Winston Churchill called it “the worst journey in the world.” According to historian David Sears, The Murmansk Run, as it was familiarly known, was absolutely vital to supplying the Soviets battling the Germans on the Eastern Front. In all, some 40 convoys totaling more than 800 merchant ships, including 350 under the U.S. flag, started on the Murmansk Run from 1941 through 1945.1
On that run alone, 85 U.S. merchant ships were lost.2 Merchant seamen became de facto combatants on these voyages north, fighting side by side with U.S. Navy armed guards.3
The next conflict will be no different. To win, the United States must be able to turn to its civilian merchant mariners to transport critical supplies through contested waters. This is not a new topic: Merchant mariners have delivered logistics and sustainment to warfighters over the past 100 years. What must be improved is their training. At present, there are no requirements or standards for wartime training provided to the nation’s civilian mariners, and the next conflict is likely to be at least as challenging as the Murmansk Run.
The Navy’s Surface Force Strategy acknowledges that the return of great power competition is testing the nation’s maritime dominance. In response, the Navy’s tactics have shifted from amassing force to the concept of distributed lethality, with a heavy emphasis on operations within the electromagnetic spectrum.
Tactical Advisors Are Insufficient
Regrettably, the U.S. Merchant Marine mind-set and training have been slow to adapt to the changing security environment. In 2018, Military Sealift Command (MSC) implemented the Tactical Advisor (TacAd) program to address training gaps and support the U.S. Merchant Marine. This program trains and employs strategic sealift officers (SSOs) as military liaisons to commercial vessel crews, providing tactical expertise and coordination with naval forces to operate secure communications equipment underway.
Currently, SSO-trained TacAds provide the crewing capability of licensed deck and engine officers to Military Sealift Command’s surge sealift fleet and Ready Reserve Force in times of national defense or emergency.4 With 60 ships in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), 46 vessels from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF), and 8 vessels from MSC’s surge sealift fleet, the likelihood of every ship having a uniformed TacAd onboard is low.5
To expand TacAd capacity and training, MSC has incorporated contested-environment training and TacAd assignment into RRF/sealift vessel activations and exercises. In March 2020, MSC integrated commercial and organic sealift to conduct coordinated maneuvers with U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Second Fleet. While contested-environment training for TacAds is a step in the right direction, it fails to address the systemic issues of training large union pools of mariners and—in some cases—high turnover rates.
The use of TacAds is a good short-term solution. However, it fails to address the greater strategic demand that all U.S.-licensed and unlicensed mariners prepare to accomplish the mission during a contingency or crisis. If the United States goes to war tomorrow, the Department of Defense (MSC) will assume operational control of civilian ships, which will be sailing into a 21st-century fight with little to no tactical training. It will not be the cigarette light on deck at night that gives the ship away to the enemy, but a phone call or the use of the wi-fi network to send an email that will have tactical and even strategic consequences.
Require Contested-Environment Training
John Konrad, a licensed master mariner, captures this problem in his editorial article “Admiral, I am NOT Ready for War.” Konrad laments that he is “fully ready to sail my ship anywhere, even into conflicted waters, everywhere except into large scale war.”6 Even more shocking, he poses questions such as, “Will zig-zagging help me avoid modern day submarines? How do I join a convoy? What do I secure for radio silence?” These are basic tactical questions. This is no fault of Captain Konrad’s; tactical training does not exist for most U.S. licensed mariners.
For the Merchant Marine to persist in a fight, mariners require training to gain the proficiency and confidence to deliver goods while sailing through a contested environment. This training should be a requirement to maintain a U.S. merchant mariner license.
Required military training for merchant mariners is not a new concept. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 created the U.S. Maritime Service (USMS), the organization responsible for mariner training.7 The USMS began operation in 1938 and expanded as the likelihood of war increased. Even after hostilities concluded, the 1946 curriculum at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy included a course for tactics in ordnance and gunnery.8 This wartime curriculum no longer exists.
According to retired Rear Admiral Mark H. Buzby, former U.S. Maritime Administration (MarAd) administrator,
MarAd continues to support mariner education and training through the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and facilitates mariner education through the support we provide to the six state maritime academies, which produce highly skilled licensed officers for the U.S. Merchant Marine.9
Part of the training curriculum and mariner education at the maritime academies must include how to operate a vessel in a contested environment. While the maritime education system produces highly skilled officers, it fails to prepare graduates for wartime service. A naval-interoperability course could easily be added to the Department of Naval Science at Kings Point.
