Blockades are classic tools of naval power but their implementation in the context of modern naval warfare is often neglected. The imposition of a blockade in the 2026 scenario is key to the accomplishment of Allied strategic goals in the face of initial People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) victories. However, the kind of unrestricted submarine warfare Germany waged against the Entente and the Allies during the world wars and the United States against Japan is no longer legal, ethical, or tactically and strategically sound.
Legally, deliberately targeting neutral merchants and civilians would be an excellent way to get hauled before the International Court of Justice at the Hague while alienating not only the neutral state but also the home nations of the crew. Ethically, it constitutes a direct attack on civilians. Tactically, attacking and sinking merchantmen would involve the expenditure of an unacceptable number of heavyweight torpedoes or advanced antiship cruise missiles (ASCM) better employed against high-end enemy combatants or troop transports. The economic damage to fisheries caused by the sinking of a single supertanker would devastate coastal nations. Strategically, it could turn neutral-friendly nations into neutral-hostile nations.
During World War I, Britian imposed a blockade employing boardings and prize-taking while Germany chose to destroy neutral shipping. This was the casus belli for the United States and arguably cost Germany the war.1 If part of the coalition cause is the maintenance of the rules-based international order, targeting merchantmen with lethal fires would be counterproductive and morally abhorrent. The United States and its allies must avoid the mistake the Kaiser made by sinking the Lusitania.
Strategic Blockades
India is key to control of the Indian Ocean and the implementation of a strategic blockade. While presently neutral, there is no reason to believe that India would remain so in the event of a larger global conflict with China. The two great powers have long-standing territorial disputes and their soldiers regularly brawl—occasionally to the death. In the 2026 scenario, the United States and its allies should move to recognize and support all of India’s claims against China contingent on India’s favorable involvement in the conflict. Flipping a large, capable neutral to the allied column would effectively neutralize Chinese trade in the Indian Ocean. PLAN ships and bases in the region could be destroyed by the joint efforts of U.S. and Allied Forces deployed to the adjacent Middle East or Mediterranean. In addition, India’s military power and position allow it to exercise air dominance over the exit to the Straits of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal, enabling it to attrite PLAN and PLA-aligned forces in the region. Warships and aircraft would then be free to conduct visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) operations throughout the Indian Ocean, at a greater range from Chinese zones of control.
Establishing control of the Indian Ocean places direct pressure on neutral nations hosting Chinese ports. Most of these ports are not as well-stocked to support Chinese forces as U.S. overseas basing, but they still represent points of Chinese control. Instead of outright destruction or a raid into the territory of a neutral nation, the strategic strength of regional domination could be sufficient to cause the host to expel PLA forces and nationalize port facilities. These ports would be rendered essentially useless to the host nation due to allied sea control and the subsequent imposition of a blockade. To restore the function and utility of these ports, neutral host nations would be incentivized to expel Chinese forces.
Blockade Tactics
Interdicting, inspecting, and either diverting or releasing vessels suspected of carrying contraband war materials destined for China is a high-risk endeavor. Force selection, interception tactics, and the correct employment of maritime geography are critical elements of a blockade’s conduct.
In the 2026 scenario, the amphibious ready group and Marine expeditionary unit (ARG-MEU) team will be vital to blockade success. When loaded with the Marine Recon Force (MRF) rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and the “skids” (AH-1Z and UH-1Y helicopters), San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) are incredibly capable blockading platforms able to conduct both surface and helicopter VBSS (HVBSS). During World War I, the Royal Navy shifted the conduct of blockade operations from traditional combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates) to the auxiliary cruisers of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of large merchant ships modified for military operations. Then, as now, destroyers and cruisers do not have the space for the additional personnel required to support prolonged blockade operations. Their crews and berthing spaces are maximized for surface, antisubmarine, and strike warfare and would not be able to support the dispatch of multiple prize crews required by blockade operations. LPDs conducting blockade operations in the open ocean should be paired with an antisubmarine warfare and Aegis ballistic missile capable Arleigh Burke–class destroyer or Constellation-class frigate, as they lack sufficient defense against submarine or antiship ballistic-missile attacks. The inclusion of MH-60Rs, either from the escorts’ helicopter detachments or embarked on the LPD, would provide the blockading forces with a potent situational awareness tool, enabling the long-range detection of target vessels and potential threats.
