In a Marine Corps planning process exposure event, the notional higher headquarters directed the student planning team to support all media requests and movement of media personnel through the battlespace. At first, I thought this was odd, but soon I saw it as an opportunity to support information warfare. Military leaders must reframe the narrative on embedding media as an opportunity rather than a constraint. Operations in the information environment are not restricted to the highest authority levels. Embedding members of the press at the tactical level can be an effective counter to adversary misinformation campaigns and help shape potential conflicts. Military leaders should incorporate embedded media into tactical-level, garrison training.
Information as Power
Passive information warfare is one of the many instruments a nation can use to achieve its strategic goals. Yet, the U.S. military struggles to effectively communicate the most basic actions, including tactical military operations, to the international audience. Information and the ability to communicate that information to those outside U.S. boundaries is essential for refuting adversary propaganda.
With creation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, the United States crafted a global public relations network to explain U.S. principles and policies to the world and at home. Voice of America presented a balanced view of U.S. actions and ideas in countries that had to rely on state-controlled sources for news.1
During the Cold War, USIA established multiple outlets around the globe as a part of a larger containment strategy. Radio Free Europe, one of those outlets broadcasting in Europe, gained credibility for reporting not only on issues on the European continent, but also on issues at home in the United States. It challenged Communist regimes and movements in eastern Europe and played “a significant role in the collapse of communism and the rise of democracies in post-communist Europe.”2 But as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has noted, despite inventing modern communications, the United States now struggles to develop an information strategy to counter peer-threat nations and take the fight to them at home.3
Globalization and the expansion of social media intensified the speed at which information is shared. Adversaries exploit this by spreading information—regardless of its veracity—to discredit Western intentions. These challenges are compounded at home by ratings-driven cable news networks competing for viewers.
A Capability Gap
For the Navy–Marine Corps, one difficulty in meeting these challenges is a reluctance to delegate responsibility to the tactical-level commander. In the Marine Corps, communication strategy and operations are general officer–level capabilities. Lower-level commands must request support from a higher command to publish news releases. Media involvement in a training exercise or even small-scale unit events faces bureaucratic obstacles. In future combat, tactical-level units will be unfamiliar with media integration.
Achieving strategic-level messaging in the time demanded by the current peer-threat operating environment hinges on the ability to reduce the “flash to bang” gap. The services should restart the relationship between members of the press and tactical-level military members.
An Active Media Presence
The day after the last U.S. forces departed Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, a Chinese-sympathetic newspaper released a scathing editorial in Taiwan. It argued that the United States could not be trusted and that Taiwan’s relationship to the United States was likely to break at the first indication of conflict. The counterargument in the international press was lackluster. Combine this with images from the chaos of the evacuation, and the United States fell behind in the messaging battle.
The image that pushed through the growing “abandonment” narrative was of Sergeant Nicole Gee holding an Afghan newborn with the caption: “I love my job.” Sergeant Gee’s photo was her own, taken in the days prior to her death in the terror attack against the airport. The photo supported the United States’ desired narrative: We will leave no one behind.
Sergeant Gee’s social media post was competitive because it originated at the tactical level. She told the story from inside the security perimeter while the media reported the chaos outside the airport.
During the Vietnam War, reporters regularly embedded with units to record events for the public thousands of miles away. UPI reporter Joe Galloway began his relationship with 1st Battalion, 7th Calvary, joining patrols among the soldiers in Plei Me. After several days of carrying an M16 and his own supplies, Galloway sat down to boil water for coffee. In their first interaction, Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore walked up to Galloway and said, “We all shave in my outfit—reporters included.”4 Galloway got the message and used the boiling water to shave. He connected with and became part of the battalion. Galloway stayed close with Moore and his men during the Ia Drang Valley campaign.
The benefits of this media-military interaction extended beyond factual, timely reporting. Galloway and Moore’s relationship enabled an empathetic component to the news coverage that captured the soldiers’ struggles.
Information Operations at the Tactical Level
The United States should educate its tactical leaders on media relation because of the bleed-over between the tactical and strategic levels. This is not an argument for every commander to be a public affairs officer; it is a recommendation for small unit leaders to prepare for and embrace media presence in garrison and combat. Human connections provide depth and relatability. The goal is to communicate beyond the standard public affairs releases. The strategic-level benefit is providing credible, critical reporting from a civilian who witnessed events firsthand.
Embedding a reporter in a squad patrol on a regular basis is almost inconceivable in today’s forces. Most media visits are isolated to the highest levels of command; the rifleman in a squad talks to a member of the press only after intense preparation and screening. The military is reluctant to improve media relations, for reasons including it is “too risky,” classification exceeds the reporter’s credentials, and a general concern for negative attention.
How can the Marine Corps change the system to bring media embeds to the tactical level? Start at home with training exercises. Not everything the service does is classified or too risky. Military Times and Stars & Stripes do a solid job reporting, but their audience is too narrow, and they cannot compete on the international stage. Relationship building to “get out the message” must occur with members of the national press, including the Associated Press and major media outlets.
Company-level field exercises, close-air support training, and service-level training exercises are all opportunities for media to embed with Marines, to understand what they do and build lasting relationships. Building the bond and connecting in garrison is necessary to achieve the connections that deliver stories like Galloway’s work for UPI. The Department of the Navy does not need propaganda, it needs reporters to live and experience combat training with the tactical-level units now to prepare for war reporting in the next conflict.
The World Is Listening
Information operations are not limited to leaflet drops or suppressing social media. A free press news report also can be effective in countering false narratives and supporting the future fight. Sergeant Gee’s post captured the humanity and emotion of military operations. Her social media account stood in contrast to the images of chaos and turmoil. But the Marine Corps and other services cannot rely on individual members’ social media posts for narrative control. They must be open to the international press and enable passive information operations at the tactical level.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore and his battalion relied on Joe Galloway to communicate their actions at Landing Zone X-ray. Fifty years later, the world still listens to the messages from the front, but the critical question for the military is who will be driving those messages.
1. See Robert Gates, Exercise of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 2020), 36.
2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “History.”
3. Robert Gates, Exercise of Power (New York: Vintage Books, 2020), 38.
4. Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, “Ia Drang—The Battle That Changed the War in Vietnam,” in We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young” (Open Road Media, Kindle Edition), 34.
