The U.S. Navy has enjoyed technological and material supremacy over its rivals since World War II. However, given the postwar changes in U.S. diplomatic, military, and maritime strategic goals, as well as advances in military technology, there is little doubt the Navy will have a learning curve in a conflict with a determined, well-trained, and well-equipped adversary.
In some cases, campaign, tactical, and operations analyses of past conflicts often are considered irrelevant because of changes in technology. However, warfare is a clash involving people, and thus certain aspects of leadership and command and control during naval combat will be applicable even as the means of waging war continue to evolve; the presence of humans on the battlefield is always the critical variable.
The 1916 battle of Jutland between the Royal Navy and Imperial German Navy presents an appropriate case study for examining the importance of initiative, especially at the deckplate level. Most interesting, perhaps, is that strategic analysts and military intellectuals already have noted operational and strategic parallels between World War I and a potential modern conflict with China.1 The lack of fleet action by the Royal Navy following the Battle of Trafalgar lasted almost 100 years and ended at Jutland, paralleling the current U.S. Navy’s inexperience in kinetic combat, following a successful “apex” campaign in the Pacific during World War II.2 Although the U.S. Navy may maintain material and technological superiority, U.S. adversaries may still succeed in delivering a tactical blow that costs lives, ships, and the Navy’s reputation as a fighting force.
The actions of the two principle Royal Navy admirals at Jutland were topics of dispute after World War I.3 Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander of the Battle Cruiser Fleet (BCF), was an initiative-driven, autocratic fighter not prone to waiting to give or receive signals before acting to close with and destroy the enemy. Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander of the Grand Fleet, was focused on the timely transmission of orders through signals and massive fleet maneuvers carefully choreographed and executed to gain a decisive tactical advantage over an enemy. The contentious aftermath of Jutland revolved around several key tactical decisions on the part of the officers involved, which ultimately cost the British disproportionate losses against an inferior enemy force.4 Waiting for orders, instead of acting without them to meet commander’s intent, was the key issue in the maneuvers in question.5
Today’s Navy is in a command-and-control-centric environment. Common tactical and operational pictures are excellent means of assessing the situation, determining a course of action, and issuing orders, but they should never supersede a dedicated dissemination and understanding of intent. There is no greater asset than a unit that can operate in a communications-denied environment, able to inflict damage on the enemy in concert with adjacent units because of its understanding of commander’s intent. This also is the basis of the “Nelson Touch,” whereby commanders share their visions directly with subordinates and trust them to execute in accordance with their intent when the time comes and signals cannot be sent or received.6
Even in this era of constant connectedness, this assertion still rings true. The ability to operate in a communication-denied battlespace means units can still achieve the mission’s aim, even as part of an aggregated but geographically separated force. The degree to which the Navy trains units to operate without orders will directly affect their ability to discharge their tasks when signals cannot to be given, received, or readily understood because of the conditions of combat or enemy counter–command-and-control measures.
Naturally, this is easier said than done, and it means leaders will have to resist overburdening subordinates with directions if such instructions would only hamper the junior’s response. It is why, during exercises and training, the Navy must seek to disrupt chains of command and deliberately confuse every level of decision-making. At Jutland, decisions were late because of lack of information—subordinates either did not or could not keep their seniors informed as to the tactical situation. The Grand Fleet’s formation of the line of battle prior to its meeting the High Seas Fleet (which was engaged with and following the BCF) was delayed and not optimized because of inconsistent, inaccurate, or incomplete information.7
In today’s Navy, training must emphasize the ability to make sound decisions based on available information, sometimes with limited or no tactical data. The Navy cannot be lulled into a large-scale engagement in which leaders wait for instructions that have been sent but not received, or instructions that have not transmitted at all. As the communication links between forces grow stronger, the services cannot be fooled into consistently relying on those links in battle. This concept is understood and embraced at the officer level in the modern Navy; however, it also should be applied in an enlisted context. In anticipation of battle scenarios in which leaders may be incapacitated and junior personnel may have to step up, the Navy should equip subordinates to do their supervisors’ jobs, and even lead their peers should the need arise. Strongly encouraging qualification and training at levels above pay-grade is beneficial in this regard; so is allowing simulations reflecting this concept during exercises, wherein a junior enlisted sailor must assume the role of his or her incapacitated leader and discharge their duties and tasks without hesitation or order.
Initiative may be somewhat of a catchphrase in today’s military, but as a characteristic, it should be loosely defined as to act without orders or prompting to meet the needs of the mission and the intent of the superior. This kind of initiative is invaluable at every level in the rank structure. If leaders are inundated with the need to constantly issue, revise, and follow up on orders, how can they focus on the big picture? It is important to note that initiative applies only in certain circumstances, as some tasks require direct orders to execute at the level of authority in question. And equally important is that several traits enable initiative—specifically, knowledge, judgment, and intelligence. Knowledge is understanding the relevant facts, the mission, and the superior’s intent. Judgment enables decisiveness and knowing when and how to seize the initiative to act when orders cannot be sent, received, or readily understood. Intelligence allows assimilation of available information, inference of the way ahead, and the articulation of clear, concise instructions to meet commander’s intent and mission requirements.
So how does one create an initiative culture? Begin with developing the art of communicating intent. Specifically, purpose (why we are doing something), method (an unrestrictive, basic statement of how it is to be accomplished), and the desired end-state (what is expected to occur). The more proficient every leader is at communicating intent, the better subordinates can respond with disciplined initiative. Subsequently, the Navy should examine the nature and effects of its long reprieve of peace. Military veterans of direct action understand that with the attrition of battlefield leaders through wounding or death, a relatively junior person may find him or herself suddenly in charge of a small unit. Also, empowering subordinates to act while embracing the occasional and inevitable mistake is easier said than done, but it is necessary to develop initiative.
Waiting for orders cost the British an astounding victory at Jutland—a consequence the U.S. Navy will want to avoid in its next fight. Practicing communicating intent and instilling initiative in officers and sailors now will pay dividends in the next fight.
1. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 44–73.
2. Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 155–93.
3. Gordon, The Rules of the Game, 503–61, 537–61.
4. “Battle of Jutland,” History.com.
5. Gordon, The Rules of the Game, 81–129.
6. Gordon, 182–83; see also, Steve Orbon, “The Nelson Touch; Leader Development and Its Link to Realizing Mission Command,” The Field Grade Leader, 24 October 2019.
7. Gordon, The Rules of the Game, 403–72.
