Aircraft Carriers: Still Indispensable
This article represents an endemic issue with how force-structure arguments often get made. It is not enough to point to mission areas and platform attributes and think them sufficient to justify a platform’s wartime relevance. They are only points of departure for tactics and operations, not the tactics and operations themselves. The concept of operations for how a platform actually fights in a contested battlespace is what ultimately determines its combat relevance, not overly general descriptions of its capabilities. The crux of the issue lies at a deeper level of tactical detail that is often missing from the conversation.
I understand that maybe Admiral Paparo does not want to talk tactics in unclassified writing. But the options for modern fleet tactics are readily discernible from open-source content, and flag officers should be taking the lead in improving the level of public conversation on naval warfighting. We have yet to see a substantive explanation from the Navy on what the role of the carrier is in distributed maritime operations (DMO), how DMO may warrant changes to the combined arms relationship between the carrier and other platforms, and what new force packages may facilitate those different relations. These all should be core aspects of the Navy’s fleet-level warfighting concepts. There also are many reasons why the carrier air wing is a poor tool for launching antisurface warfare attacks against high-end naval formations, and yet that has been the primary long-range antiship tactic for nearly 80 years. DMO can help the Navy transition toward a broader set of options for launching fires in support of fleet-on-fleet combat.
The interwar period often made the mistake of scripting wargames and fleet exercises in such a way as to guarantee a clash between battleships. This helped reinforce battleship-centric concepts of operation and force-structure planning, while masking the growing potential of the carrier. Is the Navy doing the same thing today to guarantee carrier-based kill chains?
Battleship advocates used to point to weight of broadside as the key firepower metric that highlighted the battleship’s dominance over the carrier. Perhaps sortie-generation rate is masking the potential of other platforms to deliver firepower in ways that could be superior to the air wing. This could include how vertical launch system (VLS)–equipped platforms can generate large volumes of fire more quickly than the air wing, given that VLS salvos bypass multiple, time-consuming steps that are required to make the air wing deliver equivalent firepower.
Commanders may willingly trade faster firepower delivery from VLS in exchange for depleting launch cells that take much longer to reload than aircraft. But this is still just a general description of capability; it is not a detailed narrative of a decisive tactical interplay that makes a stronger case for a specific approach.
We need to have more-substantive discussions on the combat roles of the carrier in modern fleet warfare and what that implies for the Navy more generally.
—Dmitry Filipoff
The Soft Cyber Underbelly of the U.S. Military
I facilitate a cyber personal security seminar through the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at American University in Washington, D.C.
Major Holden provides an excellent case study with valuable insights and viable recommendations. The essay shows the effects of not protecting your personal cyber health on not only the individual, but also a larger population.
This excellent article is at the top of the seminar’s reading list.
—Nick Wulfekuhle
Build Partners, Build Autonomy, Rebuild Mine Countermeasures
Collision Regulations Need to be Updated for USVs
I appreciated Lieutenant Commander Kramer’s thoughtful essay, particularly for the way in which it highlights that effective “gunboat diplomacy” might not require gunboats at all under the right circumstances.
His suggestion to relocate the Avenger-class mine countermeasures (MCM) ships to key regions in Europe offers an additional benefit to the Navy’s mine warfare community: the opportunity to train with and learn from some of NATO’s premier mine warfare practitioners.
I disagree, however, that unarmed unmanned systems are well-suited to freedom of navigation operations (FonOps). Until unmanned surface vessels can satisfy the requirements of the collision regulations, seizure of unmanned vessels is likely to continue unabated. While Lieutenant Commander Kramer suggests partnering with regional navies and publicizing seizures to deter adversaries, this might have the opposite effect, as publicity is bidirectional and reaches different target audiences differently. While risible claims of “expulsion” of a U.S. Navy vessel during a FonOp are easily refuted, those regarding seizure of an unmanned surface vessel are not.
