Denying an adversary’s ability to freely conduct space operations is emerging as a crucial facet of naval warfighting. In the next several decades, the confluence of several technological and economic developments will enable satellite constellations in low earth orbit (LEO) to support persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The proliferation of commercial and military satellite constellations is accelerating as the per-kilogram cost-to-launch into LEO falls. These constellations can carry a broad array of sensors. Combined with developments in artificial intelligence data processing, potentially driven by quantum computing, sensor proliferation will have consequential effects on freedom of maneuver in maritime conflicts. In the coming era of persistent ISR, the nuclear-powered submarine will be the only platform retaining unhindered freedom of maneuver. Persistent space-based ISR presents challenges for all land warfare and naval surface warfare.
In 2020, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency imaged the entire Earth every 24 hours using commercial satellite networks from Planet Labs.1 In this ISR environment, ground and naval surface forces will have to fight for localized superiority. In doing so, they would have to degrade or destroy an adversary’s ISR systems. Simply blinding the adversary would not constitute ISR superiority. Simultaneously, allied local ISR networks would need to be created, potentially through pseudo-satellites such as high-altitude balloons or high-endurance uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).2 Successful operations that gain local ISR superiority would generate narrow windows of time for effective offensive operations.
Establishing maritime maneuver and maintaining the element of surprise would become almost impossible if both adversaries and allied forces were to achieve persistent surface ISR, especially for surface combatants. However, persistent spaced-based ISR would not make surface combatants obsolete. After all, only surface ships can effectively function across the full range of operational missions. As demonstrated in the recent Red Sea crisis, only surface combatants can ensure visible presence and the protection of commerce.3 However, adversary space-based ISR would need to be degraded to enhance surface freedom of maneuver.
In the dynamic fight between ISR satellite constellation replenishment and degradation, the submarine force provides an unpredictable offensive punch because of its unique stealth. Surface ships are historically far more vulnerable to detection. Even in the Cold War, the Soviets used various satellite types to search for U.S. surface ships.4 However, using nuclear power, submarines were able to covertly remain on station anywhere in the world’s oceans. This remains an unmatched capability. Persistent surface ISR will be a reality long before a persistent undersea ISR environment that can negate the stealth advantage of submarines, even when acknowledging the future challenges posed by uncrewed undersea and surface vehicles (UUVs/USVs) with sensors and data processing enabled by quantum computing.5
Submarines’ stealth also could be useful in attacking satellites. Satellite constellations in LEO are the most susceptible to antisatellite weapons, such as the direct-ascent interceptors the United States demonstrated during Operation Burnt Frost.6 However, direct-ascent interceptors are costly, and the overwhelming volume of targets in LEO would limit their effectiveness in a great power conflict. Countries are more likely to use high-cost direct-ascent interceptors to destroy less numerous and more capable and militarily useful satellite constellations in high orbit—such as those used for position, navigation, and timing—which are less susceptible to directed-energy weapons.
LEO constellations are vulnerable to directed-energy weapons such as lasers and high-powered microwave systems.7 Further, only directed-energy weapons systems will be able to engage a high volume of targets in LEO. Once directed-energy technologies are operationally reliable, nuclear-powered submarines with antisatellite (ASAT) directed-energy weapons will be uniquely poised to contribute to offensive space warfare. Submarines could degrade adversary ISR satellite constellations in LEO to support localized freedom of maneuver for the more observable elements of the joint force. Moreover, ASAT-weapons-equipped surface ships would be high-priority targets for adversaries.8 Nuclear-powered submarines are the only platforms with ASAT directed-energy weapons that could offer long-term survivability in conflict.
Countering an Adversary’s Space Defense
Rapid replenishment of LEO satellite constellations would allow military satellite operators to spend more fuel reserves for sustained space maneuver.9 Persistent ISR would enable adversaries to plan defensive space maneuvers that steer satellite orbit planes away from land-based directed-energy antisatellite weapons with range limited to line-of-sight. It is important to recall that offensive operations from any geographic region can affect the space domain. For example, an ASAT system in the North Atlantic or Persian Gulf affects operations in the Pacific.
Future advancements in miniaturization, power output, and targeting could allow submarines to fit ASAT directed-energy weapons systems in their masts. With ample power from the nuclear reactor, an ASAT directed-energy mast would permit submarines to engage satellite constellations in LEO while remaining submerged to periscope depth. This would be a significant threat to any adversary’s operational planning. When combined with the stealth advantage of submarines, such systems would complicate adversary defensive space operations planning.10
Consider the following notional operational concept to demonstrate the utility: Once conflict becomes a real possibility, satellite target lists are sent to submarines best positioned to engage specific orbit planes. Undersea warfare commanders take care to ensure this mission does not interfere with the other critical roles submarines will play at the commencement of hostilities, most notably antisubmarine and antisurface warfare operations.11 As hostilities commence, submarines around the world come to periscope depth and significantly degrade or destroy satellite constellations in conjunction with surface and land-based ASAT systems.
As the conflict drags on and both sides’ surface and land-based ASAT systems face heavy attrition from long-range fires and magazine depletion, submarines continue to aggressively prosecute war patrols to sweep the oceans of adversary surface combatants and submarines.12 While doing so, they come to periscope depth and engage LEO satellites whenever operationally feasible. This vignette illustrates the potential interplay between space warfare and the submarine force.
With stealth, speed, and power, submarines can be uniquely positioned to contribute to the fight for localized ISR superiority. The growth of satellite constellations in LEO will create a persistent ISR environment in which the only platforms with enduring stealth for the duration of a conflict are nuclear-powered submarines. This operational environment is conceivable not far into the future, and the submarine force must be ready to perform a full range of offensive capabilities to support the joint force.
1. Greg Myre, “A Spy Agency’s Challenge: How to Sort a Million Photos a Day,” National Public Radio, 12 March 2020.
2. LCDR Nick Johnson, USN, “If the Balloon Goes Up,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 6 (July 2023).
3. U.S. Naval Institute Staff, “USNI News Timeline: Conflict in the Red Sea,” USNI News, 18 March 2024.
4. “GAO Audits Soviet Spy Satellites,” CIA.gov.
5. “Finding Submarines Is Likely to Get Easier,” The Economist, 27 January 2022.
6. John Antonelli, “Dahlgren’s Joint Government/National Laboratory/Industry Team Makes History in Satellite Shootdown,” Naval Sea Systems Command NSWCDD Blog.
7. James Black, “Directed Energy: The Focus on Laser Weapons Intensifies,” RAND, 25 January 2024.
8. Edward A. Hanlon, “Design Strategies and Tactics to Defeat Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Capabilities,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (June 2018).
9. Audrey Decker, “Space Command Wants ‘Sustained’ Satellite Maneuverability by 2028,” Defense One, 6 July 2023.
10. Hanlon, “Design Strategies and Tactics to Defeat Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite Capabilities.”
11. LCDR Jeff Vandenengel, USN, “The Use—and Misuse—of Submarines in Great Power Combat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no. 11 (November 2021).
12. Vandenengel, “The Use—and Misuse—of Submarines in Great Power Combat.”
