‘Strategic Disruption’ Can Thwart an Invasion of Taiwan

Among the grim conclusions of the 2023 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) wargame series was this: The loss of potentially tens of thousands of U.S. lives in a war over Taiwan would erode U.S. military strength and leave in question the global role of the United States.¹ Although in some scenarios the United States could claim victory through direct intervention, it “suffered more in the long run than the ‘defeated’ People’s Republic of China.” Such a Pyrrhic potential victory raises the question of how the United States can protect its national security interests while supporting Taiwan’s self-defense. Lacking the capability to negate Chinese advantages in the western Pacific before the end of this decade, the United States must prepare a strategy of disruption that capitalizes on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fears to delay overtly hostile actions and uphold the regional balance until the 2030s.²  

Foreign policy strategist Michael Pillsbury has identified China’s top fears as an inability to deal with Taiwan, maritime economic disruption, and horizontal escalation.³ Strategic disruption shapes advantageous conditions by targeting an adversary’s military and nonmilitary vulnerabilities to delay or deny his ability to achieve core objectives.⁴ In the event of violent conflict between China and Taiwan, the United States should disrupt China’s strategy through nonkinetic military intervention, increase pressure on China’s declining export-dependent economic model, and engage to negotiate a halt in hostilities. Having done so, the United States could establish a foundation for its own advantage.

Slowing Down

Future U.S. military innovation and China’s stagnating economy should create an opening that yields a desirable military environment. China’s military development has been fueled by GDP growth, which has averaged 13.3 percent annually since the early 2000s.⁵ But that growth is slowing, declining from 5.4 percent in 2023 to an estimated 4.6 percent in 2024, indicating the end of the “miracle growth” era.⁶ China’s officially reported military expenditure rate is less than 2 percent of total GDP.⁷ While China’s defense spending is expected to maintain its correlation with GDP, it is likely to fall short of the previously forecasted 10 percent annual increases. This slowdown in economic growth could result in a 35 percent reduction in new military funding compared to earlier projections.

Strategic disruption requires realistic assumptions about viable U.S. intervention. U.S. military capabilities are in transition, and the next five years will be marked by the retirement, decommissioning, and divestiture of many platforms. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the fleet’s vertical-launch cell capacity will decrease by 12 percent before it starts to grow again in 2032.⁸ Innovations such as the Air Force’s B-21 bomber and the Navy and Air Force Next-Generation Air Dominance programs are unlikely to be usefully realized before then.

Ready to Disrupt

If deterrence were to fail, CSIS analysis suggests the United States would have unambiguous indications and warning before a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of Taiwan, affording it the opportunity to cause strategic disruption before and during that invasion.⁹ Taiwan must not capitulate and would need to thwart a PLA military occupation long enough for nonkinetic U.S. assistance and economic initiatives to yield results. 

In the CSIS wargames, experts assessed iterations of U.S. involvement. In the “Taiwan Stands Alone” scenario, which simulated no U.S. intervention, a Chinese victory cost more than 70,000 casualties and the decimation of PLA amphibious capabilities over a 70-day period. When played to an objective of complete conquest, the 70-day window extended into a prolonged conflict of attrition lasting “many months.”¹⁰ With nonkinetic U.S. intervention, the timeline likely would increase in favor of Taiwan.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the effectiveness of nonkinetic intervention. U.S. Air Force Grey Wolf teams, for example, were an ad hoc task force that helped keep Ukraine’s Air Force operating effectively. Similar efforts in the Pacific could bolster defensive military operations and simultaneously facilitate strikes against enemy centers of gravity. For Ukraine, initial CSIS forecasts indicated that Russia would overrun Kyiv “in a matter of hours.”¹¹ Through prosecution of time-sensitive targets identified with U.S. assistance, the duration of the conflict extended significantly, from hours to nearly three years. 

Nonkinetic U.S. assistance to Taiwan should include similar cuing of Taiwanese weapons against PLA amphibious assault forces. These efforts should be designed to drive the CCP to “heed efforts and obtain adjustments like diplomatic persuasion.”¹² Because of Taiwan’s anticipated strategy—destroying many of its own ports to force a beach assault—the PLA has developed a capability to operate without ports. It has conducted multiple exercises using as many as 64 civilian roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels to land troops and provide resupply via floating causeways.¹³ Helping Taiwan focus its effects on these would diminishes the PLA’s ability to establish a beachhead, maintain resupply routes, and facilitate a breakout. 

