A stand-in force designed to persist forward inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone with an array of lethal and nonlethal payloads sounds like a formidable threat. Unfortunately, the Marine littoral regiment (MLR) does not have the ability to move, sustain, or maintain that force with the surface transportation assets currently available. The Marines are stranded.
This is a known problem. Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger’s first two investment priorities in his May 2022 Force Design update are amphibious ships and watercraft. “Given our requirements for operational and tactical mobility, we must invest in the littoral maneuver capabilities that will enable the assured deployment and dynamic employment of our forces,” he noted.1 Platforms such as the landing ship medium (LSM) are being planned, but such investments take time, and the Marine Corps must be prepared to face the pacing threat with the assets available now. No littoral maneuver asset capable of meeting the Commandant’s intent exists in the Marine Corps today.
However, a solution to the MLR’s littoral maneuver gap does exist in the Navy’s special warfare community. The special warfare combatant-craft crewmen (SWCC), who reside under Naval Special Warfare Group (NSWG) 4, do littoral maneuver, with an emphasis on supporting special operations and coastal interdiction. These crew and their craft are designed and trained for stealth, rough seas, and long-range movements, and they can accomplish a wide range of missions, from transportation and reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, to visit, board, search, and seizure operations and coastal interdiction. The MLR should outsource its tactical littoral mobility requirements to SWCC until the LSM is fielded.
A Unique Challenge
The Marine Corps is accustomed to the dynamic employment of logistic support across the deep, close, and rear areas of a battlespace. In operations over the past two decades, the service created concepts of support that used multiple delivery platforms to push logistics using the hub-and-spoke model. The stand-in force, however, is far forward in the deep area of a maritime battlespace, is dispersed across multiple islands, and must maintain a low visual, audible, and electromagnetic signature to avoid detection and maintain the element of surprise. Whereas trucks and aircraft are readily available and organically held in the Marine Corps, small boats capable of long-range sea surface convoys are not. Marine Corps logistics must find new ways to move, sustain, and maintain the stand-in force in the deep area of a maritime battlespace.
The stand-in force will be employed primarily along the first island chain in the Pacific, where objective locations may be accessible only by assault support aircraft or watercraft capable of beaching. General Berger’s vision is a “naval force [that] will persist forward with many smaller, low signature, affordable platforms that can economically host a dense array of lethal and nonlethal payloads.”2 As the Marine Corps considers littoral maneuver inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ), the low signature requirement becomes critical. Current logistics connectors such as the landing craft utility, landing craft air cushion, and MV-22 Osprey do not meet that requirement, especially within the deep battlespace. In addition, positioning amphibious assault ships deep inside a WEZ to launch surface connectors is unrealistic, sacrifices the element of surprise, and exposes the ships to enemy missiles. Given enemy radar and antiair capabilities, the use of assault support aircraft also may not always be an option.
The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is charged with solving the littoral mobility gap by sourcing organic capabilities that can move and sustain the stand-in force. Currently, the lab has nine surface programs in various stages of the acquisition process that promise to fill some of the gaps.3 High-speed logistics using wing-in-ground effect is being considered to expeditiously insert small numbers of troops or as a casualty evacuation platform. MCWL also is considering stern-landing vessels to allow a roll-on/roll-off capability forward, and even low-profile autonomous delivery vessels capable of moving supplies. None of these programs, however, will be available for employment by the time the Marines expect to face the pacing threat.
The LSM may be the ultimate solution to the MLR’s littoral mobility gaps, but the first LSM is not planned to be fielded until fiscal year (FY) 2025, with the first four by FY27.4 In addition, as recently as September 2022, the Navy and the Marine Corps could not agree on what the platform should be, as there are “two competing visions for what the ship does and . . . the Navy is unlikely to budge.”5
The stand-in force cannot wait ten, five, or even two years. The Marine Corps must look elsewhere in the joint force to find the capabilities it requires now.
An Outsourcing Solution
The MLR should outsource its tactical littoral mobility requirements to NSWG-4 until the LSM is fully fielded. NSWG-4 and the SWCC trace their roots back to the PT boats of World War II that specialized in littoral and riverine operations. Within NSWG-4 are the Navy’s special boat teams (SBTs), which conduct “coastal patrol and interdiction while supporting special operations missions . . . focusing on infiltration and exfiltration of SOF . . . [while] providing dedicated rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate.”6 By developing a support relationship with NSWG-4, the MLR could gain immediate access to a rapid, proven, and stealthy mobility platform. The SBTs could insert the stand-in force and sustain and redeploy it as needed.
