Articles and essays over the past several years have repeatedly highlighted the obvious: The U.S. Navy’s mine warfare capability is small, aging, and ill-suited to operating in an environment without complete air and sea superiority. The likeliest U.S. adversaries—China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—will deploy mines to deny the Navy access to their coasts. Iran and Russia also may use sea mines to deny noncombatants key maritime areas and shipping choke points to achieve political goals. Both types of mine deployment threaten U.S. Navy access, and the advanced force of mine countermeasure vessels required to overcome these challenges will be threatened by attack from air and sea.
That the Navy is not ready to meet the defensive mine warfare challenge is no secret. Solutions to date—including the assumption that littoral combat ships (LCSs) can perform full-spectrum defensive mine warfare—are untested, inadequate, or both. Instead of hoping the adversary declines to use mines, the Navy should prioritize developing nascent unmanned systems. Such mine-clearance systems offer an opportunity to rebuild a much-needed mission capability, capitalize on advances in information technology at low cost, communicate the U.S. commitment to maintain open sea lanes, and deepen cooperation with allies and partners.
Current Countermine Capability
The poor state of Navy countermine capability is well-covered ground. The Navy has eight Avenger-class mine-countermeasures ships (MCMs), four stationed in Bahrain and four in Sasebo, Japan.1 How much longer these aging ships will be around is an unsettled question with significant implications for the United States’s ability to counter adversary mining operations.2 The only foreseeable replacement for Avenger-class MCM capability is LCSs with the MCM mission package; however, using the LCSs for mine warfare will be challenged by the need to employ these vessels in their many other roles. It is doubtful either platform—the dedicated MCM ships or LCS—would be able to operate in wartime during which access is not ensured and the Navy must compete for air and sea control.
Relying on a small number of slow, poorly defended, and easily targeted ships is a recipe for disappointment.3 Similarly, the capability provided by MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters is only relevant when the ships on which they embark can get close enough to the mined area. Unfortunately, degraded mine-warfare capability is not limited to the U.S. Navy. Among U.S. partner nations, the number of antimine platforms is decreasing as their navies also transition from older to newer systems.4
Mine warfare commonly includes both offensive mining (deploying mines) and mine countermeasures and clearance. These two capabilities are dissimilar, however, and require vastly different equipment and serve different purposes. Analysis of the four most likely future conflict scenarios indicates mine clearance is both more important and more relevant to the Navy’s mission than mine deployment:
• China. The most likely conflict the United States could face is countering an invasion of Taiwan. Deploying mines in the strait before hostilities begin is not politically tenable for the United States; mining the strait afterward would likely be very difficult except in small numbers and by submarines. Friendly mine deployment would be best done by Taiwan, within its territorial waters. However, mine clearance almost certainly would be required to restore access to the Taiwan Strait and neutralize China’s antiaccess minefields. “The employment of sea mines remains a core tenet of Chinese naval warfighting doctrine,” and such employment likely would include mines within the strait as well as at either end to deny entry.5 China also might use submarines to deploy mines farther afield, such as outside naval bases in Japan and elsewhere.6
• Iran. The Iranian Navy is small and not very effective, so there is little reason for the U.S. Navy to seed minefields in the Persian Gulf. Rather, the U.S. Navy’s concern would be countering the inevitable moored and drifting mines Iran will deploy to keep the United States farther from the coast. Iran or its proxy forces also might deploy mines that endanger shipping, requiring a strong mine-clearance capability to prevent a global economic impact.
• North Korea. As in the hypothetical conflict with Iran, there would be little need to use mines to keep the North Korean Navy in port or to attrite its numbers. Mine countermeasures, however, will be in demand to ensure safe operation in the vicinity of the coast.
• Russia. Russia has a capable navy, but it would take significant U.S. political will to deploy mines in the Baltic or Black Seas. Russia may use mines (as it has in the ongoing war against Ukraine), and U.S. or NATO mine countermeasures would be necessary to neutralize the threat. Even limited mine deployment would overwhelm countermine forces given the possibility of simultaneous threats in the Baltic and Black Seas.
