Since the arrival of the America-class amphibious assault ships into the fleet, there have been numerous articles championing them as Lightning or light carriers (CVLs). Indeed, a recent article in Proceedings argues the Americas are as survivable as the similarly sized Essex-class carriers—citing the USS Franklin (CV-13), which survived the worst bombing attack of World War II—and offers the USS Bataan’s (LHD-5) 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment as a “Harrier carrier” as proof of the concept.1
There are a few problems with this line of thinking.
Survivability
All U.S. Navy warships are designed to accomplish their most demanding mission. For amphibious assault ships, that is amphibious assault, and to conduct amphibious assault, these ships are built to a lower survivability level (Level II) than aircraft carriers (Level III).
Level II permits amphibious assault ships to be designed and built to carry out the Marine Corps’ concepts of operational maneuver from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver, which require unobstructed, wide-open spaces, passageways, and ramps with no fire curtains or dividing doors that might impede the rapid movement of Marines, vehicles, and material ashore. That the America-class LHAs and World War II–era modified Essex-class carriers have a similar displacement does not mean they are equally survivable.
The damage report for the Franklin (an Essex-class carrier) describes what happened on 19 March 1945:
While conducting air strikes against targets on the Japanese Islands of Kyushu and Honshu, Franklin was struck by two bombs which detonated in the hangar. . . . Direct damage resulting from detonation of the enemy bombs was extensive in itself but appears minor compared with the immense damage caused by subsequent fires, explosions of bombs and rockets, and water used in firefighting. Major fires raged on the flight and hangar decks and in gallery spaces for approximately ten hours. . . . Large areas of the flight deck and hangar and gallery spaces were wrecked. All power was lost when dense smoke and heat forced engineering spaces to be evacuated. Personnel casualties were severe. . . . Main propulsion power was regained on 20 March and the ship proceeded to Ulithi and thence to the Navy Yard, New York.2
It further notes:
It is pertinent, however . . . that the resulting damage would not in itself have caused the loss of the ship. . . . This is principally attributable to the excellent shielding effect of the armored portion of the hangar deck.
What made the Franklin’s hull so survivable?
The hangar bay had fire curtains that could divide the space into thirds, and its armored deck was made of specially treated steel (STS) two-and-a-half inches thick running four-fifths of the ship’s length. It protected all the living spaces below, especially the second deck—the damage control deck—which housed eight repair lockers, each manned by teams of firefighters.
A Torpedo Side Protection System (TSPS) wrapped the carrier’s hull with pairs of outboard fuel tanks and matching pairs of voids in each subdivision to protect vital interior spaces by dissipating the impact of underwater attacks. Transverse bulkheads in the TSPS provided significant, repetitive bracing. Designed to bend but not break, the bulkheads were welded to the TSPS’s four longitudinal bulkheads that ran parallel to the side of the ship for two-thirds of her length, surrounding her power plant spaces and magazines. In fact, most of the structure, including the triple bottom, was welded together, providing tremendous strength.
The placement of the transverse bulkheads low in the ship also lowered the center of gravity to accommodate the thick armored hangar deck higher in the ship.
The America class, both Flight 0 and Flight I, has none of these structural hull features, and the fire on board the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) in 2020 demonstrated how vulnerable these ships are to fire below deck.
Size
The America class’s 45,000-ton displacement is too light to operate its aircraft more than 45 percent of the time in four of the most tactically significant seas around the world, according to a Naval Sea Systems Command 1980 study. Figure 1 plots the allowable time for operating aircraft off ships in five seas of military significance. Note the green “sea line” for the South China Sea, which starts at a displacement of 65,000 tons with a time of operability of 54 percent. If that green line were extended down to a displacement of 45,000 tons, the time of operability would be well below 45 percent. Indeed, for four of the five seas (with the exception of the Mediterranean), if the sea lines were extended down to a displacement of 45,000 tons, all their times of aircraft operability would be below 50 percent.3
But didn’t the Bataan prove the Harrier carrier concept? It did—but under the umbrella of aircraft from the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), Constellation (CV-64), or Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), which provided the airborne early warning, suppression of enemy air defenses, and antiair warfare without which the Harriers could not have performed strike missions without significant risk.
In addition, the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group improvised a daring but ingenious solution to receive ordnance from ammunition ships. As explained in a 2004 Proceedings article, a shuttle ship, the USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52), received the ordnance on its flight deck, then transferred it down into the well-deck and loaded it into landing craft air-cushion, which then raced the ordnance, protected only by tarps, to the Bataan, where it was offloaded in her well deck. “Because delivery through the well deck did not affect flight operations, ordnance supplied by LCACs gave the Harrier carrier the greatest operational flexibility.”4
While the Bataan was able to perform the strike mission well on the calm waters of the Arabian Gulf, where she could operate aircraft much more than half the time, the Navy continues to do “Lightning carrier demonstrations” with Flight 0 ships of the America class that have no well deck. The America (LHA-6) and Tripoli (LHA-7) will have to do vertical underway replenishment, which will interfere with flight operations.
Also, if the Americas carry more strike aircraft, the supply of ordnance will have to grow accordingly. Why? The size of ordnance magazines for the Americas is based on the design of the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD-8), which supports six Harriers providing close air support for one week of amphibious assault. A Gerald R. Ford- or a Nimitz-class carrier’s magazines, in contrast, are more than 23 times larger to support 60 strike-fighters for two weeks. Twenty F-35B strike-fighters will quickly exhaust an America’s ordnance, which begs the question: Where will the extra ordnance be stowed? Stowing it in the hangar bay or vehicle stowage is a bad idea. If there is no extra space for stowage, how often will they have to conduct vertical replenishment? How long will that take? Are there enough logistic ships to meet the frequency of resupply?
The America-class amphibious assault ships were built to a lower survivability level than aircraft carriers, and their open interiors aft make them more vulnerable to fire below. And Lightning carrier demonstrations have not addressed adequate resupply and safe stowage of ordnance. The time has not yet come for the Americas to be considered a reliable, survivable strike platform in most of the seas of the world.
1. CAPT Pete Pagano, USN (Ret.), “The CVL’s Time Has Come,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 147, no. 9 (September 2021).
2. “USS Franklin (CV-13) War Damage Report No. 56, 16 September 1946,” Naval History and Heritage Command.
3. Edward N. Comstock, Susan L. Bales, and Dana M. Gentile, “Seakeeping Performance Comparison of Air Capable Ships,” Naval Engineers Journal 94, no. 2 (April 1982): 101.
4. LCDR Cindy Rodriguez, USN, Maj Michael Manzer Jr, USMC, and CDRs Shawn Lobree and John Dachos, USN, “Harrier Carriers Perform in Iraqi Freedom,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 2 (February 2004).