Further, such a seizure would allow an opponent to send the message to its neighbors that it has altered the operations of a U.S. unmanned vessel, thus reinforcing its own claims of supremacy. Even so, operating USVs as a component of a FonOp could still have value in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures needed for the Navy to perfect manned-unmanned teaming for future naval conflicts.
—Victor Sussman
Lieutenant Commander Kramer asserts that: “Deploying mines in the strait before hostilities begin is not politically tenable.” I sincerely hope this is not the thinking of either Taiwan or the United States. The best way to defeat an invasion of Taiwan is to deter it, and mine deployment can help that happen.
I agree with author Ian Easton’s suggestion that the only area in Taiwan suitable for an amphibious landing is the approximately 20 miles of coastline opposite the Taiyuan Airport. The width of the Taiwan Strait at this point is roughly 100 miles. Assume for a moment that, from the 50-mile strait midpoint to the beaches of Taiyuan, an area 50 miles long by 20 miles wide contained several tens of thousands of mines. That might make any invader think twice about invading. In other words, deployed mines could be a powerful part of deterrence.
An invasion fleet of many thousands of vessels will take several months to assemble. A sneak attack like Japan’s at Pearl Harbor is simply not possible. The invasion of Taiwan will be more like the invasion of Ukraine in that regard. The Russians could not hide preparations, and neither will Xi Jinping be able to hide the People’s Liberation Army’s invasion preparations.
Can 10,000 or even 50,000 mines be deployed as the invasion fleet reaches the end of its assembly but before it sails? Yes. The mine trigger devices could be inert unless activated remotely if signaled when an invasion begins.
It is just possible that actions such as these could influence the choice to invade or not. If the invasion fleet disbanded, the inert mines could be recovered.
—William Thayer
Imagine: Intelligence has indications and warning of an imminent attack on Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
The USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and her strike group have received orders for an immediate sortie from San Diego, California, destination western Pacific. As she approaches the narrow channel abreast of Ballast Point, a mine is remotely detonated under her propellers and rudders causing immense damage and loss of steerage.
Question: If, as stated, all U.S. mine countermeasures assets are stationed in either Sasebo, Japan, or Bahrain, how is the channel to be checked for—not to mention cleared of—any mine threats in a timely manner?
—CDR Jerry C. Watson, USN (Ret)
The New Tactical Tanker/Transport Aircraft the Marine Corps Needs
The article has a number of errors that might affect a decision to favor one aircraft over the other:
• The C-130J airframe can most definitely be fitted to receive fuel in flight, by either boom or probe. The existing C-130Js have a universal aerial refueling receptacle slipway just above and behind the cockpit. British forces have operated C-130Js with probes above the cockpit for many years.
• The Rolls Royce (Allison) AE 2100 engines on the C-130J are the same as those on the C-27J. They are based on the T406 turboshafts used on the V-22. One derivative, the MT7, is used on the LCAC replacement; the RQ-4C Global Hawk uses another, the AE3007. They are flat-rated at 4,591 ESHP as turboprops at standard sea-level conditions. As a turboshaft, it can put out up to 6,150 SHP. There is considerable commonality among all four versions.
• The range and payload figures are misleading. The table does not make clear which level of payload is carried for which distance. The ranges shown for the C-130J and C-27J are with maximum payloads. The range given for the KC-390 is its ferry range with zero payload.
The KC-390 has a range of about 1,200 statute miles with the 57,000 pound max payload, not 3,610 miles. The C-130J ferry range with internal fuel and external tanks is about 4,200 statute miles. With an auxiliary tank in the cargo bay, it would probably be some 5,000 to 5,500 miles. The KC-390 can also carry an auxiliary tank in the cargo bay, with a similar ferry range of 5,200 miles.
At lower payloads, the C-130 and the KC-390 are roughly comparable with the same payload, although the KC-390 will burn more fuel, being overall a larger aircraft than the C-130J. Generally, a turboprop will always be more efficient than a turbofan in range/payload metrics because turboprops have a higher effective bypass ratio than turbofans. Moving a greater mass of air molecules at a slower speed will produce more force for the energy input.
