The Military Sealift Command’s (MSC’s) civilian manned, unarmed combat logistics force (CLF) fleet is neither a combat force nor much of a logistics force if it is unable to deliver the goods the “last tactical mile.” However, the Navy’s large amphibious ships can step into the breech and move the “beans, bullets, and black oil” from the safe havens of the rear area to the contested zones where the fleet must operate to fight and win a great power war.
CLF ships were an integral part of the Navy throughout the 20th century. The transition to MSC began after a 1972 study determined it would be less expensive to have the CLF ships manned by civilian mariners. It accelerated after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and completed in the early 2000s. In my May 2019 Proceedings article, “Organize the Combat Logistics Force for the High-End Fight,” I argued that today’s civilian manned, unarmed fleet of CLF ships represent a critical vulnerability for the Navy in the event of a high-end conflict against a peer or near-peer adversary. The vulnerability of the CLF stems from three sources: low inventory of ships, no means of self-defense, and operational limitations resulting from civilian manning. In that article, I argued for nothing less than the return of the combat logistics force to the Navy where the ships could be manned, armed, and employed like the rest of the fleet.
Given the Navy’s continuing difficulty in making the case for more funding, the money will not be there to allow a return of the CLF to the Navy any time soon. As evidenced in the fiscal year 2023 Navy budget submission, Navy leaders seem determined to press on with a budget strategy of “divest to invest,” despite a rising Chinese navy that outnumbers and in some categories outclasses the U.S Navy surface force and in the face of an ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Rather than a dramatic expansion, it is more likely the Navy’s budget will be further cut to bolster the Army in Europe.
The results are evident if an unarmed and civilian manned combat logistics force is forced to remain in safe havens far from the combat zone. Warships and formations will have to leave station for excessively long periods of time to transit to these safe havens for replenishment and then return to the combat zone, burning much of the fuel they just took aboard and losing momentum and initiative against the enemy. The Navy is exploring the concept of a force of small logistic support vessels that will take on stores and fuel from the existing CLF ships in safe areas and then venture forth to supply the frontline warships. This is a flawed concept for two reasons. First, a small vessel can only supply a small amount of fuel and stores. Second, these low-signature vessels—something akin to an offshore oil platform supply boat—are not expected to be armed and will be manned by an ever-shrinking civilian mariner pool of commercial sailors. This approach may disperse the risk to the combat logistic ships but will not meet the high-consumption demand of warships engaged in an intensive naval fight.
Gator Navy to the Rescue
Both the Wasp-class landing helicopter dock (LHD) and America-class landing helicopter assault (LHA) ships are fitted with a fueling-at-sea (FAS) rig that can deliver fuel to ships at sea while underway. In other words, they are capable of underway replenishment just like the CLF fleet of oilers and product-delivery ships. Further, these two classes of ships are equipped with organic helicopters that can conduct vertical replenishment of cargo and other stores between ships. In 2008, while deployed on board the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) as her executive officer, I witnessed firsthand the utility of this class of ship in supporting the Navy surface combatants on distant stations by conducting two fueling-at-sea replenishments for Arleigh Burke–class destroyers that were a long time between oiler “hits” from the lone CLF replenishment ship in theater. Of note, these fueling missions were not directed by fleet headquarters but rather were initiated by the ships’ leaders.
The Wasp-class carries more than 1.5 million gallons of ship fuel and another half-million gallons of aviation fuel. Its cargo storerooms are designed to support a crew of 1,000 personnel as well as 2,000 embarked Marines and the supplies those Marines require ashore. Any amount of this fuel and cargo can be transferred at sea while underway. The support the Navy’s amphibious ships can provide is not limited to fuel, food, and stores, however. The LHDs and LHAs are also equipped with machine shops to rewind motors, repair pumps, and conduct welding repairs. Both classes also have extensive medical capabilities.
Furthermore, the San Antonio–class amphibious transport docks (LPDs) can also be employed in this concept of expeditionary logistics. Although not equipped with a FAS rig, the San Antonio–class has ample fuel and stores capacity. The stores can be delivered underway via helicopter vertical replenishment and fuel can be transferred to other ships via stationary alongside methods in sheltered waters. However, adding a FAS rig to these ships would probably not be too difficult, nor require extensive modification. Medical and limited repair support can also be provided within existing ship capabilities. Furthermore, the San Antonio–class possesses low-signature characteristics that would allow clandestine replenishment missions in the combat zone.
In addition to the logistic-support capabilities of amphibious warships, they also possess extensive C5ISR equipment and layered self-defenses, thus drawing a counterpoint to the ships’ survivability vis-à-vis unarmed CLF ships. These amphibious ship types also contribute to the shared battlespace awareness of the joint and Navy force through their C5ISR sensors and communication capabilities.
Out of the Assault Business?
Amphibious ships would still do their primary mission—deliver landing forces to a hostile or potentially hostile shore and support that landing force once it is ashore. However, in the event of great power war, new means of amphibious warfare are being envisioned with experimentation ongoing and low-signature forms of amphibious shipping proposed. In the event of a large-scale amphibious operation or missions that require stand-off, long-range amphibious assault capability, the fleet of large amphibious ships would still be necessary. However, those types of operations may be deemed infeasible in the face of enemy capabilities or unnecessary in the context of the campaign plan.
Employing the Navy’s amphibious warfare ships in expeditionary logistics would be yet another example of the tremendous flexibility these ships possess. MSC’s civilian-crewed CLF ships would carry the fuel, stores, and repair parts from the continental United States and other sources of supplies as far forward as feasible, given the vulnerability of the ships and statute limitations of civilian crews. From there, the Gator navy of large amphibious warfare ships—manned by uniformed Navy personnel and equipped with the weapon systems and sensors to defend themselves—would take those supplies into the combat zone to replenish warships at the “tip of the spear.” Those warships can then remain on station and on the move, taking the fight to the enemy without loss of momentum.
This innovative and bold use of the Navy’s large amphibious warships are just one example of the out-of-the-box thinking that must be employed in the event of great power war. Although the Navy’s budget woes are largely self-inflicted by the nation’s decision to spend less than three percent of GDP on defense, the following oft-repeated quote by Sir Winston Churchill is still germane: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.”
