Learn from the Fall of the Philippines: Prepare the Third Island Chain

In the event of a war between China and the United States, the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific would rely on defending long-established bases in the first and second island chains—which include those in Guam, Japan, and South Korea—to deploy garrisoned forces and to establish new bases in the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Micronesia. The U.S. defeat in the Philippines shortly after its entry into World War II proved this strategy can be challenging when air and missile defense is not certain. The United States had to establish new bases in the less-vulnerable third island chain. 

Today, the United States must anticipate where its existing bases are vulnerable and adjust its strategy to emphasize developing new bases after a war has begun, rather than reinforcing existing bases, and preparing to rapidly establish expeditionary advanced bases in and on the periphery of contested environments. 

The 2023 Scenario

With a keen eye on China’s potential assault on Taiwan as early as 2027, each service component commander in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (IndoPaCom) has developed strategies and concepts to counter Chinese military strategy, tactics, and forces.¹ These include the Navy’s distributed maritime operations (DMO), the Marine Corps’ Force Design, the Army’s multidomain transformation strategy, and the Air Force’s Pacific Air Force Strategy 2030. IndoPaCom is reinforcing and distributing its military forces across the region, the Army is strengthening air and missile defense at Guam, the Air Force is planning to rehabilitate airfields in the Philippines and Marianas, the Coast Guard is operating in Palau’s exclusive economic zone, the Navy is exploring basing options in Papua New Guinea, and Australia is hosting the Marine Rotational Force–Darwin.²

In 2023, Proceedings published a hypothetical “War of 2026” scenario as part of the American Sea Power Project. In this scenario, China launches a preemptive strike on U.S. forces in Japan and Guam—in the first two island chains—to prevent the United States from intervening in a China-led invasion of Taiwan.³ Like Japan’s preemptive December 1941 attack on U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines and February 1942 attack on British forces in Singapore, the 2026 scenario assumes Chinese ballistic- and cruise-missile attacks inflict severe losses on U.S. forces. These assumed losses include command staffs, aircraft carriers, and airfields that would be essential in supporting the U.S. military response to a Chinese invasion.

Unfortunately, U.S. preparations for war with China in 2026 are similar to its preparations for war with Japan in 1941—particularly its plans regarding vulnerable bases within range of land-based aerial attacks. 

Preparing for War in the Philippines

Modern-day China relies more on its ground-launched ballistic missiles than its land-based bombers. In 1941, Allied forces in the southwest Pacific, including the Philippines and Singapore, were within range of Japan’s land-based bombers, which proved equally adept at attacking airfields and warships. Although Japan’s carrier-borne aircraft enabled attacks beyond the range of its land-based bombers, particularly at Pearl Harbor and Ceylon, Allied losses were not as decisive as those in the Philippines, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, where Japanese land-based bombers were able to sortie more often at longer ranges.

By December 1941, the United States anticipated a Japanese attack on its forces in the Indo-Pacific and reinforced the Philippines. The Navy relocated its Pacific Fleet from San Francisco to Hawaii and reinforced its Asiatic Fleet base with sufficient personnel and supplies to support the operation of 29 submarines from its Cavite Naval Base in the Philippines. The Army reinforced its Far East Air Force at Clark Airfield in the Philippines with nearly half its most modern bombers and fighters. Protected by 106 of the latest variant of the P-40 Warhawk fighter, General Douglas MacArthur’s forces were strategically located and supplied in the Philippines. Army Air Force B-17 Flying Fortress bombers were poised to bomb Japanese bases in Formosa, and the Asiatic Fleet’s submarines were ready to interdict Japanese amphibious landing forces in the western Pacific.⁴ Or so they thought.

Although there was doubt whether the Pacific Fleet could relieve a besieged Philippines, the strengthening of U.S. forces there in 1941 led the U.S. War Department and General MacArthur to believe U.S. forces could defend against Japanese attacks and strike Japan’s neighboring bases and shipping. On 21 November 1941, a revised Plan Rainbow expanded the missions tasked to U.S. forces in the Philippines.⁵ In addition to defending the Philippine coastal frontier, MacArthur’s Army and Army Air Forces were to support the Navy in attacking Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and warships, conduct air strikes on neighboring Japanese forces and bases, and cooperate with the Australian, British, and Dutch militaries in defense of their forces and territories. 

The Effects of Defeat

The U.S. defeat in the Philippines had three effects on Allied war efforts: 

• First, the destruction of the Army’s Far East Air Force and the withdrawal of the Asiatic Fleet during the first week of Japan’s invasion allowed Japan to land troops in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies largely unopposed. 