In addition, Congress has invested significant money in the Maritime Security Program. As part of the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress reauthorized the MSP for ten years, through 2035. “In addition to the certainty of a long-term reauthorization, the MSP stipend was increased to $5.3 million per vessel per year in 2022, with gradual increases to $6.8 million in 2032.”10 A small fraction of this expense could be invested in the training of the men and women of the U.S. Merchant Marine to prepare them to operate in a contested environment. Reappropriating funds for this could have potentially huge payoffs in war in terms of vessels and cargo avoiding destruction at the hands of an enemy.
The U.S. government could institute a mandate that merchant seamen and officers maintain naval-interoperability training as part of their National Merchant Mariner Endorsement. This requirement would prepare civilian mariners to operate with naval and joint forces in crisis or conflict.
The Maritime Administration, Military Sealift Command, U.S. Coast Guard, and industry partners should work closely together and develop realistic and cost-effective naval-interoperability courses to be included with licensing requirements. There is precedent for adding requirements to hold a national endorsement or Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) for seafarers, evidenced by the addition of the leadership and teamworking/managerial skills to the STCW gap-closing requirements.11 Also, while the domestic maritime industry carries the cost burden for leadership and management training, it allows operating companies to mandate cyber awareness training for their mariners against ransomware/malware on board their vessels while also providing shipping companies with mariners ready for high-risk routes and ultimately mitigating risk to shareholder and underwriter.
The U.S. Merchant Marine supports the Navy and joint forces today, but training for integrated operations lacks robustness. To be ready to support the warfighter tomorrow, ship owners, unions, and MarAd must take responsibility for the safety and well-being of their mariners and provide the basic tools and principles necessary to operate in a contested environment. The 2020 tri-service maritime strategy Advantage At Sea states, “The Naval Service does not compete, deter, or fight alone. We are an integral part of the Joint Force and work closely with allies, partners, and other government agencies. We are also part of America’s broader maritime enterprise, which includes commercial ships, merchant mariners, port infrastructure, and shipbuilders.”12 Industry partners teamed with the Coast Guard, Department of Defense, and Department of Transportation should work together to ensure the safety of U.S. merchant mariners. The government must prepare the Merchant Marine now to meet the objectives set forth in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and be ready to answer the call.
1. David Sears, “Murmansk or Die,” HistoryNet, (n.d.).
2. T. Horodysky, “U.S. Merchant Ships Sunk or Damaged in World War II,” American Merchant Marine at War, 1 January 2004.
3. Joan Veronica Robertson, “World War II–The Arctic Convoys on the Murmansk Run,” HubPages, 7 February 2013.
4. USMMA, “Strategic Sealift Officer,” USMMA, 22 July 2014.
5. U.S. Department of Transportation, “State of the United States’ Merchant Marine Fleet in Foreign Commerce,” Maritime Administration, 29 September 2010; U.S. Department of Transportation, “The Ready Reserve Force,” Maritime Administration, 17 June 2020.
6. John Konrad, “Admiral, I Am NOT Ready for War,” gCaptain, 8 May 2019.
7. U.S. Department of Transportation, “The Maritime Administration’s First 100 Years: 1916–2016,” Maritime Administration, 25 March 2019.
8. U.S. Merchant Marine Cadet Corps, Cadet-Midshipmen: Information for Ship’s Officers and Shoreside Officials, U.S. Merchant Marine Cadet Corps, 8 March 1946.
9. RADM Mark H. Buzby, USN (Ret.), “Sealift and Mobility Requirements in Support of the National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Transportation, 11 March 2020. See also CAPT Joseph Schwartzstein, USMM, and CDR Christopher Anderson, USN “Bring Back the National Sealift Training Program,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 146, no. 7 (July 2020).
10. Darrell L. Conner et al., “The Can-Do Congress?” U.S. Maritime and Public Policy and Law Alert, K&L Gates Hub, 8 January 2020.
11. 46 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 11, Subpart C.
12. Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, December 2020).