Frigates are back. In August 2022, construction began on the future Constellation (FFG-62).1 The Constellation’s predecessor is the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)–class guided-missile frigate, the last of which was built more than 30 years ago and decommissioned in 2014.2 There are similarities between the conditions in which the two frigate classes were developed, including internal Navy challenges such as manpower shortages, budgetary constraints, and aging ships. Externally, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is modernizing and expanding rapidly, challenging the U.S. Navy much as the Soviet Navy did in the 1970s.
Comparing these conditions and revisiting debate over the implementation of the FFG-7s yields important lessons. The FFG-7 was a “transitional” platform that directly addressed specific Navy problems of the day and offered operational flexibility. Today’s Constellation class can be equally effective and should support a transition toward distributed maritime operations to sustain the viability of U.S. surface warfare.
Historical Context
The greatest U.S. strategic threat during the 1970s was the Soviet Union. The U.S. Navy was vital to countering Soviet influence but was increasingly challenged as the Cold War progressed. The Soviet Union’s desire to interfere with U.S. interests and project its own power around the world manifested in a large blue-water navy.3
To accomplish its goals, the Soviet Union sought to threaten U.S. aircraft carriers. This threat became especially concerning as the Soviet Navy rapidly modernized in the 1960s. By 1965, the Soviet Navy had produced new submarines, cruisers, and destroyer flotillas tasked with shadowing U.S. carrier battle groups (CVBGs).4 Jane’s Fighting Ships indicated a major shift in Soviet naval capabilities by the 1970s. Soviet platforms no longer merely copied Western technology, but were instead specifically suited to their goals—including disrupting CVBGs—which caught the attention of senior U.S. naval officers.5 Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) James Holloway even admitted that, by 1976, the U.S. Navy held only a “slim margin” of superiority over the Soviets.6
Soviet naval advancements compounded internal problems facing the U.S. Navy. The Navy in the 1970s was aging and shrinking, undercutting its wartime potential for power projection and convoy protection. The fleet’s beleaguered status was partially a result of the decommissioning of World War II–era destroyers, which lacked adequate capabilities for modern warfare.7 Retiring these ships reduced the Navy to its smallest size since before Pearl Harbor—a significant concern for naval leaders tasked with ensuring sea control and power projection.8
The Navy’s internal challenges stemmed from budgetary constraints and manpower issues, which led to a “hollow force,” denoting the Navy’s insufficient operational readiness.9 These problems further limited the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter the Soviet Navy. Amid these challenges, the FFG-7–class frigates were born.
The FFG-7: Design, Debate, Action
The USS Oliver Hazard Perry was commissioned in 1977. As a frigate, she was a small addition to the fleet, yet she had new capabilities as part of a wider Navy push for cost-effective modernization. The FFG-7 displaced approximately 4,000 tons and featured Harpoon and SM-1 missiles, one 76-mm OTO Melara gun, a 20-mm Phalanx close-in weapon system, Mk 32 torpedoes, and the ability to embark two SH-2 Seasprite light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) helicopters. She had a crew of 163 and an estimated range of 4,500 nautical miles with a top speed of 30 knots.10
The FFG-7 was intended as an escort vessel for protecting convoys and underway replenishment squadrons. CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt supported the FFG-7 class—the concept originated from a force design study he oversaw.11 The FFG-7 was well-suited to addressing the Navy’s internal and external challenges, as its small crew and low cost allowed the Navy to produce more than 50 ships of the class—supplying the demand created by the Soviet threat. In this way, the FFG-7 was an important “transitional” platform—buying the Navy time to better determine how to counter the Soviet Navy.
As more ships of the class were commissioned in the 1980s, however, their once-clear value was questioned. Lieutenant Commander Bruce Linder began a debate over the FFG-7 class in Proceedings in 1983, asking: “Now that we’ve got them, how do we use them?”12 Linder’s article opened a discussion on new operational uses for the frigate. Three main suggestions made by subsequent Proceedings contributors were: CVBG integration, frigate squadrons, and warfare specialization.
CVBG Integration. Several naval officers supported integrating FFG-7s with CVBGs, despite the frigates’ shortcomings in speed and communication systems. They argued the frigate could act as an escort and potentially strengthen antisubmarine capabilities with its LAMPS helicopters and AN/SQS-56 bow-mounted sonar and SQR-19 towed array.13 If not continuously deployed with battle groups, FFG-7s could accompany underway replenishment groups and remain with carriers after resupply.14 Integration could increase a CVBG’s defensive capability without detracting from its mobility.
