The January 2022 crash of an F-35C Lightning II attempting to land on board the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) in the South China Sea gained attention around the world following the release of several dramatic videos of the event that quickly circulated on social media.1 Sadly, coverage of the mishap overshadowed the successful damage-control and rescue efforts that followed. The ejected pilot’s retrieval from the ocean and subsequent medical evacuation (medevac) was an outstanding example of the enduring utility of rotary-wing aircraft.2 Furthermore, the rescue and medevac missions illustrated the need for the Navy to include rotary-wing aviation requirements in future efforts to extend the reach of the carrier air wing.
The pilot was rescued by the ship’s plane-guard aircraft, an MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 4 (HSC-4). Conducting a traditional rescue within sight of the ship, the helicopter responded immediately on hearing the emergency radio calls, expeditiously recovered the survivor via rescue litter, and landed back on board the Carl Vinson just 34 minutes after the mishap.3 Navy rotary-wing crews train repeatedly for this situation—an ejection close to the carrier during cyclic operations. However, the medevac demonstrates the importance of the Navy’s rotary wing community to meet Indo-Pacific theater mission requirements as well as the enduring need for naval aviation to develop new capabilities and doctrine coinciding with the air wing’s “return of range.”4
Long Range Means Long Range
The F-35 crashed after returning from a training mission hundreds of miles from the Carl Vinson. As the Navy focuses on the threat from China, such long-range training missions have become increasingly common to remedy what Jerry Hendrix notably identified as the Navy’s “retreat from range” during the post–Cold War period.5 Fortunately, the long-range strike missions Carrier Air Wing 2 (CVW-2) regularly practiced from the Carl Vinson were accompanied by a long-range rescue posture from the HSC-4 Black Knights. They had developed procedures to deploy two specially equipped MH-60S aircraft hundreds of miles from the carrier. It was these aircraft that returned to the carrier shortly after the pilot had been rescued from the sea.6
In addition to the F-35 pilot, two other service members were seriously injured during the mishap, and all three required immediate medevac to higher-level medical care in Manila, approximately 300 nautical miles (nm) away. Even though CVW-2 included embarked CMV-22B Osprey aircraft, the MH-60S aircraft received the medevac tasking and completed the mission without delay.7 The HSC-4 crews were successful because they had practiced similar missions at the edge of their combat range and because they had deviated from standard aircraft fuel configurations to squeeze every possible mile of mission capability into every mission.
In addition to two 180-gallon main fuel tanks, MH-60S aircraft typically carry one 200-gallon internal auxiliary fuel tank, which extends the aircraft’s range by approximately 150 nm. HSC-4 had previously procured extra tanks and used them to fly long-range missions with a second internal auxiliary fuel tank, doubling the extended range and reducing the risk associated with their nighttime, 2.5-hour overwater flight in poor weather to an unfamiliar airfield.8
Along with growing the MH-60’s fuel capacity, other changes in rotary wing doctrine have extended the rescue reach of these assets. While supporting long-range air wing missions, HSC-4 regularly included fuel stops on board strike group “lily pads”—cruisers and destroyers sailing hundreds of miles from the carrier. Evolving distributed maritime operations doctrine will provide more opportunities for a corresponding distribution of rotary-wing rescue capabilities, but such long-range operations must be rehearsed regularly.
As naval aviation develops capabilities to extend the reach of the carrier air wing, supporting elements must stretch their reach in parallel. More work remains to ensure rescue assets can cover the full expanse anticipated in the Pacific battlespace. Range must move to the forefront of future decision-making when considering capability tradeoffs (e.g., weapons capability versus fuel capacity) as well as training focus (e.g., enroute medical care versus legacy surface attack missions).9 Furthermore, the Navy’s rotary-wing community must grow comfortable basing away from the carrier and operating at the extreme edge of an aircraft’s combat radius during exercises. The Chief of Naval Operations listed “distance” as the number one force-design imperative in his 2022 Navigation Plan. All naval aviation communities must heed that call.10
1. Sam LaGrone, “Crashed F-35C Fell Off USS Carl Vinson Flight Deck into South China Sea,” USNI News, 25 January 2022.
2. Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Carl Vinson Recovered Quickly after F-35C Ramp Strike, Say Officials,” USNI News, 15 February 2022.
3. Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Pilot Error Caused F-35 Carrier Crash and Plunge into South China Sea,” Navy Times, 22 February 2023; Department of the Navy, Command Investigation Into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the F-35C Class A Aviation Mishap of 24 Jan 22 (redacted for public release), 18 April 2022, 10, 23–25.
4. LCDRs Collin Fox, Dylan Phillips-Levine, and Trevor Phillips-Levine, USN, and Capt Walker Mills, USMC, “The Return of Range: How the Navy Got the MQ-25 Right,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 9 (September 2022).
5. Jerry Hendrix, “Retreat from Range,” Center for a New American Security, 19 October 2015.
6. Interview with CDR Tom Murray, USN, former commanding officer of HSC-4, 28 April 2023.
7. Interview with CDR Tom Murray.
8. Guardian™ Extended Range Fuel System (ERFS) fact sheet.
9. Navy Aviation Vision 2030–2035, Naval Aviation Enterprise, Public Release 2021–478.
10. ADM Michael M. Gilday, USN, Navigation Plan 2022, 8.
