Force Design Is Still Too Heavy
Gunnery Sergeant Davis’s proposal, while eloquent, would require a major allocation of effort and resources to create a capability useful only in the most ideal—and unlikely—circumstances.
It is also based on a flawed reading of history. The ultralight infantry formations and tactics he suggests—logistically independent small units living off the land and using hit-and-run attacks similar to guerrilla units—are simply unworkable, unless the fight is in the Ohio Valley.
Such extremely austere logistical support turns soldiers into subsistence-level hunter-gatherers who can operate in only the most benign terrain. Deserts, jungles, swamps, and mountains do not have sufficient life-sustaining food sources to support even a squad-sized formation for more than a few days. And what will be the local source of medical support, ammunition resupply, and replacement personnel?
Local insurgents can partially maintain themselves, for a limited time, by using cultural, linguistic, religious, social, and ethnic links to draw support from the host society. Very few U.S. service members could blend into the social landscape in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. Insurgents also can use terror and torture to intimidate a reluctant populace, seize whatever they need, and brutally eliminate opposition, methods no U.S. military force could or should ever employ.
Historically, ultralight and deep-penetration units have failed to live up to their hype. Small or large, units behind enemy lines tend to wither before doing any serious damage. Wingate’s Chindits and Merrill’s Marauders moved deep behind Japanese lines, lived light, and created some difficulties for the Japanese 18th and 53rd Divisions but achieved no strategic or operational effect, all at the cost of those same Allied units being combat ineffective for the rest of war.
The history of Marine Raider battalions in World War II shows mixed results. The raid on Makin Atoll was a fiasco. In the heroic defense of Edson’s Ridge, their most prominent victory, the Raiders were used as standard infantry. The Marines evaluated the concept and decided to disband all four Raider battalions on 8 January 1944. The defeat of the Communist insurgency in Malaya is an even more apt example of why an ultralight infantry strategy is unsustainable.
If anything, the future Marine Corps looks to be too light to engage in sustained combat against a well-equipped and competent opponent. What will the cost be to fight another Iwo Jima, Inchon, Hue, or Fallujah without tanks and robust artillery? Answer: blood.
—COL Charles D. McFetridge, USA (Ret.)
The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War
Kudos to Professor Martinson for his concise and compelling analysis of the Naval Command College Blue Team Center in Nanjing, China.
It appears the leaders of the People’s Liberation Army Navy have heeded the admonition of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu—“If you know your situation and that of the enemy, then you can fight a hundred battles without tasting defeat.” And it is abundantly clear the Chinese Navy is taking yet another deliberate step toward the ultimate goal of building a modern maritime force capable of countering any adversary in the western Pacific.
—CAPT Jeffery B. Goldman, USNR (Ret.)
Professional Notes
Kudos to First Lieutenant Ni for noting the need for additional medium-range air-defense (MRAD) assets for Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). Since the elimination of the HAWK missile system and the light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalions in the mid-1990s, the Marine Corps has not possessed this capability.
The service eliminated the LAAM battalions at a time when the Marine Corps could simply assume air superiority in any future scenario. Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Ni correctly points out, that assumption is no longer valid. Accordingly, the Marine Corps is now bolstering its short-range air-defense capabilities and, in the near term, will add a medium-range intercept capability (MRIC). A key question is whether the planned MRIC is being added with the right combination of equipment and command-and-control doctrine and in the right quantities.
While the author has correctly identified the problem and has clearly spent a great deal of time and thought developing a detailed solution, I do not think his is the correct one. Specific issues of concern:
1. He proposes to use dedicated air-defense amphibious combat vehicles (ACVs) assigned to maneuver elements. It appears these would maneuver with the ground combat element (GCE). Given the ranges of MRAD weapons, in most instances the weapon system should not be physically within the maneuver element. The best locations from which to search for and acquire targets are not likely to be the same as where the GCE is engaging the enemy on the ground. Trained air-defense personnel should closely coordinate with the GCE and then emplace launchers and sensors to best cover it.
2. I am no expert on the amphibious combat vehicle; it may be an excellent choice for conversion to an MRAD asset. But mounting missile launchers and an acquisition capability on top of one could make it top heavy and prone to rollovers, particularly when seeking high ground from which to scan the airspace. An MRAD capability supporting a maneuver force must be able to set up, fire, and displace quickly, but given its range and self-defense capability, it does not need to be in constant motion while providing overwatch to the GCE.
3. Where Lieutenant Ni is most off course is in his call for weapons that are “not part of an integrated air-defense system.” To the contrary, it is essential the system is fully integrated into the Marine Corps’ overall aviation command-and-control system. This will provide access to queueing information from a wide range of platforms, including TPS-80, Link 16, the Composite Tracking Network, and possibly F-35s and other airborne platforms. Such coordination will not only ensure the right system is designated to fire on the target in a timely manner, but also minimize the risk of fratricide.
The Marine Corps clearly needs to resurrect its MRAD capability and do so quickly, but that capability must be developed as a component of an integrated air-defense system with the ability to locate launchers and sensors for the best overall defense of the MAGTF, not within the assault echelons of the GCE.
— Col. Benson Stein, USMCR (Ret.)
