Red Sea Attacks Dominated the Indian Ocean Region in 2023

Surprises happen. Some are agreeable, some are not,” wrote strategist Colin Gray.¹ In last May’s Indian Ocean review, there were few surprises at sea. In 2023, there were at least two. One was the outsized effects of the Houthis’ attacks on maritime trade. The second was the rather unexpected renewal of piracy across a large swath of the western Indian Ocean. Maritime trade tends to adapt to disruptions with a Plan B or even Plan C, but usually at a higher cost both for goods and in terms of restoring Plan A. The Black Sea, Ukraine, Houthis, Somali piracy, Panama Canal issues, and even the Baltimore Key Bridge collapse all are disruptive; all demand new plans.

The Ansar Allah movement (that is, Houthi rebels) has voiced political objectives related to the war in Gaza and is targeting ships of those they see as adversaries. Strategically, this has had considerable effect on global trade. At the same time, among nations that have deployed navies and other instruments of power, it has been difficult to find strategic coherence and common policy outcomes aided by well-coordinated operations. This results in part from difficulties associated with the United States trying to obtain effective partnerships, but there also are downstream operational and tactical complications (such as the near-loss to friendly fire of an MQ-9 Predator drone on 27 February 2024).² Thus, only the U.S. and Royal Navies are engaged in power projection missions, while others are only assisting with constabulary functions. 

The Houthis began their campaign quite dramatically on 19 November 2023, landing a helicopter on the British-owned roll-on/roll-off vessel Galaxy Leader, bound from Korfez, Turkey, to Pipavav, India.³ The attackers filmed the assault to increase its effect and to announce new, more aggressive tactics. In the months that followed, the rebel group began a wider campaign in the Red Sea with drones and antiship ballistic missiles. Other ordnance and delivery methods also have been observed. None of this should have been a surprise; versions of all these methods have seen use on land for several years, by not only the Houthis but also other states and state-supported groups. 

Great and even middle powers’ maritime strategies thus have needed rethinking. Regarding the Red Sea, U.S. Naval War College Professor Kevin McCranie thoughtfully interprets Julian Corbett and Alfred Thayer Mahan. He quotes Corbett: “The world has become so deeply impressed with the efficacy of sea power that we are inclined to forget how impotent it is of itself to decide a war against a great Continental state, how tedious is the pressure of naval action unless it be nicely coordinated with military and diplomatic pressure.”⁴ The presence of powerful navies does not necessarily equate to deterrence, however necessary deployments are. And multidimensional strategies are ever more important. As the 2022 review noted, “At no other period in history has sea power been more affected by the interconnections between fort and fleet.”⁵ 

China, of course, has built a big, strong, and resilient fort, and it possesses a capable fleet. In the Red Sea, the Houthis offer a poor man’s version of the Chinese antiaccess/area-denial “fort.” If a comparatively small group such as the Houthis were to obtain greater land and sea domain awareness, its targeting could become progressively more effective. Actors with that capability would likely be good at open-source intelligence as well as cyber tactics. And increasing sophistication of their weapons, possibly including underwater ones, would allow them to do more serious damage to merchant ships or even warships. They may be deliberately avoiding the former. U.S. Central Command has warned that the latter is a distinct possibility.⁶ 

The other surprise was the resurgence of Somali piracy in the western Indian Ocean region after a multiyear lull. A traditional security threat at sea, piracy waxes and wanes. Whatever the causes of the latest resurgence, it needs to be countered.⁷ There could be political consonance between Houthi and Somali political factions who have the backing of larger countries. In mid-December, the Indian Navy, among others, responded to the piracy threat and the Houthis’ declared support of Hamas “by re-orienting and significantly enhancing . . . maritime security operations.”⁸ The months since have been busy for that service, with extensive deployments and major successes rescuing hostages, including sailors from Bulgaria, Iran, and Pakistan. 

There may be some common operational-tactical considerations for navies operating in the region to consider. First, rebels and pirates should be expected to innovate and adapt, sometimes faster than navies. Second, depending on their motivations, objectives, and utility for external players, these groups can create complex links with and receive support from regional governments. The historical U.S. experience with the Barbary States and their pirates over decades might resonate. Houthis and pirates both engage in hostage-taking, just as the Barbary States did; politics and economics remain linked. Third, navies often pay a high price in effort, money, and wear and tear in constabulary or low-level combat environments, which could affect readiness for other prospective fights. The high expenditure rate of expensive munitions against cheap drones cannot be ignored. All this leads to a supposition that such campaigns may add to the West emerging “depleted from helping Ukraine . . . and that may suit China.”⁹ Hopefully, navies investing in such deployments continue to find means and measures to maintain operational readiness. 

In 2023, the Indian Navy accounted for more than three metric tons of the substantial narcotic hauls seized by multiple nations. Drugs are not the only concern occupying the military-political leaders of Indian Ocean nations—illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing continues to be troublesome. At the October 2023 Goa Maritime Conclave, Chief of the Defense Forces of Seychelles Brigadier Michael Rosette said poachers “have adapted” to countermeasures. And, regarding narcotics, “We know where it ends, mainly funding other  illegal organisations like terrorist organisations.”¹⁰

Finally, if unsurprisingly, China continues to be a big factor in the region. Elections in Maldives led to a very pro-China government, with consequences for the decades-old security relationship with India. New Delhi has reacted with relative equanimity; if not this regime, it suggests, future Maldives leaders may decide who makes for a better partner. China’s motivations and choices regarding activity versus inactivity in security matters reinforce concerns over its eventual aims. Its national partnership with Pakistan in all domains is deep, even if fraught with frequent distrust among individuals. Their 2023 bilateral Sea Guardian exercise was the biggest thus far and provoked more attention than usual.¹¹ 

The maritime domain remains critical to peace and prosperity, and partnerships remain the key to striving for both. Addressing concerns about drugs, fishing, pirates, rebels, and a China seeking to build its influence is a tall order both for the nations of the region and those who necessarily operate in the region.