According to Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) data, production—meaning the target to create the required number of aviators—within the Naval Air Training Command (NATRACOM) averaged 91 percent for the decade ending October 2022. Within the strike-fighter pipeline, it was 79 percent. The consequences of underproduction are dire: fewer aviators produced in flight school means a shortage of instructor pilots (IPs) for production tours, a reduction in second sea-tour billets filled, and operational department head shortages. Moreover, underproduction forces the Navy Personnel Command (PERS) to man fleet squadrons later in the workup cycle, resulting in the newest aviators missing crucial predeployment events. While there were fewer aviators created during this period, demand for naval aviation remains high, stretching qualified aviators thin. This is unacceptable.
For the fiscal year ending October 2023, CNATRA produced at 102 percent on average across all pipelines. In 2024, the target is 105-percent production for rotary and maritime pilots and 100 percent for strike pilots. Currently, all pipelines remain “on glideslope” to achieve the elevated target. What caused such a dramatic turnaround? The naval aviation enterprise (NAE) owned the aviator shortage and made CNATRA the supported commander within naval aviation. In other words, the Navy recognized it could not meet force generation requirements without a full stable of qualified naval aviators. It was time to reenergize and rebalance the system that produced them. It was time to “Get Real, Get Better.”
A Growing Problem
A secondary effect of sustained underproduction was the growing pool of student naval aviators (SNAs) awaiting training in Pensacola. Historically, there has always been a short wait to begin flight training. The time is used to handle the administrative, medical, and educational prerequisites needed to be successful in flight school. At its zenith in October 2022, the wait to begin flight training exceeded 14 months. The pre-training “A-Pool” was ultimately the result of a simple math equation: more SNAs were entering the ecosystem than were exiting it each year.
To fix this, CNATRA leaders evaluated three options. First, feed fewer aspiring aviators into the system and work through the accumulated glut. Second, cut the pool (for example, if there were 1,000 ensigns and second lieutenants awaiting flight training, simply select 500 to continue—the other half could be offered reassignment within the Navy and Marine Corps or separated). Option three was to ramp up production. The goal would be to increase output while maintaining steady input, gradually burning the existing pool down to a healthy level. Options one and two would mean a shortage of aviators in the affected year groups, causing complications in department head manning years later. Option two would not keep faith with the naval aviation ethos.
Though not the quickest option, CNATRA chose option three. Doing so had benefits—namely, that an entire class of future naval aviators would still be able to pursue their dream and year-group health would be maintained at critical selection milestones. However, it also required the most effort. Accelerating production would be one thing, but more would be required to fast-track the burndown and restore balance to the system. For this reason, CNATRA set the goal of 105-percent production. If the system churned out a higher number of winged aviators than the number of SNAs it accepted, the “A-pool” would steadily decrease to a healthy size. By April 2026, CNATRA projects the pilot pool will be at entitlement (the pool is already at entitlement for student naval flight officers), restoring the 100-percent production target.
The Flight School Factory
Flight school can be compared to a factory with different conveyor belts, representing the different syllabi in which SNAs train to become rotary, strike/E-2, or multiengine aviators. Furthermore, the aircraft that support these conveyor belts vary—some are aging, while others are newly delivered and facing a breaking-in process. IPs are another vital piece. Some are in abundance while others are hard to come by because of historical underproduction within CNATRA. Importantly, the motion of the conveyor belts within the factory must be synced. Any imbalance can result in a missed fleet seat—one less aviator needed to fully man the fleet squadrons. Boiled down into an equation, success in CNATRA and a healthy ecosystem looks like this:
Sufficient Instructor Pilots + Aircraft Ready for Training + Proper Student Loading = Optimized Production.
Optimized production means that CNATRA produces the required number of winged aviators each year for the fleet replacement squadrons (FRS) to train and fill the Navy’s fleet squadrons. All in, that’s 1,100 to 1,200 naval aviators each year.
Recurring Challenges, Creative Solutions
The road to 105-percent production was not without its bumps. In theory, balancing the CNATRA equation to burn down the “A-pool” and exceed production targets by 5 percent is straightforward. Simply supply the right ingredients in the right proportions to optimize production. In practice, CNATRA experts mapped the entire enterprise and created a digital twin, based on queuing theory. This data-driven approach allowed modeling, simulation, and excursions to validate efficiency theories and identify barriers. The results highlighted two recurring challenges: IP shortages and “black-swan” or unpredictable, high-impact aircraft events. Overcoming them required creativity, grit, collaboration, and, most important, total buy-in across the NAE.
Naval aviation’s manning shortfall is well documented. In CNATRA, the shortage is most acutely felt in Meridian, Mississippi, and Kingsville, Texas—the strike/E-2 training hubs. Whereas the IP manning in the primary, multiengine, and rotary pipelines remains stable, the strike pipeline was a different matter. As previously mentioned, 79-percent production over a decade means the students who would have completed a fleet tour and been eligible for flight instructor duty were never made five years ago. The same pool that supplies IPs to the T-45C community also supplies the Naval Air Warfare Development Center, TOPGUN, and the FRS.