Given the likelihood of PLA strikes aimed at crippling Taiwanese cuing and targeting capabilities, the United States could mitigate Taiwan’s losses through specialized teams deployed to territory near but not in Taiwan. A find, fix, track, and target process like the one used in Ukraine could integrate U.S. intelligence and cuing capabilities with organic Taiwanese systems. This would allow the United States to be a nonkinetic force multiplier, supplementing Taiwanese systems while avoiding direct engagement.

Such avoidance is crucial to preventing vertical escalation. U.S.-enabled strikes on the Chinese mainland likely would result in retaliatory long-range strikes against U.S. soil. The response of U.S. leaders to the loss of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, or other strategic assets could likewise escalate the conflict. Disruption, on the other hand, could give China incentives to halt aggression without provoking a strike on “large, manpower intensive, and politically iconic” U.S. forces.¹⁴ As important, cuing Taiwanese effects must come with restrictions. China has made its navy a “cultural center of gravity,” establishing it as a symbol of national pride.¹⁵ Limiting U.S. targeting assistance to operational assets such as RO/ROs and causeways instead of emblematic ones such as aircraft carriers would allow for operational disruption while preserving strategic avenues for negotiation. 

It’s the Economy . . .

China’s primary strength lies in its economic and commercial power.¹⁶ The United States should “apply commerce as a lever” to target this reliance and create an economic incentive for China to cease hostilities and seek diplomatic negotiations.¹⁷ The investment-led economic model that fueled growth is now at risk, with an “unprecedented credit and investment bubble coupled with the downturn of [foreign direct investment],” which recorded the first deficit since 1998.¹⁸ With domestic consumption lagging, exports are now the Chinese economy’s primary driver, constituting more than 20 percent of GDP.¹⁹ 

Kinetic conflict would threaten China’s crucial maritime trade, which accounts for more than two-thirds of its imports and exports. Chinese President Xi Jinping has identified a need to “reinforce food security,” as China’s food self-sufficiency ratio is only 66 percent.²⁰ China is projected to be the top importer of seven of nine primary food sources in 2024, making imports a basic requirement to keeping its population alive.²¹ Similarly, petroleum comprises about 42 percent of all imports thanks to a requirement of 10.2 million barrels per day to sustain industry.²² 

To encourage deescalation, the United States should avoid traditional sanctions and instead target China’s vulnerabilities through existing economic mechanisms. The United States and its allies should declare the East and South China Seas a military exclusion zone, which likely would result in increased marine cargo and hull insurance, thereby inflating import and export pricing for China. Classifying hostile targets in a sea of civilian maritime traffic would be challenging, thanks to the PLA’s use of repurposed civilian vessels for military objectives. The risk of collateral damage would extend to all merchant and naval vessels across the region, disrupting maritime trade.

The declaration of a military exclusion zone would avoid criticisms of conventional sanctions that retired diplomats Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris say “compound crises rather than [help] defuse them.”²³ If an (avoidable) invasion were the cause of rising premiums, the Chinese Communist Party would bear the political burden. Should nonkinetic disruption delay a PLA occupation of Taiwan, economic effects would be a substantial drag on the Chinese warfighting machine. 

The United States must ensure international cooperation to maximize economic and nonkinetic consequences while lending legitimacy to its efforts. The International Union of Marine Insurance asserts that the conflict in Ukraine caused an invocation of war insurance clauses that resulted in a global premium spike of more than $3 billion.²⁴ In 2022, premium increases related to the Russia-Ukraine war led to the cost of many goods rising by 50 percent and food costs by 59 percent.²⁵ War premiums returned with the ongoing Red Sea crisis, with some companies avoiding that region altogether.²⁶ If the PLA employs civilian means to achieve military ends, the increased risk to commercial vessels would almost guarantee regional war premiums and associated spikes in shipping costs. 

Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company, explains, “China definitely views maritime insurance as a weakness, especially after sanctions on Russia.”²⁷ While China is trying to reduce its dependence on susceptible sea lanes by expanding overland commercial deals and liberalizing tariff barriers, these measures will not bear fruit for years.²⁸ China’s export-reliant economic model is a vulnerability.

Allies and Partners

For this discussion, it is assumed fears of horizontal escalation would drive China to avoid initiating strikes against U.S. military assets on U.S. allies’ territory unless provoked. Even so, alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines increase the risk of horizontal escalation, China’s fear of which British defense analyst David Bickers maintains is a U.S. competitive advantage.²⁹ 

To avoid direct military involvement, European U.S. allies likely would limit overt action to economic restrictions on China, mirroring past responses to Chinese policies.³⁰ At the same time, U.S. cooperation with European countries would be crucial for the effective implementation of war premiums, given those countries provide 66 percent of worldwide cargo and hull insurance.³¹ Regional trade challenges could be mitigated in part with solutions such as alternate routing through a presumably U.S.-secured Philippine Sea. Regional and global partners could facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid and logistical support to maintain Taiwan’s supply lines and unite the region against aggression. 

Exit Ahead

Military and economic pressure should increase with time to create avenues for diplomatic negotiations. In staking its legitimacy on nationalism and taking an uncompromising stance, the CCP risks its viability if it fails to achieve unification with Taiwan.³² Thus, the United States must provide a viable off-ramp. 

One possibility would be to help structure a territorial swap for the Kinmen or Matsu Islands. China has settled 11 land border disputes with its western and northern neighbors since 1998, often ceding more than half its original claims.³³ Taiwan would not willingly give up territory, but it is unlikely the Taiwanese would be able to meaningfully defend those territories. If Taiwan is threatened with the existential threat of a mainland invasion, it might cede these territories to create an off-ramp to China. 

Given the CCP’s history of revising narratives to align with policy changes, it is plausible that securing even partial control over Taiwan could be portrayed as a strategic success. This would allow the CCP to refocus on mitigating challenges induced by U.S. strategic disruption. While this would not satiate the CCP’s appetite for a unified China, it could delay direct confrontation with the United States until the pivotal 2030s. Given that the CCP’s primary objective is to preserve its survival and maintain control over Chinese society, the rational step would be to take the off-ramp to restabilize economically and militarily by ending the conflict.

Military instability and global economic collapse are likely risks if the conflict escalates. Author Robert Haddick predicts that, after a year of kinetic involvement, U.S. economic output would decline by 5 to 10 percent, and China’s would plummet by 25 to 35 percent, potentially resulting in a global recession.³⁴ Excluding China, East and Southeast Asia are home to 7 of the top 20 global trading nations, accounting for more than 21 percent of international trade, amplifying the severity of the situation. 

Avoiding open conflict may be the best course of action, but China’s insatiable expansion—demonstrated by the so-called 10-dash line—has provoked territorial disputes with six nations, increasing the risk of future vertical and horizontal escalation. For example, Japan might see a capture of Taiwan as a threat to its sovereignty if China attempted to exert control of critical maritime routes or take possession of the disputed Senkaku islands. Escalations in regional tensions would result in counterbalancing that would only pave the way for larger-scale future conflict. Strategic disruption would allow the United States to achieve regional goals, while also mitigating extra-theater risk.

Failing to face the problem of how to intervene on a global scale is bad strategy. The United States needs a plan of action that recognizes current limitations and the risks of global escalation. The present is more dangerous than the perceived future; inaction now could lead to disaster later. While the potential for U.S. military innovation and supremacy in the 2030s is open to debate, it is reasonable to suggest that military advancements and economic de-risking will establish a more favorable geopolitical environment for the United States. The zero-sum extremes of abstention from Taiwanese engagement and full-scale military intervention would in all probability result in international instability and economic depression. 

Instead, the rational strategy is a nonkinetic approach to restoring the status quo and creating a long-term strategic advantage—in which China’s influence diminishes and the United States’ strengthens. A disruptive campaign would impose costs on and present challenges to the CCP that would limit its ability to realize its interests, setting favorable conditions for conflict resolution. The art of statecraft often lies in the patient pursuit of a more opportune moment, when diplomacy, information, economic, and military finesse converge. Time is the United States’ greatest asset in the Indo-Pacific region.