.
An effective counterstrike against Chinese forces would require naval strike aviation to counter the IADS. Enter the EA-18G Growler, a dedicated electronic warfare (EW) version of the F/A-18 Super Hornet. As the only joint tactical electronic attack aircraft, it would be at the forefront in any regional conflict.5 The suppression/destruction of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) mission, particularly the neutralization of SAM threats, is fundamental to modern warfare. The Growler’s jamming and other SEAD capabilities would be essential for U.S. and allied tactical aircraft to carry out their strike missions, and vital in any counterattack.
Addressing the Challenges
Although other aircraft—F-35 joint strike fighters, in particular—are capable of the SEAD mission to an extent, they are not purposely designed for it, and operational demands would most certainly hamper their ability to perform that mission well. The EA-18G remains the sole dedicated U.S. electronic attack aircraft.
Naval aviation already has a fleet-wide Growler inventory shortage, however. There are only 14 active and one reserve Growler squadrons, or 75 aircraft.6 Many of these squadrons are not even allocated to carrier air wings and are instead expeditionary squadrons that deploy independently. In a conflict with China, the strains of intense combat and inevitable losses would result in major declines in sortie rates. In addition, the production of both Super Hornets and Growlers is coming to an end, so the size of the fleet will not increase.
In addition to its advanced electronics suite, the Growler uses high-speed antiradiation (HARM) missiles to destroy enemy radar facilities. The AGM-88E, an important upgrade to the venerable HARM, is a potent weapon, yet its range would leave much to be desired in a conflict with China. Nor does the Growler have any weapon systems to counter the ship-based A2/AD threat. The shortfalls in the effective range and inventory of the Navy’s other air-launched missile systems exacerbate this issue. All hope is not lost, however. With this operational context and known deficiencies in mind, the Navy has provided funding to Northrop Grumman to develop a long-range variant of the AGM-88E—the AARGM-ER.7
Another issue to consider is that the Growler is prone to the same issue befalling all F/A-18E/F airframes—a lack of range. According to publicly available figures, the Growler has a combat range of approximately 850 nm.8 In a western Pacific war, China’s advanced A2/AD umbrella would require a carrier to assume tremendous risk to launch the Growler close to the combat zone. The Navy also has a tanker problem, with the only organic, carrier-borne tanking capability coming from other F/A-18E/Fs using the buddy refueling system.9 This takes a Super Hornet away from a combat mission and limits the number of aircraft available to sustain operations. In a conflict with China, naval aviation cannot rely on large Air Force tankers. Meanwhile, a manned Growler, operating at its maximum range, would struggle to adequately suppress the enemy weapon systems, especially with combat losses and pilot fatigue.
The need for UAVs is more apparent now than ever. The Navy is addressing its tanking deficit with the MQ-25 Stingray, which is not expected to reach initial operating capability until at least 2026.10 The concurrent adoption of a man-unmanned team (MUM-T) approach in tactical airborne electronic warfare is crucial.11 Using UAVs as jammers or as alternative weapon delivery systems would help make up for many of the deficiencies in the fleet. With the EA-18G slated to remain in service until the 2040s, implementing MUM-T is a necessity to ensure the Growler remains effective for years to come.12
Minimizing the Deficiencies
To alleviate some of naval aviation’s current shortcomings, the Navy must continue to develop and increase the number of available weapons and aircraft for the electronic attack mission. The Navy should do the following to enhance its capabilities in the airborne electronic warfare realm:
• Fund and support the development of UAVs for both tanking and MUM-T combat missions.
• Fund and develop new air-to-surface missile systems for SEAD, antiship, and other attack missions.
• Fund and support the continued production of both EA-18 and F/A-18E/F airframes for the foreseeable future.
• Expand the size of the EA-18 fleet and ensure both joint force and theater commitments are met.
• Evaluate use and integration into U.S. Navy airframes of allied missile systems, such as the Franco-British Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missile, the British Air-Launched Anti-Radiation Missile (ALARM) and Select Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR 3) air-launched cruise missile; the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD 350 air-launched cruise missile; and the Taiwanese TC-2A antiradiation missile.13
As the United States and its armed services prepare for potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the Sea Services must remain vigilant. In any fight, the continued development and support of naval aviation’s electronic-attack capabilities will be essential to victory.
1. Vitaly Shevchenko and Alex Murray, “Ukraine Reports Jump in Number of Downed Russian Planes,” BBC, 28 February 2024.
2. Hunter Stoll, John Hoehn, and William Courtney, “Air Defense Shapes Warfighting in Ukraine,” RAND, 22 February 2024.
3. Yang Yunxiang, “China’s Air-Defense Weapons Pose ‘Wicked’ Problem for the U.S. Air Force,” Business Insider, 13 November 2023.
4. “China’s Anti-Access Area Denial–Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 24 August 2018.
5. Harrison Kass and Peter Suciu, “EA-18G Growler: The U.S. Navy’s Most Important Plane,” The National Interest, 10 December 2023.
6. CDR Graham Scarbro, USN, “Strike Warfare’s Inventory Problem,” U.S. Naval institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023).
7. “The Need for SEAD/DEAD,” Northrop Grumman.
8. “EA-18G Growler,” Naval Air Systems Command.
9. Stephen Losey, “’Brittle’ Air Refueling Capability Endangers U.S. during Major War,” Defense News, 15 November 2021.
10. Omar Memon, “The Boeing MQ-25 Stingray: A Refueling Drone to Revolutionize the Tanker Market,” Simple Flying, 30 July 2023.
11. Luca Peruzzi, “Manned-Unmanned Teaming with Present and Future Combat Aircraft,” EDR Magazine 64 (July/August 2022).
12. In 2020, Navy Warfare Development Center conducted a successful demonstration of two autonomously controlled EA-18G Growlers. Two Growlers acted as UAVs under the control of a manned Growler to prove the Navy aircrew’s ability to remotely control fighter and attack platforms from the cockpit.
13. These systems do not provide an advantage over any U.S. system. However, in a war with China, munition shortages and the need to closely interface with allies will necessitate the ability to use allied weaponry.