• Second, a lack of planning and compatible supplies hampered the U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s relocation to Dutch-controlled ports. It also hindered the fleet’s integration with the remaining U.S., British, Dutch, and Australian forces working to containing Japan at the Malay Barrier. In addition, it contributed to the final Allied defeats at the 1942 battles of Balikpapan, Flores Sea, Badung Strait, Java Sea, and Sunda Strait.⁶ 

• Third, once Allied naval and air forces were pushed back to Ceylon in the Indian Ocean, Australia in the South Pacific, and Hawaii in the Central Pacific, Japan established bases in strategic locations in the southwest and South Pacific to threaten SLOCs to Australia. This included the Combined Fleet’s attack on the Royal Navy at Ceylon in April 1942, a planned invasion of Port Moresby in May 1942, and the attempt to establish an airfield at Guadalcanal in August 1942, which were all major setbacks for the United States and its allies.

Instead of being in a position in the Philippines to threaten Japan’s Formosa bases or in Guam to threaten the Japanese garrison at Truk, the United States was forced to operate from as far away as Hawaii. It also had to fight additional campaigns in the third island chain—the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea—that had not been planned for before the start of the war. Although these campaigns were necessary to prevent Japan from cutting the SLOCs between Australia and the United States, the naval battles and amphibious operations proved costly in lost ships, sailors, and Marines. While U.S. victories against Japan at the 1942 Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway were critical to stopping Japan’s offensive operations, establishing the naval advanced base in Vanuatu’s Espiritu Santo in April 1942 was essential to supporting sustained U.S. operations in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea campaigns.

After Japan’s advances pushed the Indo-Pacific frontlines to the South Pacific, the United States needed new bases to support its operations. First, replenishment forces consisting of fleet oilers escorted by cruisers and destroyers operating from Tonga and Fiji already had supplied U.S. aircraft carrier task forces in air raids on Rabaul, Salamaua, and Lae in February and March 1942, and, later, in the U.S. victory at Coral Sea. Second, the Navy built its first naval advanced base at Espiritu Santo in May 1942, where the headquarters for Operation Watchtower—the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal—was based. Navy ships were repaired and resupplied there before and after the naval battles of Guadalcanal. Third, newly commissioned service squadrons (ServRons) augmented smaller advanced bases established to keep up with Allied forces in the Pacific. This included ServRon 4’s tankers, fleet oilers, ammunition ships, supply ships, floating docks, and repair ships stationed at Naval Advance Base Funafuti in November 1943.⁷ 

These new advanced bases and ServRons—established in strategic locations along the third island chain among Hawaii, American Samoa, Fiji, and New Zealand—were less vulnerable than the prewar bases along the first and second island chains and were able to provide essential support for the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea campaigns in the South Pacific. 

The losses and setbacks that resulted from the inability to defend and reinforce large concentrations of forces in the Philippines during World War II could happen again to U.S. forces in Guam and Japan, as hypothesized in the 2026 scenario. China’s ballistic and cruise missiles have the potential to inflict comparable damage to U.S. air, land, and naval forces garrisoned in Guam and Japan in a current-day war.

Prepare the Third Island Chain

Unless it is certain U.S. forces can defend and operate from bases in the first and second island chains, IndoPaCom should consider adopting a strategy similar to the one Admiral Chester Nimitz used during World War II. This would involve rapidly establishing robust and resilient advanced bases in the third island chain to support contingency campaigns in the South Pacific. 

The Marine Corps must acquire its own dedicated air defenses to defend expeditionary advanced base operations, and the Army needs more Patriot and THADD batteries to protect Guam and Japan.⁸ The United States needs to prioritize improving air and missile defenses at Guam and Japan, determine where it will need to establish advanced bases before or immediately after hostilities with China begin, and organize the air and naval forces necessary to reinforce existing bases. The considerations for improving air and missile defense do not minimize China’s other military capabilities. 

Japan’s use of land-based and carrier-based aircraft in preemptive strikes on U.S. bases and forces in December 1941 significantly contributed to its rapid capture of Guam and Wake Island, the isolation and eventual surrender of the Philippines, and the United States being forced to alter its strategy. To prevent such losses in current-day scenarios such as the one presented by the American Sea Power Project, IndoPaCom needs to bolster the air and missile defenses of U.S. forces in the first and second island chains and be prepared to establish advanced bases in the third island chains, before China attacks.