Risk-Based SAR Decision-Making Works

On 21 October 2020, the Coast Guard search-and-rescue coordination center in South Portland, Maine, received a report of a 77-foot fishing vessel, the Sea Farmer II, disabled and adrift 60 miles east of Kennebunkport. Sea Farmer II’s generator had failed. On notification, Coast Guard Sector Northern New England dispatched the USCGC Sitkinak (WPB-1329), a 110-foot patrol boat from Portland, to assess the on-scene conditions and render assistance. In the ensuing 24 hours, crews from Coast Guard Sectors Northern New England and Boston demonstrated effective use of the risk-management system to respond
to a disabled fishing vessel, save five lives, and avoid nearly $1 million in property losses.

On an average day, Coast Guard crews respond to 45 search-and-rescue (SAR) cases, save 10 lives, and preserve more than $1.2 million in property.¹ Risk management is how Coast Guard crews evaluate, manage, and communicate risk to shore-side management staff. The Coast Guard updated its risk-management instruction in 2018 and broadly categorizes risk-management activities into deliberate and real-time assessments. The instruction defines risk as “the possibility of loss or injury due to exposure to a hazard” and risk-management as “a process to identify, assess, control, mitigate, and manage hazards associated with an operation or activity.”²

Deliberate risk management occurs in advance of operations to identify potential risks and hazards.³ This is often done at the beginning of a day or watch as a discussion of all planning, event complexity, asset, communications/supervision, and environment (PEACE) elements that may arise. It also can be a monthly training board meeting to discuss shortfalls in the unit’s ability to respond to certain missions.⁴ Real-time assessments occur following a mission brief and immediately prior to beginning an operation. Operators assess all PEACE elements using the General Assessment of Risk (GAR) 2.0 process and use the spread-out, transfer, avoid, accept, reduce (STAAR) model to mitigate and control risk after all factors for a specific mission are identified.⁵ A real-time risk assessment results in GAR “scores” that identify risk (low/medium/high) and gain (low/medium/high). GAR scores allow on-scene units to quickly communicate their concerns and mitigations for a mission.

The Sitkinak crew had a daily risk-management discussion while underway and did a formal GAR 2.0 assessment before every mission. By promoting a command climate in which all team members could speak if they felt uncomfortable or noticed an unsafe situation, the Sitkinak was prepared for more complex evolutions in variable weather conditions and with a tired crew. Furthermore, the Sitkinak routinely discussed SAR response during unit training board meetings as part of deliberate risk management. The boat procured lines and visual aids for towing at night and held training with other units to improve the crew’s skill level.

The Sea Farmer II Rescue

After arriving on scene, the Sitkinak and Sea Farmer II captains discussed the latter vessel’s conditions via radio to ensure all risk factors related to a towing operation were best understood. The Sea Farmer II’s captain provided two vital pieces of information. First, the Sea Farmer II was operating on backup batteries of unknown endurance. Second, the captain was unable to raise the trawl net, which was stuck in the “down” position with approximately 150 feet of net dragging underwater from the vessel’s aft deck. The battery situation was potentially a safety-of-life concern. The net’s condition informed the “event complexity” discussion, as the Sitkinak had not prepared to tow a vessel with unknown displacement.

The Sitkinak’s captain relayed this information via satellite phone to the Coast Guard coordination center and the SAR mission coordinator (SMC). The SMC is responsible for all aspects of planning, coordinating, and managing the SAR response, to include risk management.⁶ The Sitkinak’s report to the SMC included the full results of the GAR 2.0 real-time assessment.

