Bring Unmanned to the Indo-Pacific

To counter the threat of a rising and expansionist China, Indo-Pacific nations are pushing to improve their ability to identify vessels in the maritime domain. Their current capabilities tend to feature land-based radars and limited satellite capabilities. A possible solution already is being tested in the Middle East, where U.S. Fifth Fleet has established an unmanned task force that is enhancing regional maritime domain awareness.¹

Task Force 59 has taken commercially available unmanned platforms, paired with artificial intelligence, and quickly integrated them into Fifth Fleet operations in novel ways. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Fifth Fleet Commander, says the intent is twofold: “One, enhance our maritime domain awareness, and two, increase deterrence.”² As the Navy looks ahead to the next region where an unmanned task force could affect adversaries’ calculus, the Indo-Pacific region’s growing importance as the center of rising global competition and hub of worldwide maritime trade is a powerful argument for assigning the next unmanned task force to this theater. This would make the Indo-Pacific more transparent and could serve as the command-and-control backbone for other unmanned missions.

Plan to Expand

The Navy must consider some basic questions as it stands up the next unmanned task force. Where should this organization be situated to best capture lessons from Task Force 59 and other organizations that operate unmanned vehicles? What missions are most compatible with unmanned platforms and their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)? What is the Navy’s role in the unmanned mission and where can it have the most impact given the state of competition and rising maritime security concerns in the Indo-Pacific? How might it integrate unmanned platforms from the air, sea, and undersea domains?

The Navy also must determine in which regions a task force can be successful and develop the proper command-and-control structures to ensure the unmanned platforms meet their full operational capabilities and relieve pressure on crewed resources.

In addition, as the operating areas for unmanned vehicles expand, it will be critical to standardize operating principles and procedures. Surface Development Squadron 1 (SurfDevRon 1)—established to man, train, and equip the three Zumwalt-class destroyers, the Navy’s two large unmanned surface vessels, and the Ghost Fleet ships—is the ideal organization to standardize the TTPs, oversee manning, training, and equipping, and act as the force provider for all unmanned surface vehicles as the Navy expands beyond the vital work of Task Force 59.³ As fleets desire to implement unmanned surface vehicles, SurfDevRon 1 should deploy the assets as part of a task group. Together with SurfDevRon 1, the fleet’s regional experts and partner nations should further develop regional concepts of employment.

Task Force 759

Eighty percent of the world’s maritime trade in oil passes through Indian Ocean region (IOR) choke points.⁴ Understanding what is floating on and under these waters is of vital interest to India and the many countries that border this vast expanse of the maritime domain.⁵ By knowing the pattern of life of “white” shipping, it becomes easier to classify the potential bad actors, military vessels, or vessels otherwise not reporting their information.

A new Task Force 759 based in Seventh Fleet should be the next instantiation of the Navy’s unmanned operations. Using current unmanned assets available to the fleet and supplied by SurfDevRon 1, the task force could help identify and deter malign actors in the region. A network of unmanned vessels could serve as additional sensors in critical areas.

Using patterns of life as a starting point, these unmanned vessels could relay precise information to manned platforms and shore facilities to aid in vessel classification beyond what is available from space or over the horizon. The task force could include both Navy operators employing currently fielded technology solutions from multiple warfare communities and civilian contractors using new systems.

Unmanned platforms will enable distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations. By putting the command-and-control structures in place under Task Force 759 as the supported commander, with task group assets provided by SurfDevRon 1, the lessons can start to be gathered now to develop and refine future concepts of operation and employment. In turn, SurfDevRon 1 could act as a centralized learning hub for all unmanned surface operations.

Task Force 759 could partner with Japan, Australia, India, and other nations in the Indo-Pacific. Formal alliances should not be required to participate in this information sharing, but the United States might need to formalize information-sharing procedures to control who has access to certain types of data. The Information Fusion Center–Indian Ocean Region, hosted by India and staffed by liaison officers from many countries including the United States, continues to improve its vessel tracking capabilities and pattern of life tracking.⁶

FONOPS

Task Force 759 also could be used for freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea. Littoral combat ships (LCSs) teamed with unmanned vessels could create a new layer of support for this vital national mission—unburdening Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and the dwindling number of Ticonderoga-class cruisers. During peacetime operations, an LCS flying the U.S. flag with unmanned vessels in formation would be impactful. Such a formation would expand the coverage possible with a traditional single or dual-ship FONOPs and show U.S. allies and partners that the Navy continues to operate wherever international law allows.

Analysis on the rights of unmanned vessels at sea is ongoing. If conducting military data collection, a naval unmanned vessel is entitled to operate in another country’s exclusive economic zone in accordance with Article 58 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, as long as it does not interfere with the economic activities of the nation.⁷ However, if that vessel were in an area where China has made excessive maritime claims, it could be illegally detained or seized—and China might have less concern about disabling or capturing an unmanned vessel. But there are ways to deal with this problem:

• The vessel could be attritable, with no technology to exploit.

• The vessel could be optionally manned, meaning crews sometimes could be on board, adding an element of the unknown for adversaries.

• The vessel could be within range of a crewed ship, effectively tethering the unmanned platform.

As the Navy moves toward an unmanned future, it must continue to explore opportunities to employ new technologies. Under the guidance of SurfDevRon 1 and the leadership of an unmanned Task Force 759 in Seventh Fleet, the unmanned mission could grow and continue the U.S. pivot to Asia.