Frigate Squadrons. Another suggestion was for FFG-7s to form frigate-only squadrons or to act in tandem with complementary platforms. Operating with other ships, such as the missile-patrol hydrofoils, combined FFG-7 squadrons could act as “fast-attack surface action groups” that would provide capabilities greater than the sum of their parts.15 Paired with other platforms, FFG-7s could provide quick and mobile escort capabilities to more expensive or specialized platforms to complement the strengths of both vessels. These squadrons offered to fulfill U.S. strategic demands for sea control and choke-point control and operate as “forward-deployed trip wipes” around the globe.16
Warfare Specialization. Also suggested was specialization within the class. With systems for antisubmarine, antiair, antimissile, and surface warfare already on board, some FFG-7s could be reconfigured to carry a more favorable load-out for combating a particular threat. Favored areas of specialization were antiair or antisubmarine warfare. Proponents claimed the FFG-7s, if outfitted correctly, could better contribute to the “outer-air battle” or long-range detection of submarines as pickets to support carrier and convoy protection.17
Real-world events, however, proved the FFG-7 was best suited for its initial purpose: escort duty. The 1980s Iran-Iraq War created new demand for convoy security, and as the Navy began protecting Kuwaiti-flagged tankers in the Persian Gulf. Between 1987 and 1989, the Navy protected 136 convoys, in which several FFG-7s participated.18 Most notably, attacks on the USS Stark (FFG-31) and Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) led to Operations Earnest Will and Praying Mantis, during which the USS Crommelin (FFG-37) and Simpson (FFG-56) protected convoys and destroyed Iranian gunboats, respectively.19 These operations demonstrated the FFG-7’s ability to conduct modern surface warfare. Operational flexibility also emphasized the FFG-7’s role as a transitional platform, allowing the Navy to fulfill key missions by addressing multiple challenges. FFG-7s neared the end of their service lives in the 1990s and were decommissioned as the Navy turned to new programs such as the littoral combat ship.
The Constellation Class
Today’s Navy faces challenges similar to those of the 1970s. Externally, China’s strategic aims in the western Pacific represent a resurgence in great power competition. U.S. government publications have assessed Beijing’s strategic goals to be: increasing military leverage over Taiwan, dominating China’s near-seas region, and displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific by eroding confidence in the U.S. Navy’s ability to conduct surface warfare operations.20 China’s goals are becoming more serious as its military continues to modernize.
China’s actions have led the Marine Corps and Navy to recognize the need to adapt to sustain the viability of naval warfare operations.21 The PLA has steadily advanced its capabilities, including four recent developments that directly threaten the viability of U.S. surface warfare: 1) long-range surveillance, 2) advanced antiship cruise and ballistic missiles, 3) improved strike aircraft, and 4) quieter submarines equipped with new munitions.22
These developments are direct challenges to U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs)—similar to those of the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. While China seeks to threaten carriers, it is important to acknowledge differences in technology and Beijing’s more regional (rather than global) concerns. Nonetheless, these external challenges threaten the carrier’s central role in the Navy and compound current issues that mirror historical internal challenges.
Today’s Navy faces internal challenges comparable to those of the 1970s, including an aging fleet, investment in faltering new platforms, manpower shortages, and too few ships to meet demands. As of 2018, more than 50 percent of the Navy’s ships were more than 20 years old.23 In the fleet’s younger half, underperforming platforms such as the littoral combat ships are being decommissioned early. The Zumwalt-class destroyers proved too expensive to build in quantity, and the three that were built have required additional time and alteration to reach operational practicality.24 The Navy has been unable to meet its desired fleet size, with even modest demands for 355 ships deemed “infeasible” because of rising costs.25 Despite fleet downsizing, the Navy is still struggling with manpower retention, reporting that nearly 9,000 at-sea billets went unfilled in 2022.26
Facing these challenges, the Navy is building the Constellation. She will displace approximately 7,200 tons and feature systems such as Aegis, the SPY-6 radar, 32 Mk 41 missile cells, one 57-mm gun, rolling airframe missiles, Mk 53 missile countermeasures, as well as the ability to embark one MH-60R helicopter and multiple unmanned aerial vehicles.27 The Constellation’s program manager describes her as an agile platform capable of task force integration and multiple warfare operations.28 With such a broad description, however, the question—much like the one posed by Lieutenant Commander Linder in 1983—still stands: How should these frigates be used? The Constellation class, in many ways, can directly address the Navy’s internal and external challenges.
Recommendations
Past suggestions for the FFG-7 class are equally applicable to the Constellation class, with some key differences. Unlike the FFG-7, the Constellation is specifically designed to integrate with CSGs.29 In addition, the Constellation class will cost more (in today’s dollars) than the FFG-7 class, despite its use of preexisting systems.30 Besides these differences, both classes similarly address the Navy’s problems through design and operational flexibility. That flexibility will be key to successfully implementing the Constellation.
