Tips for Getting Your ‘Fish’
Lieutenant Howard was a classmate of mine during nuclear power school, and I completely agree with her advice. I especially agree that “mission success is a function of the watch team’s ability to work well together.” Procedural compliance and level of knowledge are fundamentals a good command will require of junior officers. Humble leadership, however, is vital for a successful qualification process (and beyond), and it is something new JOs must figure out for themselves.
The submarine environment places new junior officers in a unique situation. They are often certified by the very sailors they are expected to lead. Each new officer needs to learn how to establish a professional relationship with their sailors that allows them to comfortably display their academic deficiencies (of which there will inevitably be many) but still maintain enough respect to lead a watch team effectively. It can quickly feel as if you are at the mercy of your (busy) sailors, while the wardroom is constantly pressuring you to qualify. While the nuclear pipeline provides a simulation of this environment during prototype, the experience is different in that prototype does not force you to lead a division or watch team of sailors responsible for training you. It can be quite a leadership dilemma.
For these reasons, Lieutenant Howard’s advice is important. Showing up to the boat with humility is the best thing you can do. No one expects you to know everything, so there is no reason to pretend otherwise. Check your ego at the hatch. Recognize the value your sailors provide to the boat and the sacrifice each is making to take the time to train you. Work hard, be honest when you don’t know something, and let the specialists teach you about their jobs. Take the time to be a leader by getting to know your sailors while you are learning from them. After all, you will likely soon be spending eight hours a day on watch together, and good watch team dynamics require sound personal relationships. You will be surprised at how much confidence in you this will give your watch team when it’s your turn to run the show.
—LT Sean Cruess, USN
A New Approach to Submarine Officer Retention
Commander Holwitt’s article offers bold solutions to a problem that has persisted in the submarine force for decades: how to retain junior officers (JOs). It is crucial to our combat potential but, despite great efforts from submarine force leaders, we have not solved it.
Many disagree with his proposals, including extending the minimum service requirement to ten years. Some urge better focus on command leadership, removing administrative distractions, and improving quality of life and detailing. We can and should pursue improvements in those areas—they are near and dear to my heart. However, the submarine force has been striving to improve JO retention by those means for decades. Many improvements have proved fruitful, such as the recent start of talent management boards, but they are incremental changes that yielded incremental improvements in retention. They have not solved the problem.
Without “systemic” changes such as those proposed by Commander Holwitt, we will not see large improvements in retention. We will continue to lament the mass exodus of JOs we spent incredible amounts of time and money training—the officers that would be our competitive advantage in any possible fight against China or Russia—while not being willing to take bold steps to improve both the quantity and quality of department heads in the force. We will continue to select those department heads based not on their leadership, tactical prowess, technical ability, or accomplishments, but primarily based on who wants to stay and who wants to go.
—CDR Jeff Vandenengel, USN
Recruiting Requires Bold Changes
Discussing the challenges of recruiting for the all-volunteer force (AVF) has been a cottage industry for a number of years. So, I read the Commandant’s article with great interest. I was most taken aback by his comment, “We must do more to reach those who are unfamiliar [with the military]. Failing to do so risks reinforcing an increasingly closed system and its related pathologies.”
My grandfather served in the Marine Corps in World War I. My father was a sailor in World War II. I served more than 25 active-duty years in the Navy. All my family did was help win two world wars and defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War. What specific pathologies did my family bring to the table, and what specific issues or traits does General Berger refer to in military families that need to be avoided in the future?
I have grown children of my own now, one a stock broker and the other a lawyer. I never really encouraged either toward military service. Nor will I encourage my grandchildren to serve. When I went to sea in the Navy in the 1980s and 1990s for seven operational deployments, my wife and I knew that, despite the risks associated with the Sea Service, I stood a good chance of coming home. With the contemporary Navy and Marine Corps beset by esoteric social political reengineering experiments and mission incoherence, the Sea Services have lost their warfighting, warrior edge. I am afraid my grandkids might one day rest at the bottom of the South China Sea. Combine those concerns with a blended retirement system that only generates 60 cents of benefits to the dollar I received and a Congress that struggles to support a 250-ship (let alone 300-ship) Navy, and my answer is no.
