The war in Ukraine is forcing the West to adjust politically and militarily to new realities with Russia, but we cannot overlook the opportunities China now stands to gain in the Arctic. The sweeping sanctions imposed on Russia have had serious impacts on their banking system, energy sector, and access to key technologies. These sanctions effectively cut Russia off from the West and could force them to rely on China to avoid economic ruin. While Beijing could benefit in several ways, the United States cannot overlook the international security implications for the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
The Northern Sea Route
The NSR lies along Russia’s Arctic coast and could become a primary maritime highway linking Asia and Europe. The NSR saves one to 3,000 miles over the Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal. These savings are of similar magnitude to the voyage increases caused by the grounding of the Ever Given, which resulted in major supply chain and economic disruption across multiple continents. Russia can currently maintain NSR traffic for about nine months out of the year, but they have stated their goal is to facilitate year-round access by 2024. Reliance on the NSR and other Arctic shipping lanes will only increase as the far north warms. Though Western sanctions now threaten the NSR’s development, China is prepared to capitalize.
China’s Interest
China shows clear economic and strategic interest in the Arctic. Economically, they are eager to exploit the advantages of Trans-Arctic shipping routes, and they have established a “Polar Silk Road” initiative specifically outlining their goals to influence Arctic development. Strategically, China seeks to increase its maritime influence as a near-peer power, even claiming it is a “Near Arctic State” to justify its interests above 66˚30’N. China announced plans in November 2021 to build a third icebreaker and other ships tailored to assist Russia’s Arctic developments, and President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin jointly stated their plan to “intensify” their Arctic cooperation in February 2022.
Now, with a weakened and desperate Moscow, Beijing could step up and exploit Russia’s NSR. Though Russia has over 40 icebreakers, those currently planned or under construction and other necessary Arctic infrastructure are likely jeopardized by Western sanctions. Russia will need increased support from China to keep the NSR and other national interests on track. China could then leverage free use, and possibly gain special privileges to assist in the operations and upkeep of the NSR. It is even possible an ever-isolated Russia could become so indebted and desperate for an Arctic ally to the point of giving China a small piece of Arctic territory, thus facilitating admission to the Arctic Council. The two nations who pose the greatest threat to the international rules-based order will be inseparable in the final maritime theatre.
Looking Forward
To stay in step with these realities and counter Russian and Chinese capabilities, the United States must increase cooperation with Arctic allies, as well as our own capabilities. Of the eight Arctic Nations, five are members of NATO, and all but Russia are our allies. The United States and our northern allies must grow our commitment and joint presence in the Arctic to prevent Russia and China from becoming leaders in the far north. Second, the United States must further expand our own capabilities in the Arctic. While the U.S. Coast Guard has three heavy Polar Security Cutters on the way and long-term plans for three medium Arctic Security Cutters, this bottom line must increase, and production must accelerate. Joint U.S. Coast Guard and Navy high latitude operational abilities must be broadened. Lastly, in order to lead responsible development in the Arctic, we must prepare and protect our own Arctic waters through research and investment. While the United States and allies adapt to the new global reality, we must recalculate and reinforce our commitment in the Arctic now more than ever.