Following is one example of how the SWCC and the MLR could integrate:
Four SWCC boats arrive in the well deck of an LPD and load 76 Marines from the MLR. The LPD positions itself 200 nautical miles from the objective and launches the boats. The SWCC then rapidly and stealthily insert the Marines to their objective, a small island, and return to the LPD. Following this model over three periods of darkness, a company of Marines is inserted in the first island chain, at night, from a location outside the adversary’s WEZ. For the next two weeks, the SWCC push sustainment hits from the ship to the Marines ashore every 48 hours. Finally, after “standing in” for two weeks, the SWCC begin inserting the next company while removing the Marines who were ashore. By combining the tactical surface mobility of the SWCC with the capabilities of the MLR, the stand-in force could access a reliable and stealthy sustainment platform that is available now.
One SWCC boat stands out as a candidate for tactical littoral maneuver. The Mk 1 combatant craft medium (CCM) entered service in 2015 and has the tactical littoral maneuver capabilities needed by the stand-in force. The CCM is capable of speeds greater than 50 knots, can carry four crew and an additional 19 combat-loaded troops with mission equipment, and has a range of 400 nautical miles.7 Its 60-foot hull boasts a 7,750-pound payload and supports medium and heavy machine guns for force protection and direct fire.8 The CCM also provides a communications suite, including HF, UHF, VHF, and satellite communications, has a maritime infrared radar and global positioning system built in, and is equipped with identification friend or foe capability. Most important, the CCM can be launched and recovered from LPD and LHD amphibious assault ships. These capabilities make the CCM ideally suited for stand-in force maneuver and sustainment in the littorals.
The MLR’s capabilities will be enhanced by integrating Naval Special Warfare and the stand-in force. Early last year, during an at-sea training event, elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and SEAL Team 2 united with the USS Arlington (LPD-24) and Winston S. Churchill (DDG-81) to form an “Amphibious Black” maritime force to demonstrate two future concepts for the Navy and Marine Corps: distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations.9 Navy Captain Christopher Hill and Commander Timothy Shanley determined that “to contribute to a Pacific fight against a formidable adversary, NSW needs to be fully integrating with naval amphibious forces now.”10 By developing a relationship between NSWG-4 and the MLR, the Marine Corps and NSW could further integrate amphibious operations.
To solve the littoral maneuver gap, some have called for the Marine Corps to create its own small-boat companies: “permanent coastal/riverine assault companies (C/RACs) within existing infantry battalions.”11 However, this would exacerbate the sustainment concerns of the stand-in force, not solve them, as a large footprint of boats along with a security detail detached from the main body of the ground force would be left behind deep inside the WEZ. In addition, the Marine Corps would incur the costs of procuring, maintaining, and manning the boats. This idea might have merit as a long-term solution, as the strength of the Marine air-ground task force is its ability to self-lift and self-sustain, but an immediate capability is required before those investments are made.
Rethink Tactical Sea Transportation
The Commandant has made his intent clear: create the stand-in force and sustain it. The concept for the MLR is forcing logistics into the deep area of the Pacific littorals. As a result, the Marine Corps logistics community must rethink tactical sea surface transportation. The MLR may require 20 or more small boats that can stealthily and quickly move in the littorals. The Marine Corps has no such boats today.
NSWG-4 has highly skilled and trained operators with boats such as the CCM that can meet most of the littoral maneuver demands of the stand-in force: long-range, stealthy surface transportation that can handle rough sea states. The Marine Corps has always relied on the Navy for transportation on the high seas; it should be no different in the littorals. Because an organic tactical littoral maneuver capability cannot be procured quickly enough for the MLR, it must be outsourced to the SWCC.
1. Gen David H. Berger, USMC, Force Design 2030 Annual Update (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, May 2022), 15.
2. Gen. David H. Berger, USMC, Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, July 2019), 10.
3. Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Science & Technology Division, Logistics Combat Element (LCE) Overview & Portfolio Brief (Quantico, VA: 31 August 2022).
4. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 August 2022), 6.
5. Mallory Shelbourne, “Marine Corps, Navy Remain Split Over Design, Number of Future Light Amphibious Warship, Divide Risks Stalling Program,” USNI News, 14 September 2022.
6. U.S. Special Operations Command, 2016 Factbook (USSOCOM Public Affairs, 2015), 25.
7. “Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) Mk1,” AmericanSpecialOps.com.
8. “Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) Mk1.”
9. CAPT Christopher F. Hill and CDR Timothy F. Shanley, USN, “Amphibious Black: Guerrilla Warfighting in the Maritime Domain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 4 (April 2022).
10. Hill and Shanley, “Amphibious Black.”
11. CAPT Matthew Galadyk, USMC, “Small Boats, Big Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 146, no. 6 (June 2020).