Revitalize Marine Air Defense
As an old antiaircraft warfare officer, I was excited to read Lieutenant Flynn’s essay. I long have wondered when Marines would start thinking about air defense in the context of expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and the rising threats in the Pacific.
The Marine Corps clearly needs to revitalize its air-defense capabilities, but there are a number of obstacles to consider:
1) Integration with Army air-defense systems is not currently viable. In 2018, I met with the head of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Center at the Pentagon. He made clear the complexities of Marine Corps integration with Army systems. At that time, the Army could not even integrate its Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems with each other, and he made it very clear that tying its systems to the Marine Corps’ was not going to happen. THAAD and Patriot both have significant capabilities but neither system is particularly mobile, and the cost per round makes both systems questionable for use against the relatively inexpensive/high-volume threats Marines are likely to encounter in the South China Sea.
2) Distributing Stingers to infantry battalions is problematic. Current practice is based on the need to avoid fratricide and appropriately site the Stinger teams. Without means to tie these newly minted gunners into the aviation command-and-control network, this essential concern remains unaddressed.
Traditional infantry battalions may not “fit” into the EABO construct. What may evolve is a Marine defense battalion with an antiship element, a logistics element, a command element, a ground security element, and an air-defense element. In this scenario, Stinger gunners from the low-altitude air-defense battalion can meet the need.
3) Intercept range is essential. Current systems are excellent but have very limited detection and engagement ranges. Stinger has a notional range of about 8 km but, realistically, visual acquisition shortens even that.
The Army’s current and planned systems are too expensive, too immobile, and too difficult to integrate. The Marine Corps needs a medium-range air-defense system, a capability lost when its HAWK battalions were deactivated in the 1990s. At present, the most viable alternative is a U.S. version of Israel’s Iron Dome system (which the Army is determined to not field). Iron Dome is not perfect, but it is relatively movable, can defend against high-volume attack, is comparatively affordable, and is available quickly.
Reestablishing a viable medium-range air-defense capability in the Marine Corps is a big ask in this era of highly constrained budgets and ever-increasing demands for limited personnel, but absent it, EABO may simply not prove viable.
—Col Benson Stein, USMCR (Ret.)
Can-Do Is Not Working
Lieutenant Zeberlein’s excellent article covers a number of issues affecting the Navy’s readiness. He notes: “A high operational tempo and manning shortages have plagued the fleet, which has loaded more work on those who remain—leading to more maintenance delays, mishaps, and avoidable deaths.” It seems the “all-volunteer” force is failing, despite all the positive comments from leaders over the years. The warship staffing levels have been less than desired for years. There have even been discussions regarding the retiring of combatants not for maintenance issues, but for lack of sailors!
Expanding the number of warfighting ships to counter the buildup of Chinese naval forces will require the successful recruiting of individuals who are willing to do the rewarding but challenging work at sea. Current recruiting levels are not keeping up with sailors leaving the service. Only by lowering standards (only 30 percent of men 18–26 are even suitable for service) will the Navy attract enough for suitable ship staffing. (Overworking those on board short-staffed ships is another story.)
Senior naval leaders should read Lieutenant Zeberlein’s article very carefully. What the Navy is doing currently is not working. Is it already too late to course correct?
—CAPT Alan L. Williams, USNR (Ret.)
Mahan and Corbett Will Not Inform a Modern Strategy for China
It is misguided to assert that Sir Julian Corbett and Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan have nothing to offer on 21st-century issues. We should all be concerned that these two strategists are pitted against one another and considered by some as outdated or irrelevant to contemporary maritime strategy discussions. These arguments overshadow the centrality of their works in historiography, their lasting influence on the academic discipline of history, and the vital importance of original documentary research to inform contemporary strategy.
Uninformed arguments lack a solid understanding of the basics and are not new; since 1945, those with alternative agendas have promulgated theory over experience. It is a mistake to discard the effort and scholarship of historians (under the delusion of technological solutions) or to suppose the challenges of today and tomorrow bear no resemblance to those of the past.
Although cautious over like-for-like comparisons, serious historians understand that strategy evolves to reflect strategic-economic circumstances: Strategy cannot pursue ideology or be founded on guesswork. Geography and the fundamental nature of the commercial use of the sea remain basically unchanged—things that both these historians closely studied. Corbett and Mahan masterfully recovered wisdom and insight contained within the past. Their works remain critical to making sound decisions in the contemporary context of the future of sea power policy and maritime strategy.