Like the FFG-7 class, the Constellation class could operate with carriers, squadrons, or as specialized platforms. Improved capabilities now allow frigates to better operate with CSGs—serving as scouts, air-and-missile-defense platforms, or antisubmarine warfare ships. Constellation-class frigates and Zumwalt-class destroyers could complement each other’s capabilities, with frigates escorting and supporting more expensive, offensive systems. Frigate specialization also is an interesting proposition, given the decommissioning of the Navy’s minesweepers and the emerging threat of PLAN submarines.
Just like the FFG-7 class, the Constellation class will increase the Navy’s size and operational flexibility—buying time to develop a fleet better prepared for warfare in the coming decades. Given the PLAN’s increasing threat to carrier-centric operations, the Constellation class should support both traditional concepts—such as integrating with CSGs—and new distributed maritime operations.
1. “Navy Commences Construction of First Constellation Class Frigate,” U.S. Navy Office of Information, 31 August 2022.
2. “Ingraham (FFG-61),” Naval Vessel Register, last updated 5 October 2021.
3. Steven E. Miller, “Assessing the Soviet Navy,” Naval War College Review 32, no. 6 (September–October 1979): 57.
4. Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea: A Violent Peace, 1946–2006 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2007), 183.
5. Raymond V. B. Blackman, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1970–71 (New York: McGraw, 1970), 571; and Rose, Power at Sea, 183.
6. Rose, Power at Sea, 183.
7. Frederick Bigelow Easton, “Case Study: FFG-7 Class Ship,” master’s thesis (Naval Postgraduate School, 1978), 11.
8. Rose, Power at Sea, 186.
9. Andrew Feickert and Stephen Daggett, A Historical Perspective on “Hollow Forces” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1.
10. John Evelyn Moore, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1977–87 (London: Jane’s Yearbooks, 1977), 603.
11. “Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt’s Project 60, Part 1,” CIMSEC, 14 August 2019.
12. LCDR Bruce R. Linder, USN, “FFG-7s: Square Pegs?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 109, no. 6 (June 1983): 38–43.
13. LCDR Graeme G. Rogers, RAN, “Tough New Kids on the Block,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 116.
14. LT Dennis T. Stokowski, USN, “The FFG-7s in War and Peace,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 115.
15. LCDR Kendall King, USN, “The Not-So-Odd Couple,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 124; and Bruce Friedman, “A Squadron of 7s,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 127.
16. ENS Daniel L. Richardson, USN, “Super Sevens,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 134.
17. MIDN Scott M. Newman, USN, “FFG-7s in the Outer Air Battle,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 110, no. 4 (April 1984): 138; and King, “Not-So-Odd,” 125.
18. Craig L. Symonds, Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 267.
19. Andrew R. Marvin, “Operation Earnest Will—The U.S. Foreign Policy behind U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 1987–89; A Curious Case,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 13; Symonds, Decision at Sea, 297, 283, 307.
20. Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 November 2022), 2.
21. Gen David H. Berger, USMC, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2 August 2021).
22. “Chinese Threats to U.S. Surface Ships: An Assessment of Relative Capabilities, 1996–2017,” RAND Corporation (2015), 1.
23. Megan Eckstein, “Heritage Report: Aging Navy Fleet Complicates Tradeoff Between Buying New Ships, Fixing Old Ones,” USNI News, 4 October 2018.
24. Paul McLeary, “20 Years Later, the Navy Says Its Littoral Combat Ships (Kind Of) Work,” Politico, 15 July 2022; and Mallory Shelbourne, “USS Zumwalt’s Recent Pacific Underway Is ‘First Step’ for Future of the Class, Says PACFLEET Commander,” USNI News, 21 November 2022.
25. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021: Navy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 November 2020.
26. Heather Mongilio, “Navy Needs to Fill About 9,000 At-Sea Billets in More than a Dozen Ratings, Says Personnel Command,” USNI News, 25 October 2022.
27. Kevin Smith, “Guided Missile Frigate (FFG-62) Update: National Symposium–Surface Navy Association,” slideshow, Surface Navy Association, 11 January 2022, 4.
28. Smith, “Guided Missile Frigate,” 2.
29. David B. Larter, “Exclusive Interview: The Navy’s Surface Warfare Director Talks Frigate Requirements,” Defense News, 11 July 2017.
30. For costs of the FFG-7 and FFG-62, see: U.S. Government Accountability Office, The Navy’s FFG-7 Class Frigate Shipbuilding Program, and Other Ship Program Issues (Washington, DC, 1979), 4; and Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 August 2022), 5.