The Falklands War: Intelligence Indicators for the Taiwan Strait

A review of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas to the Argentine) reveals similarities to the sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan. The Falkland Islands are a grouping of rocky archipelagic islands in the South Atlantic Ocean. Similar to China with Taiwan, Argentina has long claimed dominion over the Falklands’ terrain and its inhabitants. As with Taiwan, the people on the Falkland Islands have rejected the mainland’s claims; the Falklanders are proud to be citizens of the United Kingdom (UK). The United Kingdom’s control of the Falklands was firmly reinforced by its defeat of Argentina’s military invasion in 1982. 

Initial Similarities 

The Falklands War was the largest air-sea conflict since World War II. Both belligerents’ order of battle contained aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Argentinians and British both had aircraft and ships armed with Exocet missiles.¹ The Royal Navy had to maintain sea lines of communication that extended nearly 7,500 miles from home. However, the Royal Navy could be resupplied via stores flown into Ascension Island, a remote British island long used as a strategic supply hub in the Atlantic Ocean, approximately halfway between Great Britain and the Falklands. The long-distance supply lines, cut in half by a remote overseas territory, is eerily similar to what the United States would have to contend with during a Taiwan conflict. 

Though overhead satellite imagery was available in 1982, the United Kingdom claimed it was largely fighting without it. Later, Argentina accused the United States of providing the United Kingdom valuable intelligence about its critical assets, such as the General Belgrano.² However, this was refuted by the United States as the imagery was “of such poor quality that Washington actually showed them to the Argentinians to prove they were not helping the British.”³ Argentina had no access to spaceborne intelligence gathering equipment. Thus, both nations were largely fixing and tracking over-the-horizon targets with similar World War II–era capabilities such as radar, sonar, and visual vectoring. A major conflict between the United States and China also is likely to see a degraded space domain with 21st century tools such as GPS, overhead intelligence collections, and satellite communications largely unavailable. 

The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands did not happen in a vacuum. It was the culmination of nearly 20 years of failed diplomatic initiatives, more than 150 years of disagreement, and represented the final act of the weakening military junta in political control of Argentina. Any military action over, on, or adjacent to Taiwan will merely be an evolution of diplomatic, political, and historical events. 

Here are six intelligence indicators from the 1982 war that can be used to assess China’s intentions toward Taiwan.

Six Indicators

A domestic crisis. Gaining sovereignty over the Falklands was a national imperative for most Argentines. To unite the country and distract from worsening economic woes, the junta sought the ultimate distraction: a war that would rectify a long-standing historical grievance. In addition, Argentinians were still recovering from a brutal civil conflict known as the Dirty War. The junta believed that repossessing the Falklands would “cleanse” the country and grant long-term legitimacy to the regime.⁴

Listen to the press. A year prior to the invasion, a prominent Buenos Aires newspaper wrote: “The only thing that can save this government is a war.”⁵ That same newspaper, La Prensa, laid bare Argentina’s intentions: “If the Argentine attempt to resolve negotiations with London fails, Buenos Aires will take over the islands by force.”⁶ 

A forthcoming weapons capability. The junta’s invasion, originally scheduled to occur between July and October 1982, was tied to Argentina’s ability to field additional French Super Étendard strike fighters. Equipped with sea-skimming Exocet missiles, the jets were expected to arrive around July 1982 and would have pushed Argentina closer to military parity with the United Kingdom.