The effects of inadequate mine countermeasure capability can be direct and indirect. Direct effects include damage to or incapacitation of U.S. ships. As the USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and Princeton (CG-59) learned during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, even cheap mines can cause expensive and mission-affecting damage.7 Russian mine deployment in the Black Sea during the ongoing war against Ukraine has threatened noncombatants and put pressure on the global community to accede to some of Russia’s demands.8
In a future scenario, the inexpensive mine that a carrier strikes could change the course of conflict. Indirectly, minefields slow platforms capable of navigating through them and deny access to others. Keeping a substantial portion of the Navy from an operationally important area would be valuable to an adversary and might well be the difference between victory and defeat. Even the cost of an expansive minefield, consisting of thousands of advanced mines, is justified if it denies access to the conflict area.
Focusing on defensive mine warfare capabilities is beneficial primarily to enable naval power projection, but it also has other advantages. Using mines, even those that are “smart” or can discriminate targets, is not popular and may be a sticking point for countries the United States seeks to include in a coalition. Given the demonstrated capacity of U.S. adversaries to engage in gray zone behavior that stops short of open hostility, there may never be a point at which the United States authorizes offensive mine warfare. Mine clearance, however, is purely defensive and has no negative political connotations. Developing such a capability would be useful as a foot in the door with allies and partners that initially may be reluctant to do more. Moreover, developing autonomous capabilities on platforms with no offensive capability is more palatable domestically and internationally than the same advances on platforms with offensive weapons.
Developing a dedicated platform, such as the Avenger-class MCM ship, is not necessary. A new class of minesweepers would incur significant procurement costs. The hundreds of sailors who would crew these vessels are also an expense. Finally, minesweepers would be easy and enticing targets if tasked to clear minefields in contested areas. A submarine could be capable, but at significant cost. What task is better suited to autonomous and uncrewed systems than one that is repetitive, data-driven, and inherently dangerous?
Multiple countries have developed unmanned mine clearance systems, including Canada, France, India, and the United Kingdom.9 The U.S. Navy has the Knifefish, designed to support the LCS MCM mission package.10 The Knifefish is capable but it is still relatively expensive per unit. Its capabilities could be better employed by complementing them with small, expendable unmanned underwater or surface vessels (UUVs/USVs). These could be deployed independently or en masse from warships or from shore. At a minimum, they need only to be able to communicate with each other (to characterize and report on the minefield). The ability to clear mines would, of course, be of great value as well. Though autonomy would make these craft significantly more capable in a communication-challenged environment, there should be an option to remotely operate the vessels (or confirm identification of a mine and its location prior to its destruction).
An Autonomous Countermine Capability
Once the Navy has established an inventory of capable, remotely operated or autonomous mine-clearance craft, it should deploy them to locations that would most benefit from their proximity. Roughly half of the Navy’s autonomous craft should be deployed to Okinawa or Sasebo, Japan, as half the Avenger-class MCM ships are now. Forces at those locations are well-positioned to respond to conflicts with China and North Korea, as well as any mines Russia deploys on its Pacific coast. A quarter of the Navy’s capacity should remain in Bahrain, where it can respond to mine deployment by Iran or its proxy forces.
The remaining quarter of the Navy’s MCM forces should be based in Europe, probably on the Black Sea coast, from Romania or Bulgaria, because of the lack of allied countermine capability there. Northern European nations already have the capacity to detect and clear sea mines and regularly exercise it.11 The U.S. Navy should continue to support allied mine countermeasures capability in the Baltic Sea. For as long as the Avenger-class MCM ships remain seaworthy, they should be freed to work with partner nations that would benefit from familiarity with mine clearance (such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Egypt). These nations’ ability to keep vital sea lanes open would allow the Navy to use its resources more efficiently.
