Don’t Ignore the Value of Basic Carrier Training

Landing on an aircraft carrier is and always will be hazardous. Innovation has decreased the mishap rate over time but has not eliminated the underlying risks. The most recent innovation is Precision Landing Mode (PLM) in fly-by-wire aircraft. PLM dramatically simplifies the problem of precise glideslope control for a pilot. Indeed, according to Commander, Naval Air Forces, since PLM’s introduction, the initial carrier qualification (CQ) failure rate at the F/A-18 fleet replacement squadrons (FRSs) has plummeted from 18 percent to 4.5 percent.

The success of PLM has led to the desire to exploit its efficiency for cost savings. Carrier training for student pilots happens in two stages before they reach the fleet. The first stage is at the training command before they receive their wings. The second stage is in the FRS. In the PLM era, some have questioned the necessity of the first stage. Currently, training command CQ is accomplished in the T-45C Goshawk, an aging aircraft due for a replacement. However, a carrier-capable replacement would be very expensive.

In light of this, for the past two years, in an experiment to determine if such training could be permanently eliminated, the Chief of Naval Aviation Training has selected specific student pilots to forgo T-45C CQ. While the experiment’s results are still pending and the quantifiable benefits unknown, there is a danger the Navy will minimize or dismiss the unquantifiable benefits of training command CQ under pressure to save time and money.

Building Confidence, Suppressing Arrogance

Pilot confidence is essential, while arrogance is deadly. To develop confidence, student pilots need relevant skill tests. Unfortunately, most of the advanced-jet syllabus does not provide such tests. The bombing and air-to-air combat portions do not and, for the most part, cannot reflect current fleet procedures. On the other hand, T-45C CQ uses the same approach pattern as the fleet. The ultimate test also is the same: predictable and safe carrier landings. Competence at this difficult evolution is a huge source of confidence.

T-45C CQ can also combat arrogance. Before PLM was adopted, FRS CQ was known as the “great equalizer.” CQ, both at the training command and the FRS, is a short evolution—mistakes cannot be repeated and learning must occur quickly. In the fast-paced and stressful environment of carrier operations, students who cannot learn under pressure are quickly humbled. This is no longer true with PLM, as it covers up, but does not eliminate, most pilot errors. But it is still true in training command CQ, without which some students may not learn they struggle under pressure until later in their careers.

Building Trust with LSOs

The carrier’s landing signal officer (LSO) controls all carrier landings. When an LSO makes a call to a pilot, the pilot must respond promptly and accurately. Therefore, it is vitally important pilots trust LSOs. This trust starts in the training command CQ phase.

The phase starts with three weeks of preparation flights ashore. During that time, students have an individual LSO assigned to them. In no other training block do students receive such sustained, individualized attention from an instructor. This lays the foundation of trust.

Once on board the carrier, the trust is deepened. Given the stress they are under, many students are unaware of their own mistakes. Thus, on-the-spot debriefs from the LSO are often critical to getting students to pass. This is when students learn the LSO is not only an evaluator, but also a member of their team, invested in their success. Without training command CQ, this vital lesson would not be learned at a formative stage in pilots’ careers.

Getting Over the Initial Shock

If you ask naval aviators to recall their first CQ, most have only one memory—staring at the carrier below and thinking, “I’m supposed to land on that?” Training command CQ exposes students to this stressful environment in a low-cost aircraft with as many safeguards as possible. Low cost is essential because simple mistakes can have expensive consequences. For example, tapping the brakes on arrestment will blow the tires. That damage to a T-45C may be of little consequence, but what about to an F-35?

Safeguards are essential because they prevent aircraft damage and reduce student stress, which aids learning. For example, in T-45C CQ, lead aircraft take student pilots to the ship and escort them back if they get low on fuel. These leads keep students safe and take on as many administrative tasks for students as possible. This allows students to focus solely on learning to fly and operate from the carrier.

However, safeguards also add inefficiency. The training command can handle inefficiencies, such as having lead safe aircraft, but the FRSs cannot because of resource limitations. They do not have the jets or instructors required. Without training command CQ, students would go to the carrier for the first time with fewer safeguards and flying much more expensive combat aircraft.

Discontinuing training command CQ would create pilots with lower confidence, less trust in their LSOs, and less ability to handle the stress of the carrier environment. And there would be fewer safeguards to account for these shortcomings. If these risks seem nebulous, history provides plenty of lessons to make them concrete.

Since World War II, carrier landing mishaps have killed far more naval aviators than enemy action. According to the Government Accountability Office, 24 naval aircraft were destroyed during launch and recovery operations in the five-year period between 1974 and 1979 alone.¹ The Navy has only minimized this grim toll in the modern age after decades of constant improvement of equipment, procedures, and training. Dropping training command CQ would be a major step backward in the last of those areas.