A final diplomatic push or a slight warming of relations in an otherwise declining trend. Amiable relations between United Kingdom and Argentinian negotiators were noted as late as their February 1982 bilateral talks regarding sovereignty.⁷ This positivity was misdirection to the British. Argentina wanted diplomatic relations to backslide prior to their planned year-end invasion. Some Argentinian officials were upset about the cordial public attitude between negotiators in early 1982.⁸ However, an analysis of the two decades leading up to the invasion reveals declining Argentine patience over a lack of solutions to the Falklands dispute. In January 1982, Argentina’s foreign minister Nicanor Costa Mendez communicated “an absolute condition” to the United Kingdom regarding Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands and stressed that “there could be no further delays.”⁹ Further, in 1982, Argentina began requesting monthly meetings with the United Kingdom Foreign Office to discuss the islands’ sovereignty and set a deadline for one year.¹⁰ Similarly, the Argentine press parroted their government’s timetable and announced 1982 as the year Argentina would finally regain dominion over the Falklands. This deadline would roughly coincide with 3 January 1983, the 150th anniversary of the British formally taking possession of the Falklands. 

An unrelated regional crisis. The Falklands War started on another disputed South Atlantic Island called South Georgia. On 19 March 1982, Argentine scrap metal workers hoisted Argentina’s flag on sovereign British territory. The flag hoist, coincidentally witnessed by British scientists, led to HMS Endurance being sent to remove the workers and deter further antagonizing actions by the Argentinians. Anticipating a broader British response, the junta commenced its invasion plans months before they were originally set to take place. The Falkland Islands were captured by the Argentinians on 2 April 1982.

Diversion of critical military assets from a previously announced engagement. During the incident on South Georgia, the Argentine navy was conducting a large, bilateral exercise with the Uruguayan navy.¹¹ However, the dispatch of HMS Endurance prompted the Argentine Navy to divert missile corvettes from the Uruguayan exercises. The Argentine ship diversion also corresponded with significant activity ashore: sailors’ leave was canceled, and heavy equipment was shifted to the major air and sea bases.  

These events all took place or were set to take place within a year’s timeframe of 2 April 1982. From the tactical- to strategic-level, Argentine actions were consistent with the leaders’ rhetoric. The United Kingdom’s inability to accurately deduce Argentine intentions led to an avoidable war. Had the United Kingdom quietly sent a large deterrent force as it had in 1977 or trilaterally engaged Argentina with the United States, the junta could have been dissuaded from its invasion plans.¹² In 1977, an incident in the Falkland Islands’ territorial waters prompted the British government to send a nuclear submarine and two frigates as a deterrent force to the region.¹³ After the Falklands War started, the United Kingdom moved quickly to terminate arms agreements between Argentina and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies such as France and Germany. Such actions could have been taken earlier to slow the junta’s acquisition of Super Étendard strike fighters and Exocet missiles. The capabilities France provided gave the junta confidence in its ability to hold the Royal Navy at risk and move ahead with invasion planning. 

Western Pacific Indicators 

Considering all six indicators for the Falklands War, the most dangerous that might apply to the Taiwan Strait would be the appearance of an unrelated regional crisis. For example, a conflict involving China in the South China Sea could become a casus belli that spirals into the Taiwan Strait. A regional crisis involving countries such as India or Vietnam, would allow the Chinese to mobilize without having to immediately contend with the U.S. military. In addition, such a crisis could slow the United States and its allies’ decision-making process as they debate a possible war with China over a secondary issue. 

If the United States were to involve itself militarily in a regional crisis, it could instigate a still-hypothetical Taiwan war into reality. Such a conflict, whether manufactured by China or not, could expedite Chinese designs toward Taiwan. An ancillary conflict to the main event (Taiwan) would also be fertile ground for complex Chinese information operations. A blockade of Taiwan is an act of aggression that requires direct action to be effective; it is also the most expected opening act of a potential future conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Regardless of China’s domestic messaging toward its citizens, it will be difficult for China to overcome the international anger and reaction that would be sure to follow a blockade. Just as the dispute over South Georgia between the United Kingdom and Argentina ultimately led to the Falklands War, an ancillary conflict that allows the Chinese to expand its conflict up into the Taiwan Strait onto Taiwan itself enables a self-defense narrative. 

The six intelligence indicators learned retrospectively from the Falklands War can be applied to events today in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. To continue deterring Chinese actions against Taiwan, it is important to accurately assess their intentions and react accordingly.