As to a conscripted, mandatory type of national/military obligation as a solution: When a generation of American youth has been raised to believe that the United States is, at best, a flawed racist experiment, or inherently evil in root and branch at worst—good luck there.
—CDR Peter Gregory, USN (Ret.)
General Berger makes many insightful comments concerning the problems in recruiting an all-volunteer force. It is therefore odd that he ignored the herd of elephants in the room.
According to a 2021 analysis by the Brown University Watson Institute, 7,057 service members who served since 9/11 died in combat. This comes with the territory. But during that same period, 30,177 active-duty personnel and veterans killed themselves.
The Veterans Administration (VA) indicates that, depending on which war they fought, members of the military are between two and five times more likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress than the general public. They are also 50 to 60 percent more likely to commit suicide. The VA reports that, among veterans who use VA health care, about 23 percent of women reported sexual assault when in the military. This reality is reflected in numerous articles in Proceedings. Overall, these numbers indicate that if the U.S. military were a product, it would be required to carry health and safety warnings.
General Berger also bemoans the fact that confidence in military officers has declined to its lowest level since the survey began in 2001. He should not be surprised. For two decades, an unending parade of flag officers testified to Congress and told the public that things were “improving” and “progress” was being made in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why should Gen Z look up to people who took 20 years to lose two wars?
If one is serious about getting Gen Z to voluntarily join the U.S. military, many things will have to change.
—Guy Wroble
Standby, Fire: Recovering from Mistakes
Corporal Hayashi’s essay was well written; she addressed an important topic of significant importance to her life and career. She has owned her mistake, and, with the assistance of good Marine leaders, she took corrective actions to return herself to being a productive leader as a field artillery section chief. While, quite fortunately, her mistake did not lead to death, injury, or property damage, such is not always the case.
Military leaders must always remember that soldiers and Marines are human, and they will make mistakes from time to time. Retraining to overcome errors enables returning mature young NCOs and their soldiers back to productive duty.
It has been many years since I served on a gun line, but her article prompts me to make two recommendations. I would encourage the use by all artillery sections of a “speaker box” at the piece. This would, ideally, enable each cannoneer—not just the radio telephone operator (RTO)—to be able to hear the fire commands from the fire direction center.
Second, I recommend that section chiefs not perform the duties of RTOs. A dedicated RTO should handle the phone or radio and should be recording the fire commands as they are received. This would more readily allow the section chief to perform all the necessary safety checks (read that as “accuracy” checks, too) on the piece before it is fired: correct propellant charge, quadrant elevation, deflection, proper gunner’s sight picture, and properly leveled bubbles on the sights, checked by both the assistant gunner and gunner.
If the section chief repeats an incorrect element of the fire order, the RTO can, and must, speak up to make a correction. Each member of every field artillery section must understand that they must call “cease fire” if they observe any unsafe act. Even in a shorthanded section, accuracy and safety call for some duties to be distinct and not combined with other duties.
Unfortunately, I have personally seen and investigated the consequences of errors made on various gun lines, some of which resulted in unnecessary loss of life and grievous injury. Members of the military must do their very best to ensure they discharge their duties in a manner as error free as humanly possible.
—Col. Neal H. Bralley, USA (Ret.)
Retirement Jobs for the LCS
I enjoyed reading Lieutenant Adornato’s article. The Navy now contemplates retiring its purpose-built hospital ships because of their age. These “white elephants” lack speed and littoral access thanks to their size. They will be great targets for the hybrid and asymmetric wars of the future since they are not armed for modern self defense. New ships need to be designed differently.
The necessity to perform lifesaving interventions within minutes of personnel suffering combat trauma requires that medical resources be placed close to the forces being supported. The same need for proximity and ease of accessibility also exists in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. A hospital ship must be easily accessible by sea, air, and land transport.