The Marine expeditionary unit is a vital element of blockade success, able to conduct noncompliant boardings beyond the capabilities of the surface force. Opposed boardings involve active and potentially lethal resistance from the target vessel and require specialized boarding teams that are not common in the fleet. Regular Navy boarding teams are only authorized to board compliant vessels, but Maritime Raid Force (MRF) teams are trained and equipped to conduct noncompliant boardings. Once control of the target vessel has been established, the merchant crew must be swapped out for a prize crew. Traditionally, prize crews—or ship control teams (SCT)—are led by junior officers qualified as officers of the deck officers and sufficient to carry the target vessel to the nearest friendly port. During World War I, these crews were typically made up of reserve sailors from the merchant marine.
Firepower may be necessary to compel compliance, but restraint is vital. Compelled compliance should only be employed when a boarding begins as opposed. The employment of warning shots or even targeting the bridge of a vessel that has demonstrated hostile intent (e.g., swerving toward the boarding team or action with small arms) with medium-caliber and crew-served weapons may be necessary. This is preferable to the loss of the boarding team or the employment of munitions that could kill the crew or sink the target vessel. However, escalating to lethal fires without demonstrated hostile intent quickly enters legally, morally, and strategically dangerous territory.
Choke Point Blockade
Allies are key to the 2026 fight over choke points. In this, the United States, its allies, and partners have the advantage of sitting directly on China’s most important sea lines of communication. The Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore sit on the accesses to the North, East, and South China Seas. Other friendly and neutral nations complete the encirclement. Merchant shipping attempting to reach mainland China must, therefore, pass within sometimes tens of miles of allied coastline. Here, American MRF survivors of the opening strikes on Okinawa can be employed directly against neutral shipping attempting to run the blockade to China. Working in conjunction with the littoral combat ships of Destroyer Squadron 7 or partner nations for resupply and additional prize crews, these Marine Raiders can board and divert merchants into friendly ports before they enter the first island chain.
MRF rapid intervention battalions RHIBs benefit from the classic advantages of FAC: They are small and fast. Their size complicates targeting, especially when operating in dense shipping and fishing traffic. Their speed enables them to outpace most enemy threat surface vessels, although Houthis and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia may pose a threat. Basing should be shifted frequently, as strikes against fuel depots can effectively neutralize the MRF raid units.
Blockade Enables Victory
Expanding the coalition to include India and other neutrals, as the Entente expanded with the United States, will be critical to the strategic conduct of the war. Blockade operations, especially against autocratic land powers, are not immediately decisive, but they are important. Blockades weaken and erode the isolated power, enabling ultimate victory in combat, and their proper conduct ensures they are not counterproductive. Employing LPDs, MRF, and reservists in boarding, inspecting, and capturing neutral shipping will allow the United States and its allies to ultimately triumph.
1. The practice of unrestricted submarine warfare stems from the specific form of commerce raiding practiced by the German Navy during the World War I. German submarines and auxiliary cruisers were the only combatants able to leave port and strike at Allied shipping. At the time, the laws of warfare dictated that enemy or neutral shipping be captured, the vessel and cargo adjudicated in a prize court, and the crews treated as prisoners of war (POWs). As German submarines were unable to man prize crews or otherwise bring their prizes to friendly ports, they were, legally, permitted to scuttle them as the capture of a large merchantman endangered the safety of the much smaller submarines. Initially, these neutrals were allowed to abandon ship before being sunk. It was not until British “Q-ships” started concealing weapons and ambushing German submarines that the surprise torpedo to the side became common. See “The U-Boat Campaign That Almost Broke Britain.”