The caption on p. 82 incorrectly identifies a vehicle as an amphibious combat vehicle (ACV) antitank (AT). It in fact appears to be a light armored vehicle (LAV) AT variant. You can tell by the distinct external muffler and exhaust on the forward right-hand side of the vehicle. In addition, the angle of the hull armor changes about midlevel, rather than higher up, as on the ACV.
—MSgt. Chris Dierkes, NYANG
Civilian Recruitment AND Retention Matters, Too
It should not be overlooked that the future education and understanding of sea power, maritime strategy, and naval history have always relied on civilians and their close relationship with military personnel.
Focus is often overwhelmingly on military personnel’s intellectual development and advancement, but this would be impossible without the civilian historians, doctoral researchers, professors, and supporting staff. A growing perfect storm is jeopardizing the attraction, development, and retention of civilian talent. Increasing barriers include the cost of study, access to primary documentary resources, and the military’s limited understanding of the issues civilians face.
Components of the educational force such as naval historians often rely on the goodwill of experienced and other academics when they face issues in their career paths and fields. Goodwill and hope can carry people only so far.
But civilians are essential to the debate on sea power. If they are not supported, who will educate lawmakers and military students? Who will perform essential research to answer the questions of today and tomorrow? It requires specific skills, effort, and sustained engagement that only academics can deliver. Failing to support them to the point of decline undermines the foundations behind the success of the naval service past, present, and future. Debate across the full range of defense topics fails when it becomes limited in scope, lacks original thought, or is relegated to a select club of individuals. That is the quickest path to irrelevancy, one the nation and its military can ill afford.
—James W. E. Smith, King’s College London
A Better Case for SLCM-N
Lieutenant Commander Cummings makes a strong argument for the diversification of the U.S. nuclear triad to include submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCM-Ns).
Deploying fast-attack submarines armed with such weapons would help make up for the reduction in submarine-launched ballistic missiles when the 14 Ohio-class boats are replaced by the 12 planned Columbia-class submarines. And it would give the President and his nuclear commanders more options when facing the risk of an escalating conflict with an adversary such as North Korea. The enemy would have to assume all the fast-attack submarines are armed with nuclear weapons, thus adding to deterrence in a volatile region.
But as Annie Jacobsen’s new book, Nuclear War: A Scenario (Dutton, 2024), makes clear, the only way to win a nuclear war is not to fight one.
—OSC(SW/AW) John M. Duffy, USN (Ret.)
Build Your Command Brand
Captain Booher makes a great case for commands to create a “brand” that reflects the story they want to represent.
But a brand alone is not enough. It requires a USP to be complete—a “unique selling proposition.” Examples abound: Burger King—Have it your way. McDonald’s—You deserve a break today and I’m lovin’ it. Coca Cola—It’s the real thing. Hertz—We’re number one. Avis—We try harder. FedEx—When it absolutely, positively has to be there overnight. Starbucks—Expect more than coffee. And my favorite: The Masters—A tradition like no other.
Each of the armed services has its own USP—Forged by the sea, for example, or The few, the proud.
When I was in charge of the Navy’s morale, welfare, and recreation as well as social and family services, to reflect the investment we were making in people’s lives we created our brand: Navy Life—Getting better every day. A banner with those words was hung whenever we opened a new gym, fitness center, bowling alley, or family service center or showed free movies. The Navy Exchange even printed it on their shopping bags.
—RADM James B. Hinkle, USN (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and Commander, Navy Personnel Command
Asked & Answered
I thoroughly enjoyed the responses to the March Asked and Answered question about which warfare area is the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard over- or underinvested in.
Every idea was excellent, but the one area not mentioned was people. Without people, all the high-speed, low-drag, bleeding-edge gear is useless. Invest more in the time and training for the men and women who actually have to operate the equipment. Without that, the war of 2026 is already lost.
—Vincent Fasone, Marine Corps veteran
Ways to Strengthen the U.S.-Indian Naval Partnership
There and Back and There Again: U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines
To be blunt, the United States is losing the naval race in the Pacific to China. The United States lacks the shipyards needed to make up the current deficit in warships. It is no longer the only big dog on the block. This has led to a requirement to build alliances and coalitions.
Some of the pitfalls of these have been illuminated by Messrs. Pattatathunaduvil and Harding in their respective well-written articles. Risk comes down to partners wanting the benefits of an alliance, deterrence, with none of the downside, having to fight if deterrence fails.
The United States would doubtless like to have its partners on a trip wire, so that in the event of a shooting war with China, those nations would immediately join the American side. But entangling alliances dragged Europe into a world war that began over a fairly minor incident in the Balkans. What nation would care to repeat that?
It should be remembered that in both world wars, the United States took years to join the fighting. This was largely because U.S. public opinion was not on board with the idea of fighting distant foreign wars—just as it does not seem to be now.
For this reason, no one should be surprised if some members of a “China Containment Coalition” were to react slowly, waiting to see which way the wind blows. It will not matter how many exercises have been conducted or how many agreements signed. If a war with China breaks out, every country in the Indo-Pacific will determine just where its self-interest lies. Keeping one’s allies onside after the shooting starts is where the true challenge of coalition building will lie.
—Guy Wroble