• The maximum fuel available for offload in a KC-130J can be upped by 24,000 pounds by simply installing an auxiliary tank in the cargo compartment, therefore, the given figure should be about 82,000 lbs.
Having said that, the KC-390 is certainly a good aircraft and competitive with the Hercules. The advantages of the Brazilian jet are basically speed and the maximum unitary cargo capability, combined with lower direct operating costs. The C-130J is still somewhat more fuel efficient in terms of payload X moved Y miles and has advantages in short, unimproved field operations, which will become more important when airfields come under attack from long-range fires and drones. At the same time, the composite propellers on the C-130J are known to be vulnerable to cracking with impact from rocks thrown up in certain types of field conditions. The aluminum propellers on older versions of the C-130—although the cause of some recent fatal crashes—were known to have greater material toughness and could take a beating and keep on ticking in dirty-field operations. If a rock were thrown down one of the KC-390’s turbofans, it would likely “FOD out” (foreign object debris) just the same.
Overall, I give the short-field advantage to the straight-wing Hercules. Given that the Marine Corps and many other countries’ services already have or are buying the C-130 in its various guises, I think I would stick with the Hercules.
—MSgt Chris Dierkes, NYANG
The Promises and Challenges of Shipboard Additive Manufacturing
The photo on page 63 of the July issue shows a student measuring a block made by a 3D printer. I might be a bit picky in my old age, but the digital caliper should be in his other hand so the readout can be read directly and not upside down. I tried reading mine that way, and the output cannot easily be read—a measurement of 1.091 inches could be misinterpreted as 1.601 inches.
Sorry, but that photo bugs me (and I don’t work for Boeing!)
—Bob Walters, Life Member
Amphibiosity Is Up in the Air
One thought immediately came to mind: Can anyone say “Martin P6M Seamaster”? Since the Navy has not wasted enough money on the F-35, the V-22, littoral combat ships, the USS Boise (SSN-764), the Bonhomme Richard, and so on, let’s pour billions more down a rat hole the service cemented closed more than 60 years ago.
No offense to Lieutenant Commander Ackman, but now is not the time for another white elephant.
—Richard C. Thompson, Life Member
There’s a Diversity Gap in the Wardroom
I found Commander Urban’s comment on Ensign Barbero’s excellent article fascinating and ironic, in that it demonstrates the exact point that the original author was trying to make—that the concerns about a lack of representation by minority officers are summarily dismissed by those in the majority.
The issue here—that racial disparities are viewed differently depending on the viewer’s demographic—is clearly illustrated by the Navy’s own 2023 Health of the Force survey: 48 percent of white sailors agree with the statement “Racism is not a problem in the Navy,” while only 17 percent of Black service members agree. The idea that a pure meritocracy exists in the first place ignores reality, and the implication that it would result in a disproportionate representation seen in the officer corps is an ominous and unfair conclusion, implying a direct relationship between race, performance, and merit.
The oft-cited sports analogy is also flawed; there is a well-documented history of socioeconomic disparity in opportunities by demographic; golf, baseball, and tennis have long histories of racial exclusion. The stark contrast in the diversity of NFL coaches vs. players bears a strong resemblance to the issue pointed out by the author in the military, with similar negative effects on the institution. Lieutenant Commander Keith Green and I discuss another example of a discriminatory practice that resulted in racial disparity elsewhere in this issue. (See “The Tragedy of a Lost Generation,” pp. 74–75).
Numbers matter. I recently mentored a young officer who shared, “I am the only Black officer in my ship’s wardroom. I hate to say it, but sometimes I eat elsewhere just because I don’t feel welcome there, and there’s no senior mentor around to help me navigate the situation.” According to Lieutenant Commander Green, minorities (and some whites) fear the “IIRE response” when they speak about racism and discrimination: indignation, invalidation, retaliation, and envelopment. Coupled with the Department of Defense and individual services’ admittedly flawed formal complaint systems, it is understandable why so few are willing to risk it, as Ensign Barbero did. In Green’s case, he speaks from experience.