The Navy should be open about its unmanned MCM capability. Mine clearance is an essential mission and enables local sea control. But mine clearance also is a global good—it benefits free and open commerce and protects people and property of all nations. Highlighting naval equipment that is defensive (or “supportive”) would signal U.S. commitment to its partners and allies in the region while avoiding unnecessary escalation that provokes or could be misunderstood by nonaligned countries. In great power competition, actions by one state to improve its own security may cause reactions among others that lead to a worse situation.12 The Navy must be strong enough to deter opportunistic threats, but choosing to place unmanned minesweepers in the spotlight will demonstrate strength while avoiding provocation.
Unmanned mine-clearance vehicles are ideal for deepening cooperation with other nations and advancing interoperability. As a capability that is neither offensive nor escalatory, mine countermeasures are broadly acceptable even for those nations wary of seeming too aggressive or militaristic. MCM technology may have sensitive attributes, but sharing it with partners presents far less concern than sharing weapon or communication systems technology. In addition, the tactics and techniques for employing remotely controlled or unmanned MCM vessels should be released to partner nations to enable joint exercises and operations. Because these are relatively small craft, sharing the operating procedures would be more palatable than sharing those of expensive high-end offensive assets.
The Navy should conduct demonstrative, well-publicized countermine exercises with any prospective partner navy. Like its freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, the Navy should conduct FONOPs with unmanned vehicles to shape international law and set a precedent for using unmanned vehicles in defense of sea lanes. More specifically, these vessels should be deliberately sailed through the Taiwan Strait, Persian Gulf, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. Given the growing presence of unmanned vehicles in allied and NATO militaries, the Navy must prepare for unmanned FONOPs by taking advantage of the support of friendly navies. Any hostility on the part of the likeliest U.S. adversaries, especially direct interference or seizure, should be made public. The Navy would benefit from having the first widespread, autonomous, defensive military capability.
Countermine Capability is a Force Multiplier
The Navy’s ability to detect and clear maritime mines has atrophied considerably over the past several decades and now is only vestigial. The vulnerability of traditional mine-clearance platforms makes them a poor model for future capabilities. The Navy should instead develop a robust unmanned capability, autonomous or remotely operated, for dedicated mine countermeasures.
Countermine operations are critical to the Navy’s combat operations, but unmanned MCM vessels also should be used to advance naval goals outside combat. As a defensive capability, mine countermeasures are ideal for coordinating with nontraditional partners or nations wary of fully aligning with the United States. Unarmed vessels with no offensive value also are well-suited to advance U.S. interests, including FONOPs and shaping maritime law regarding unmanned systems.
Rebuilding the Navy’s antimine capability will provide a force multiplier in combat and in competition, at a fraction of the cost of high-end weapon systems.
1. “Mine Countermeasures Ships—MCM,” U.S. Navy.
2. Jan Tegler, “Navy Mine Warfare Teeters between Present, Future,” National Defense, 17 January 2023.
3. Scott Savitz, “Rethink Mine Countermeasures,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 143, no. 7 (July 2017).
4. Jonathan Bentham, “Naval Mine Countermeasures, Clearing Up Misconceptions,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 7 February 2022.
5. Lyle J. Goldstein, “China Thinks the United States Can’t Handle Sea Mines,” The National Interest, 14 October 2021; and CAPT David D. Belt, USN (Ret.), “Damn! . . . The Torpedoes!” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022).
6. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Japan’s Folly Could Be China’s Gain in a War against America,” The National Interest, 17 July 2015.
7. Belt, “Damn! . . . The Torpedoes!”
8. ADM James A. Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), “Mine Warfare Could Be Key,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (December 2023).
9. “High Endurance Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (HEAUV),” Alpha Defense, 12 March 2024; and “Royal Navy to Receive World-Class Autonomous Minesweepers,” Royal Navy, 29 January 2021.
10. Program Executive Office Unmanned and Small Combatants, “U.S. Navy’s Knifefish UUV Program Achieves Milestone C,” Naval Sea Systems Command, 26 August 2019.
11. “Exercise Dynamic Move Brings NATO Mine Countermeasures Expertise Together,” NATO Allied Maritime Command, 7 February 2024.
12. Anders Wivel, “Security Dilemma,” in Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Morlino, eds., International Encyclopedia of Political Science (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011).