A future hospital ship needs to be tactically interoperable with Navy warships in speed, self-protection, and encrypted communication and be able to survive the current high-risk global commons. The new ship therefore must be fast, tactical, and a defensible gray hull. Threats can come from a variety of potentially unprincipled adversaries using delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles or high-speed boats. Russia has damaged 788 Ukrainian medical facilities and turned another 123 into piles of stones. Navies must move on from the tradition of painting hospital ships white, adorning them with red crosses or red crescents, keeping them unarmed, maintaining open and insecure communications, and illuminating them at night.
Retiring littoral combat ships (LCSs) provides a possible solution. An LCS is a small, fast, maneuverable, and defensible platform with aviation facilities. The ships’ interiors can be reconfigured with modules for various roles by changing mission packages—conversion to hospital platforms is an option that would maximize the return on investment for these ships while supporting the fleet and its missions.
—RDML Michael Baker, USN (Ret.)
Repairing Submarine Cables Is a Wartime Necessity
Engaging Russia over A future maritime cable-cutting conflict would be round two in such a battle.
In February 1959, some U.S.-to-Europe undersea cables shut down. Cable technicians geographically pinpointed the trouble spot off Newfoundland, Canada. Because the cables are strategic assets, the Pentagon got involved.
Near the trouble spot was the Roy O. Hale (DER-336), a destroyer escort doing antiair radar-picket duty. The destroyer cruised to the break area and found the midsize Soviet fishing trawler MV Novorossisk. An unarmed “friendly” boarding followed. On the trawler’s deck were pieces of undersea cable. The skipper quickly explained that cables came up with a net haul. The crew cut them to free the fishing net, then dropped the severed cable back into the sea. The destroyer commander communicated the explanation to higher authorities.
The highest authority, President Dwight Eisenhower, deemed it plausible, so no Cold War crisis ensued. As to why the trawler captain just didn’t throw the “smoking gun” evidence overboard? Even small Soviet trawlers had political commissars on board to ensure crew loyalty. Perhaps their KGB overseer saw a chance of a potential reverse engineering undersea windfall. The U.S. Navy voided that chance. Round one won!
—Capt. Murdock M. Moore, USAF (Ret.)
Reimagine Recruiting to Prevent Sexual Assault
While better recruiting practices are needed, the culture for those currently serving needs to be addressed as well. Commissioned and noncommissioned officers need to spread the message that inappropriate behavior toward their fellow Marines is not welcome.
When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was adopted, corporations sought to prevent expensive lawsuits by educating managers from the chief executive officer on down. The goal was that all levels of the organization would work to combat any inappropriate behavior.
It was up to all managers, if they heard anything derogatory, to clearly explain that such comments were not acceptable in the company’s culture and would not be tolerated.
Perhaps officers and noncommissioned officers need such messaging and training so that all can work to stop harassment of and violence against their fellow Marines.
—Sgt D. R. Inglisa Sr., USMC (Ret.)
Lieutenant Roland’s proposed solution to the problem of sexual assault is impractical and unwise. The armed services, including the Marine Corps, are made up of people. They demonstrate the entire range of human behaviors—including, sometimes, criminal behavior. Even after extensive background investigations, service members with the highest security clearances sometimes commit espionage. It is farcical to think a Marine recruiter could easily identify and screen out a potential rapist with a few simple questions.
It is important to attempt to prevent sexual assault but impossible to eliminate it. The correct response is to improve systems for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing offenders. It is also essential to respect the rights of the accused and to convict and punish only on the basis of evidence. Neither a commander’s decision not to prosecute on the basis of a dubious allegation, nor a court-martial panel’s decision to acquit demonstrates a failure to take sexual assault seriously.
The Marine Corps will likely remain a mostly male force, and (controlled) aggressiveness is central to its culture. There is nothing wrong with this, and the author’s speculation that warfighting ethos inevitably creates a “rape culture” is just that: speculation.
Marine Corps recruiting appropriately focuses on young people who want to prepare to fight. Lieutenant Roland’s proposed alternative is unlikely to produce either the number or kind of recruits the Marines need.
—LCDR Brian Hayes, USNR (Ret.)
Erratum
On page 41 of the September 2022 Proceedings, the article incorrectly notes that the USS Hornet (CV-8) launched 15 Army Air Forces B-25 bombers. The Hornet launched 16 bombers.