To meet the requirements of the production equation, CNATRA implemented a handful of unique measures. First, CNATRA requested temporary assignment IPs from across the NAE to help jumpstart production. FRS instructors, staff officers, and even base commanders pitched in. In addition, the reserve component materially increased support. These additional flyers allowed CNATRA to implement three solutions to revitalize the long-term health of the IP cadre using nontraditional sources: pipeline transfers, selected retained graduates, and contract instructor pilots (CIPs). Highly qualified IPs from various CNATRA pipelines and IPs coming directly from P-8A fleet tours competed for slots in the T-45C fixed wing instructor training unit (FITU). In addition, a small number of high-performing T-45C SNAs were selected to enter the FITU after receiving their wings and complete a year of IP duty before progressing to the FRS. While these efforts were part of the manning puzzle, the bulk of the solution was the CIP Solution. The T-45C Commodores finally had the manpower solution to meet the 105-percent production mandate—which should begin to stem IP shortages in three to four years.
Former Defense Secretary James Mattis was fond of saying that in war, “the enemy gets a vote.” In the training realm, the aircraft gets a vote. Without sufficient ready-for-training (RFT) aircraft, no surplus of IPs or well-prepared SNAs can complete the mission. Aircraft readiness has been a persistent challenge across all pipelines for varying reasons. Most notably, the T-45C has suffered multiple “quality escapes” that resulted cumulatively in months of halted production. Black swan events aside, the T-45C is aging and due to be replaced in the coming years. As is true with any aircraft at the twilight of its service life, maintenance is increasingly time consuming. In the rotary realm, the delivery of a cutting-edge platform such as the TH-73 Thrasher has posed a different subset of challenges. From training and transitioning the workforce that performs maintenance to conforming the inspection schedule to support the high cycle rates required in naval air training, the process has required diligence and attention. As for primary flight training in the T-6B, supply shortages plague RFT numbers. The only solution for such a fixed constraint is to spread schedules over longer periods, obligating six-to-seven-day workweeks at times for IPs and SNAs.
Of all the challenges facing the CNATRA team, the aircraft problems require the most cross-organization coordination and the most diverse solutions. The criticality of aircraft readiness highlighted the need for safety valves that, when activated, allowed production to continue if readiness suffered. The core effort to keep the aircraft flying is ensuring the enablers to safe and timely maintenance are in place: trained maintainers, adequate parts supply, and efficiently scheduled phase maintenance. In addition, CNATRA leaders are pulling levers to save flight hours on certain airframes and mitigate production risk. Most notable of these creative efforts are the COPT-R program, the Hellcat syllabus, and the incorporation of VR/MR simulators. These efforts have the collective effect of providing more flexibility to leaders across the board in distributing resources to meet the 105-percent production mandate.
The Contractor Operated Primary Training-Rotary (COPT-R) concept is borrowed from the Air Force. The idea is straightforward: A subset of SNAs volunteer to attend civilian helicopter training in place of the primary flight training syllabus in the T-6B. To date, the program has successfully graduated SNAs in about one-third of the time it takes to complete primary flight training and for a fraction of the cost. Most important, these aviators progress to advanced rotary training at Naval Air Station Whiting Field, Florida, with 50 additional rotary hours compared with their peers in the traditional track, therefore making them a more experienced helicopter pilot when they wing. The program is noteworthy for another reason: it allows the enterprise to redirect flight hours on the T-6B to be used to increase primary flight training production or support the Hellcat syllabus.
Hellcat is CNATRA’s adaptation of a syllabus in which higher-end training is pushed down to more affordable training aircraft. In other words, Hellcat flows a portion of the T-45C syllabus into the T-6B. Accordingly, when the T-45C replacement aircraft delivers, a portion of the FRS syllabus will likely flow to that system, preserving flight hours on FRS aircraft. Finally, using the latest in simulation and AI in tandem with syllabi revision facilitates training at a realistic and complex level, regardless of weather conditions or aircraft readiness. To date, CNATRA, in partnership with industry and Naval Air Warfare Technical Systems Division, has delivered 81 VR/MR devices across the five training wings with 86 more devices pending delivery. As a result, several syllabus events have been moved to the simulator to ensure a better prepared aviator for aircraft events while preserving the readiness of the fleet. As these devices mature, they will incorporate the use of live, virtual, and constructive technology.
Collectively, CNATRA’s work addressing these lines of effort produced a rebalanced and reenergized ecosystem. Yet, the work is never complete. Maintaining and sustaining the balance is a 24/7/365 endeavor. The only acceptable product is a world-class aviator ready to win on day one. The fleet requires it—our nation demands it.
