Safe and effective navigation is something the surface navy often takes for granted. With GPS for real-time fixes and automatic plotting on the electronic charting display and information system–Navy, the art of navigating by traditional means seems antiquated. The lack of human input desensitized a whole generation of surface warfare officers (SWOs) to the vital importance of navigation, and skills such as plotting on a chart have atrophied. Yet, traditional navigation is far from obsolete. In an age during which GPS denial is becoming a greater threat, the practice of traditional navigation skills will be critical in helping ships find their way.
Navigation needs its own group of specialists. Luckily, such a category already exists for the surface navy—warfare tactics instructors (WTIs). Currently, there are officers who learn, develop, and train others in the latest warfare tactics for integrated air and missile defense, antisubmarine/antisurface warfare, mine warfare, and expeditionary warfare. All these warfare areas depend, in one way or another, on navigation.
The increasing complexity of the tactical environment necessitated the creation of the WTI program. Similarly, a navigation environment of growing complexity requires navigation WTIs.
Novices in Navigation
Even with the recent changes to SWO training, there is opportunity for improvement in mariner skills. Most surface warfare junior officers are novices at navigation. Even those serving in designated navigator billets, which require completing a five-week navigation course, need a lot of on-the-job training and support from more experienced quartermasters and navigators on the waterfront.
Centralizing expertise is part of what the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) does for tactics. Doing the same for navigation would simplify the process of obtaining support. In addition, there is a need to consolidate lessons learned from GPS-denial exercises so they are accessible to all navigation teams.
The U.S. Navy could learn a lot about training navigators from the Royal Navy. Today’s Royal Navy continues to create professional mariners who earn Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) certificates and sends its prospective navigators underway for training.1 The Ministry of Defence takes underway navigation training so seriously that it recently recommissioned HMS Severn to serve as a navigation training ship.2 Instead of relying as much on on-the-job training, the U.S. Navy could create a specialty to further hone the craft of navigation.
The Royal Navy has two separate tiers of “navigating officers.” The International Navigating Officers’ Course (INOC) prepares officers to serve as navigating officers on board corvettes, mine countermeasures ships, or offshore patrol vessels. It is a ten-week course, during which eight weeks are spent in the classroom and two weeks underway on the Severn. To qualify for this course, officers must be sub-lieutenants (equivalent to U.S. Navy ensign) or junior lieutenants (lieutenant junior grade) with an STCW certificate, two years of seagoing experience, and 1,000 hours of certified bridge watchstanding experience.3
The International Long Navigation Course (ILNC) qualifies officers to serve on frigate-size vessels and larger, as navigation instructors or staff navigation officers.4 This is a 14-week course that, like INOC, also incorporates underway pilotage on board the Severn. To qualify for ILNC, an officer must be a lieutenant with five years of seagoing experience and 2,000 hours of bridge watchstanding. The stringent requirements and training pipeline for INOC and ILNC display a level of qualification the U.S. Navy lacks.
Navigation WTIs
The qualifications for navigation WTIs should be the same as the requirements for immediate-superior-in-command navigation assessors, as specified in the Surface Ship Navigation Department Organization and Regulations Manual, which includes officers, quartermasters, and operational specialists.5 Having enlisted navigation WTIs would help address the lack of senior navigation experience throughout the fleet, which contributed to the 2017 USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) collision.6 Most of the officer billets would be filled by navigators who are post-second-tour division officers, but some billets would be filled by post-second-tour department head navigators. Including the latter improves tactical integration because those officers have experience as tactical action officers. Post-second-tour department head navigators, who only serve on amphibious assault ships, would also be able to apply their experience with amphibious operations.
SMWDC’s navigation division could be in Newport, Rhode Island, where the surface navigation course resides. This would allow the experts to train future navigators. Enlisted navigation WTIs would be the top picks to serve on afloat training group (ATG) staffs. Previous ATG experience training and certifying ships to the standard for mobility–navigation is invaluable, and it complements the tactical perspective SWOs bring to navigation.
The training pipeline for navigation WTIs should start with advanced navigation techniques and information warfare, especially as the latter pertains to GPS, radar, radio, and other navigation systems susceptible to adversary interference. WTI candidates should also undertake meteorology and oceanography training, with particular emphasis on their tactical implications, such as sound-speed profile for antisubmarine warfare or weather for communications. Even though paper charts are no longer authorized, prospective navigation WTIs should be given training for plotting on paper charts. This is a fundamental navigation skill that does not rely on electrical power and is the basis for understanding plotting on electronic systems. Finally, the curriculum should include a detailed lesson modeled after the navigation self-assessment and groom training each ship receives. This would familiarize prospective WTIs with the operations, capabilities, and limitations of all navigation systems in the fleet, enabling them to begin formulating new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Navigation WTIs would bring their knowledge to prospective navigators and assistant navigators, as well as to their next ship after they complete their SMWDC tour. The Navy would soon have navigation experts on board most ships who can assist the navigators and instruct junior officers. WTIs could also serve as researchers and provide the energy and motivation to industry and other Navy organizations to develop, test, and field new technology. Establishing a navigation center of excellence would enable the Navy to continue being a high-velocity learning organization that incorporates best practices.
The Navy should not use the ability to successfully shoot down missiles in a simulator as the sole gauge for readiness to win the high-end fight. A higher standard of navigation, brought to the fleet by expert navigation specialists, would give the surface navy a tactical edge it needs to dominate in battle. Recent history has shown how complacency in navigation can spell doom for ships. The Navy must think tactically about navigation and stop treating it like an afterthought.
1. LT Mitch McGuffie, USN, “A Rude Awakening,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135, no. 1 (January 2009).
2. The Royal Navy, “Second Life Officially Begins for Severn after Thames Recommissioning,” 28 August 2021, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2021/august/28/20210828-severn-recommissioned.
3. The Royal Navy, International Defence Training, “International Navigating Operators’ Course (INOC),” May 2015, www.royalnavy.mod.uk/-/media/royal-navy-responsive/documents/idt/operations/warfare-officer/11_04_ops_inoc.pdf.
4. The Royal Navy, “International Long Navigation Course (ILNC),” International Defence Training, January 2017.
5. Department of the Navy, Naval Surface Force/U.S. Pacific Fleet, ComNavSurfPacInst 3530.4G: Surface Ship Navigation Department Organization and Regulations Manual (28 October 2021).
6. Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Lack of a Senior Quartermaster Contributed to Fitz Disaster,” Navy Times, 24 January 2019.