The commentator states flatly that “no one should care” about a lack of diversity in the wardroom, thereby minimizing the fact that the author does care. The key to understanding—and to the author’s second point, trust—is communication. I would encourage the commenter to reach out to Ensign Barbero and ask a simple question: “Why did you decide to write this article in the first place?” The ensign will be flattered that the commander took the time to ask. And the commander might learn something in the process.
—CAPT John Cordle, USN (Ret.)
An officer quota system to socially engineer prearranged outcomes can jeopardize training standards, create divisions, and demean minority individuals who merely want to compete on a level playing field. Similar to civilians, Sea Service members ought to be evaluated on the content of their character rather than skin color, in the words of Martin Luther King Jr.
Mandating a process based on diversity, equity, and inclusion could end up damaging the future success of minority individuals and punish those who scale the career ladder based on experience and meritocratic standards. Most enlisted folks do not care who leads them as long as those leaders are competent and fair, and everyone is held to the same standard of pulling their own weight.
—Christian Milord, USCG veteran, Life Member
End Affirmative Action in the Officer Corps
Kudos to Captain Flynn for expressing what really should be evident to even the casual observer.
Anyone who is honest and has spent even a few years in our modern military knows that among large groups in our country, the U.S. armed forces must be considered the paradigm for race relations in the United States.
While our military is not perfect in this metric, it is an organization that has displayed incredible effectiveness that can be attributed largely to unit cohesion. To be most effective, we must have as our focus to operate in all respects as one unified force. It is truly a matter of life and death and, further, essential to the defense of the United States and the Free World.
Forcing our young men and women to identify themselves by race and dividing them into identity groups based on immutable characteristics is not only unnecessary but nonsensical and dangerous relative to how we must work and fight as a team.
We divide and focus on such characteristics other than competence at our peril.
—CDR Steve Shatynski, USN (Ret.)
Why You Shouldn’t Come to the Naval War College
A Critique of Navy Professional Military Education
Five Recommended Reforms for the Naval War College
Rear Admiral Garvin’s article was a nice counterbalance to recent discussions of professional military education in general and the Naval War College in particular.
Captain Rubel and Dr. Elleman remind us that there is always room for improvement. Admiral Garvin reminds us of the war college’s storied past and its current contributions to national and global security.
Taken together, these three articles ought to impel us to ensure that the Naval War College keeps developing into the world-class institution it needs to be so that future warfighters can indeed better prevent or win the wars that come our way.
—CDR Shaun S. Brown, USN (Ret).
Leaders or Enablers? The Role of Information Warfare Officers
On active duty in the Navy, I was a scope dope—a radarman—and served on board the USS Long Beach (CGN-9) in the Gulf of Tonkin. In the combat information center, we collated information from multiple sources, digested it, and then disseminated our conclusions.
I spent most of my reserve career moving from service to service to retain what had become my main interest, operations and intelligence. I served in the Naval Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Army National Guard. I spent time educating the different forces as to what the sister forces were doing, how, and why.
Here is an example of the discord in military intelligence. I worked for General Dynamics in Fort Worth, Texas, for nine years. One of my assignments was a “black hole” project, which I analyzed and told my unit manager not to begin. The company did not have the appropriate resources. Well, the manager decided not to accept my conclusion and instead approved the project. We spent a year and millions of dollars on a project that was canceled one week before its first flight test on an F-16. The company that built the board had never built this type of board before and required more than 200 variances in design, and we lacked the software to perform the operation.
At brief in, I was taken by a government representative to a radio-frequency-secure room along with a new hire. The briefer talked in general terms. When he finished, he asked if we had any questions. I told him no, but I would tell him what the project was trying to do. I told him exactly what was being explored for the F-16. He looked shocked! How did I know what was to be accomplished? I told him they were trying to do on an F-16 what I had done on board a 721-foot-long nuclear-powered cruiser. I also asked why the Air Force did not talk to the Navy.
—SSG Gary M. Farral, ILANG (Ret.)comm
