In 1982, when I received my wings and was selected to fly the AV-8A Harrier, the aircraft had a reputation of being not just difficult, but dangerous to fly. On the other hand, it had just played a prominent role in the Falklands War, and its mission appealed to me. I was planning on staying in the Marine Corps for only one tour, so my calculus was to go for it.
The AV-8A had been in operation with the Marine Corps since 1971 and the Royal Air Force (RAF) since 1968, so most of the bugs had been worked out. Things still went wrong. I once had an oil plug come out in flight. I followed the NATOPs procedures to the T, flew to the nearest airfield 10 minutes away, and landed uneventfully—any disciplined pilot could do the same. The plane was back on the flight schedule the next day. The AV-8A demanded you do things by the book, but once I learned to fly it, I found the aircraft to be both reliable and capable.
In 1988, after serving as an instructor pilot and completing the weapons and tactics instructor course at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1), I was selected as an exchange officer with the RAF, flying GR-3s (AV-8A equivalent) and GR-5s and 7s (AV-8B equivalents). The RAF was even more disciplined and standardized than the Marine Corps. Its training was demanding. I experienced some maintenance and material failures, but each time I was able to recover the airplane by knowing my systems, my procedures, and both my personal and my aircraft’s operating envelope. I learned a ton flying division strike missions in poor weather with low ceilings and visibility.
When I returned to MAWTS-1 in 1991 as an instructor, we were seeing a spike in the AV-8B mishap rate. The RAF was flying the same jet, but it was not having the same experience.
The causes were mixed: parts shortfalls, lack of maintenance experience, mechanical issues, and squadron and pilot decision-making. The Harrier community attacked the problem and instituted more regimented training, wrote and adopted the first Marine Corps tactical standard operating procedure, and raised the cutting score for a new pilot to get assigned to the Harrier.
Nevertheless, the aircraft was not delivering the readiness or hours our pilots needed to be safe and proficient.
The Harrier Reviews
In an effort to reduce the mishap rate and build confidence in the aircraft, Marine Corps Commandant General Charles C. Krulak in 1997 established the Harrier Review Panel (HaRP), tasked with identifying issues that contributed to the Harriers’ low readiness and reliability. The panel identified shortfalls in the depth and experience of maintenance manpower, as well as in parts and material, that would require funding to address.
What followed was a focused and funded three-year effort by the Marine Corps to improve Harrier readiness, on top of the training and standardization efforts already in force. That effort produced a ready and reliable Harrier force that delivered sustained readiness and warfighting capability for more than 15 years in the war on terror
In 2014, retired Vice Admiral Wally Massenburg led an additional independent readiness review, which identified a need for changes to the Harrier sustainment plan to ensure flight line and inventory readiness. Most of the fixes were inexpensive, such as bolstering parts availability, setting a “no-lower-than” amount of funding for program-related logistics and engineering, and staffing the maintenance departments with the right number of maintainers with the right skills.
Most important, the community adopted the review’s recommendations in their entirety—lock, stock, and barrel.
It worked. The Harrier team has not had a fatality since 2009, the mishap rate has plunged, and pilots love flying the aircraft. The community is transitioning to the F-35B and C, but it will be ready for anything until the last Harrier is retired.
The Osprey Today
In Iraq in 2004, the CH-46 was the primary troop carrier. It required refueling stations throughout the battlespace, and those refueling stations were resupplied by fuel convoys that were routinely attacked. When the MV-22 Osprey arrived in 2007, it changed everything. Its longer range meant fewer refueling stations, and its higher ceiling kept Marines out of most threat envelopes and got them to their objective almost three times faster than a CH-46.
Demand for the MV-22’s capabilities was such that as soon as units stood up, they deployed. The high operational tempo and demand were unmatched, but it was stressing for a new aircraft. Like the Harrier and many military aircraft, the MV-22 had growing pains. We experienced lower readiness than we required.
Echoing the 2014 Harrier review, I ordered an independent readiness review of the MV-22 in 2016. I asked Lieutenant General Keith Stalder, an F/A-18 and F-4 pilot who had not flown the MV-22, to lead it. His team did an exceptional job, laying out a holistic, actionable plan to improve MV-22 readiness.
The review noted the need to rightsize maintenance departments with Marine maintainers with the right qualifications. It recommended greater parts availability and reliability and a plan to give the aircraft a common configuration. Most of all, it outlined the funding requirements for those changes.
In light of the V-22 Osprey’s recent challenges, a new review is underway. I will be interested to see what it produces. I hope it looks at which recommendations from 2016 were implemented, which were not, the results of both, and how to build on that. Only in that way can the MV-22 achieve sustained readiness and capability.
The Harrier, for all its problems along the way, turned into a reliable and safe aircraft that provided a unique capability. Similarly, the MV-22 Osprey is an incredibly capable aircraft of irreplaceable capability.
It is my hope the Osprey will follow in the footsteps of the Harrier. If history is any guide, the reviews of the Osprey, both past and current, will provide the insights needed to make it a reliable and capable aircraft for the remaining decades of its service life.
