Fight Mines Instead of People

Naval mines are an effective yet inexpensive strategy for an adversary seeking to prevent the United States from moving forces by sea. But they also provide the U.S. Navy with tangible targets in operations short of open warfare, gray zone conflicts with unmarked military forces, or interventions between two warring nations. In short, naval mines can present an opportunity as well as a problem.

Mines, China, and Taiwan

Given the lack of a formal defense agreement between the United States and Taiwan, it is unclear how the United States would respond to a conflict between China and Taiwan.¹ What is clear is that, at the start of a conflict, China would employ a blockade campaign designed to strike at Taiwan’s economy and military by stopping maritime and air traffic.²

Taiwan’s seven port cities would be critical for the resupply of its military and the flow of humanitarian relief for civilians. Were China to resort to mining ports that could not be adequately blockaded, clearing even one harbor might be beyond the capability of Taiwan’s four 1950s-era ex-Aggressive–class oceangoing minesweepers, four German-made MWW-50–class minehunters, and two ex-Osprey-class minehunters. In line with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requirement to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services . . . as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” the U.S. Navy would need to employ large-scale stand-off minehunting and mine-neutralization systems to remove the mines—without directly engaging China’s naval forces.³

During the Korean War, the U.S. Navy conducted close-in clearance operations in Wonson Harbor, within range of North Korean shore batteries and aircraft. China’s mining of Taiwan would not necessarily be accompanied by the same attrition witnessed in Wonson. China could avoid direct conflict by blockading shipping beyond the effective range of Taiwan’s naval and air forces and mining Taiwan’s harbors using submarines and unmarked surface vessels of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia.

Ordinarily, the gray zone tactics preferred by China are difficult for the United States to counter effectively.⁴  But a naval mine laid outside China’s territorial waters can be legally removed. In the case of China mining Taiwan’s harbors and sea lines of communication, the U.S. Navy could conduct large-scale stand-off mine clearance using the mine countermeasures package developed for the littoral combat ship (LCS) across destroyers, optionally manned vessels, and unmanned vessels.

U.S. Navy Capabilities

The Navy continues to decommission its remaining Avenger-class mine countermeasure (MCM) vessels. And although it plans to dedicate the LCS to mine and surface warfare missions, it intends to decommission nine Freedom variants. Elimination of the Avenger class and cuts to LCS numbers complicate a large-scale mine clearance effort.

The reduced number of dedicated mine-clearance vessels could be offset if the MCM mission package developed for the LCS were backfitted on the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. With more than 60 in service, the Arleigh Burkes are among the world’s most numerous modern warships afloat. But only six of these ships were specially fitted to operate the Remote Mine Sensor. They could be more readily refitted to accommodate the Knifefish surface mine countermeasure unmanned underwater vehicle (SMCM UUV) system to locate and help clear detected mines.

In addition, each destroyer is capable of embarking two MH-60R Seahawk antisubmarine warfare helicopters, and the same aviation facilities can operate the MH-60S Knighthawk utility helicopter and MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The MH-60S can employ the remotely operated vehicle and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, while the MQ-8B can be equipped with the Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis mine-detection sensor.

MCM-capable destroyers offer an answer to the Navy’s need for large-scale mine clearance. Still, the emergence of optionally manned surface vessels (OUSVs) could expand the MCM revolution. Intended to transform surface warfare by providing an unmanned surface vessel equipped with antiship missiles, the OUSV is designed to accommodate containerized systems such as the LCS MCM package and the necessary personnel to operate them.⁵ While OUSVs lack aviation facilities, they can employ unmanned minesweeping systems that enable a larger LCS to conduct stand-off clearance operations.

By dedicating the remaining LCSs to mine warfare, backfitting more Arleigh Burke–class destroyers to carry the Knifefish and MCM-equipped helicopters and UAVs, and extending LCS MCM mission packages to large OUSVs, the Navy could attain more than double the minehunting and mine clearing capability it ever had and provide its fleet with a modern countermeasure to the mine threat.

Lessons from the Past

Had the U.S. Navy been more proficient in MCM during Operation Ernest Will in 1987—the escort of noncombatant civilian shipping amid the Iraq–Iran War—it might not have suffered the mine damage to its ships and civilian shipping and also might have avoided conducting retaliatory strikes against Iran’s naval forces in Operations Nimble Archer and Praying Mantis. U.S. escalation and the Iranian losses suffered during the Iran–Iraq War contributed to Iran ending its attacks on shipping. Still, it inadvertently contributed to the 1988 downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG-49) after it was misidentified as an Iranian fighter flying toward an ongoing naval engagement between the Vincennes and Iranian gunboats.⁶

The United States has to prepare to intervene in a blockade and mining of Taiwan’s ports. But it cannot risk the same escalation with China as occurred with Iran in the 1980s. Although it is more logical to prevent mining than wait to clear the laid mines, destroying China’s mine-laying capability is a sure way to insert the United States into a war it does not want to fight. While refitting Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to detect and avoid mines would help in any large-scale mine-clearance operation, augmenting MCM-equipped LCSs with MCM-equipped OUSVs is a feasible option to increase the size of the MCM fleet to help keep Taiwan’s sea lines of communication open by fighting China’s mines instead of risking a fight with China’s people.