Conducting the tow at night, in three-to-four-foot seas at a five-second period and heavy fog with only 100 yards of visibility, and with an uncertain load trailing behind the towed vessel, added to the complexity of the Sitkinak’s discussion with the SMC. However, high risk factors alone do not determine whether a mission should be undertaken. When assessing the gain of taking the vessel in tow, responders discussed the alternative of the Sitkinak simply escorting the vessel back to port. However, the Sea Farmer II’s back-up batteries were the sole source of power for the very-high-frequency (VHF) radio, GPS, radar, navigation lights, and electronic steering system. If the batteries died before reaching port—which would take more than 20 hours—the vessel would lose all maneuverability and radio communications, preventing it from transmitting distress calls.

The Sea Farmer II’s size and displacement coupled with the unknown additional weight of the submerged net could exceed the patrol boat’s max towing capacity of 300 tons. The Coast Guard team initiated a conference call between the SMC, command center duty officer, and the Sitkinak to decide the best course of action. Based on the known elements, the Coast Guard team decided it best to take the Sea Farmer II under tow rather than allow her to continue home unassisted.

Just after sunset, the Sitkinak’s crew safely took the Sea Farmer II into tow toward Gloucester, Massachusetts. It took approximately 800 of the maximum 900 feet of towline to get in step with the fishing vessel. By the time the vessel was in step, the cutter was not able to see her at the end of the towline. The weight of the tow was substantial. The cutter had both main engines engaged and was only making three knots of headway. This was significant, as the cutter normally clutches in at 12 knots on both main diesel engines.

Throughout the night, there was a fair amount of strain on the towline as the weather worsened, with seas increasing to four to six feet and visibility decreasing to less than 200 feet. The Sitkinak advised the fishing vessel to turn off all navigation equipment except for the VHF radios. If radio communication was lost, there would have been no way to communicate with the Sea Farmer II in the event of an emergency.

As sunrise approached and visibility increased, it was clear the towline was under significant strain with no catenary (slight dip) in the line, indicating a high risk of parting. After this discovery, the Sitkinak’s captain mustered the team to reassess the initial concerns presented in the GAR discussion the prior evening. The Sitkinak’s captain notified the Coast Guard coordination center and SMC of the high-risk situation but recommended continuing the tow since the vessel’s steering system and navigation equipment had lost power. The gain still outweighed the risk, given that the crew would be stranded more than 30 miles offshore if the Sea Farmer II’s batteries failed.

After being towed for 18 hours and 60 nm toward Cape Ann, the Sea Farmer II was met by a 47-foot motor lifeboat from Coast Guard Station Gloucester and its owner for repairs. During repairs, the vessel’s trawl net fouled on the bottom, requiring the Sitkinak to initiate an emergency breakaway. The changing dynamics of this and most incidents warrant continuous dialogue between the SMC and on-scene leaders. Earlier that morning, the Sitkinak and SMC discussed the proposed rendezvous point and concerns over water depth. It was agreed that the cutter would remain four miles east of the original rendezvous point in at least 150 feet of water. However, the trawl net fouled in approximately 170 feet of water. In hindsight, this was likely because the additional fish catch accumulated overnight, increasing the net’s reported depth. Luckily, this was identified early and discussed at length, preventing the situation from worsening.

In less than 10 minutes, the Sitkinak’s crew safely disengaged the tow and brought all 800 feet of heavy tow line on deck. They remained close to the vessel to provide assistance in the event of further casualty. The Sea Farmer II’s owner was able to successfully make repairs, raise the net back on board the vessel, and bring the vessel into Gloucester harbor under her own power.

The Sea Farmer II response highlights the need for continuous and deliberate risk-based decision-making and to discuss asset limitations and clearly communicate crew concerns to those making decisions about the case but not in the operating environment. Real-time risk assessments using GAR 2.0 discussions also aided the team in communicating their concerns; however, these were only starting points for the non-structured discussions directly between the on-scene commander and the SMC.

For routine evolutions, risk management and GAR 2.0 briefs can seem mundane and unnecessary—even boring—but when lives are at stake, they provide essential information to command centers and SMCs. Risk management and direct communication in this case ultimately saved lives and property and should become a standard component of Coast Guard SAR operations.