The Navy Must Fix Mine Warfare’s Institutional Structure

For all their utility, the U.S. Navy’s mine warfare capabilities have fallen low: a decade-late littoral combat ship (LCS) mine countermeasures (MCM) mission module, multiple theaters covered by just eight MCM ships, the sundowning of theater airborne MCM capabilities, and mine stocks limited in both capacity and capability. Meanwhile, international mine warfare capabilities are on the rise. The technology and ideas to revive U.S. mine warfare are available and plentiful, but the community lacks a command structure to cohesively advocate, support, and properly conduct mine warfare.

Support for Mine Warfare

“Stars aligning” is not just a metaphor in the military—priorities are set by flag-level leadership or attention. LCS reforms now are occurring rapidly because of Rear Admiral Theodore LeClair’s leadership of Task Force LCS and the Naval Surface Force authority backing him. Previously, the ships’ readiness issues persisted despite three program offices being directly responsible for the program—Naval Sea Systems Command Program Manager 420/501/505—under a single program executive office (PEO). It took a two-star task force to generate high-profile attention from the public—as well as stars aligning at the fleet and joint level—and Congress to provide a demand signal.

However, even the root signaling mechanisms for the fleet mine warfare community are weak. The Naval Expeditionary Combat Command supports the explosive ordnance disposal community’s interests, but fleet mine warfare is spread across a disconnected group of structurally stovepiped O-6 and O-6 equivalents. The mine warfare program office (PMS 495) is one of eight in PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants, which also deals with LCS, the Constellation-class frigate, and all Naval Special Warfare. Within PEO Integrated Warfare Systems, Integrated Warfare Systems 8.0 deals with mine, amphibious, auxiliary, and command system integration, so even that individual program office is spread thin. And Naval Air Systems Command’s only mine-related focuses are buried deep within individual program offices, like PMA 299.

The Naval Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center (SMWDC) has “mine” in its name, but its “surface” mandate is so broad that the small, offsite O-6 MCM technical directorate is eclipsed by the vast body of surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, amphibious, and Integrated Air and Missile Defense experts working innumerable broader fleet requirements. Meanwhile, portfolio integration is further diluted by the shift of mining from SMWDC’s former Mine Warfare Division to the submarine community under the Undersea Warfighting Development Center. Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City Division, is another O-6 command among seven others and lacks the support of mine warfare-specializing uniformed billets for systems or tactical development. Even the Mine Warfare Training Center (MWTC) in Point Loma, California, is only an O-5 command. All other organizational MCM commands are O-6 commands divided among legions of other priorities and missions.

This is not a criticism of the individual organizations —these commands are diligent and understand the urgency of the mission. But even when these commands are at the top of their game, mine warfare is neither linked nor positioned to compete well on flag-level priority lists. None of these commands are united under a common flag officer focused on mine warfare.

MineWarCom

The Navy once understood the peril of structurally burying mine warfare. This was one reason Mine Warfare Command (MineWarCom) was established in 1975. MineWarCom united the disparate interests of the mine warfare community under a two-star designated as the fleet commanders’ and Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNOs’) direct advisor on MIW. Those connections were strengthened over time, notably with stronger operational control in 1992 based on lessons from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Navy fielded two classes of minehunter, an MCM command ship, and multiple airborne mine countermeasure units with robust and varied capability—all united under a flag officer with the power to compete for mine warfare’s priorities.

Unfortunately, the Navy dismantled MineWarCom in 2006—disestablishing the command, distributing its operational units across the fleet, transferring what remained of its responsibilities to the Naval Mine and Antisubmarine Warfare Command, and further diluting its remaining essence in the shift to the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in 2015.

If the Navy wants to succeed in mine warfare, no revolutionary new tactic or technology needs to be discovered—they exist but remain frustratingly out of organizational reach. The Navy must restore MineWarCom, collecting its many authorities and portfolios under a flag officer with operational and administrative oversight of the global MIW enterprise —from the remaining MH-53s to the MWTC. Mine warfare may impact everyone, but it cannot merely be everyone’s side-hustle—mine warfare is a complicated, involved field that someone must carry as a primary duty and focus. The side-hustle model fails as hard organizationally as it does onboard ship—as the failed Remote Mine Hunting Vehicle for DDGs demonstrated.

But robust organization is still no guarantor of success. MineWarCom was unable to prevent the disastrous first convoy of Operation Praying Mantis in 1988, whose lack of preparedness for mining turned a display of American strength into a black eye. Even with a more secure position and stronger advocate, numerous Government Accountability Office reports from the 1990s still raised concerns about the future direction of the mine warfare enterprise. The MCM community lacks MineWarCom’s uniting will today, while the threats and opportunities are even greater. The Navy must collect the dispersed MCM assets under a united command advocating directly to the CNO and with the authority to make a severe nuisance of themselves to the Navy at large.
So MIW can make a further nuisance of itself, MineWarCom should dual-hat as a new PEO Mine Warfare, headquartered alongside Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City—with a major addition of uniformed billets to aid in tactical and technical development. If the assorted mine warfare interests can be dredged from the lower tiers of their disparate PEOs, a new MineWarCom could consistently advocate from a position of operational experience and insight for advances in mine warfare technology, tactics, and operations. Otherwise, only marginal resources will be spent in pursuit of operationally awkward but theoretically clean operational concepts such as “man out of the minefield” and good-on-paper systems such as the MH-60 towed AN/AQS-20A. The AN/QS-20A illustrates the consequences of institutional disunity in how, after a significant investment of time, effort, and money, too-late involvement of MH-60 pilots revealed that the towing altitude would practically guarantee crew loss in case of an engine failure.¹

Looking Forward

Like mines, mine warfare is always just below the surface in peacetime—and as with mines, allowing it to remain there is a dangerous proposition. The Navy needs a strong advocate for fleet mine warfare, one who operationally and programmatically unites the mine warfare mission. There is no such advocate or unifying commander now—and without one, the naval mine warfare enterprise will flounder in facing the threats and grasping the opportunities of rising global mine warfare capabilities.