Ignoring experience and organizational knowledge can only lead to poor decisions and uninformed policies. To consign Corbett, Mahan, and their scholarship to the trash demonstrates a fundamental failure not just in the often-mentioned failure to study history, but also in the why and how it is done.
—James W. E. Smith, King’s College London (UK), David Kohnen, U.S. Naval War College, and Mark L. Bailey, Australian Naval Institute
Mr. Benson arrives at the correct conclusion. The great Mahan and Corbett may not be the best prophets to guide us toward a 21st-century naval strategy, but he wanders into a few cul-de-sacs before getting it right. His assertion that nuclear weapons and modern cyberspace warfare will obviate classic seapower theories flies wide of the mark.
It has now been more than 75 years since the last general engagement between fleets at sea. Entering the 21st century, the linking of artificial intelligence, cyberspace, satellites, and drones promises to create a new, transparent battlespace at sea, an environment Mahan and Corbett could not have anticipated.
In this time of uncertainty, perhaps it is appropriate to reconsider a lesser-known naval prophet—Rear Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov. Writing at the dawn of the 20th century, he recognized the uncertainty of that time. With no fleet engagement among significant powers in more than 90 years, navies had transitioned from wood to steel, sail to steam. New weapons and technology were untested in combat.
Admiral Makarov recognized Mahan’s contributions; however, he was uncomfortable that Mahan’s conclusions were developed by analyzing the age of fighting sail when naval platforms and technology were static. Makarov asserted, “Decisions on the questions of naval tactics are to be found not in the teachings of history, but rather in a study of the qualities of weapons.” Rather than be hidebound by historical practice, Makarov argued that modern naval planners should first examine the technology and weapons at hand, then devise the best means and platforms of employing them.
The 21st century’s ability to link multidimensional information sensors to commanders and weapon systems has profoundly changed the naval battlespace. Developing a transparent battlespace at sea will cause us to rethink our concepts of command of the sea. Naval officers schooled in the importance of Mahanian concentration of naval forces composed of capital ships will learn to employ smaller, more dispersed units. Command of the sea will have a different look in the 21st century.
—CDR Steve A. Hill, USN (Ret.)
Fighting A Different War: The Modern Sailor’s Mental Health Crisis
Petty Officer Hanson presents an insightful appreciation of the Navy’s suicide prevention program and the difficulties it is facing. Her remarks strongly merit consideration.
I appreciate that meeting mission requirements is paramount for the Navy. However, if meeting such requirements is breaking its sailors at all ranks and rates, it might be prudent for the Navy to reassess the requirements and either increase resources (ships and sailors) or seriously consider how it can safely decrease the demands on its sailors.
Personally, I have been scorched by the attempted suicide of a loved one. I have also had to lead an investigation into a completed suicide. I thus take Petty Officer Hanson’s words very much to heart.
—SCPO Paul H. Sayles, USN (Ret.)
Review & Commentary—
The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War
Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War
In my 50 years reading Proceedings, I have found the articles, commentaries, and reviews interesting, thought-provoking, prescient, irritating, insightful, and occasionally superficial. Captain Byron’s reviews of The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War and Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War are all of the above. My comments address the review of the former book. The war in Afghanistan has been and will continue to be analyzed extensively. The Afghanistan Papers will be an important source for this, but we should be wary of drawing definitive conclusions from those engaged in the frustrating business of war, especially a long war. Many of the interviews reflect feelings that could easily have come from a Marine on Iwo Jima, a soldier in Korea, or an airman flying over North Vietnam. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even the American people were tiring of World War II by 1945, though victory appeared in sight.
More contentious is to blame the failure in Afghanistan entirely on the Army, especially on the all-volunteer force (AFV). The Army should take its fair share of responsibility for the course of the war and do some serious soul-searching. Counterinsurgency doctrine was clearly not up to the demands of the situation until a joint effort by Army General David Petraeus and Marine Corps General James Mattis led to a revision of that doctrine. Operations by the (all-volunteer) Marine Corps in Afghanistan were not significantly more successful than those of the Army, a point Captain Byron skips.
Finally, the Army did not “invent the all-volunteer force” any more than the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps invented their all-volunteer organizations. Congress ended the draft, not the Army. Having lived through that transition, I can assure you it was not a happy time for the Army, but the resulting product was far superior to the unwilling conscripts with whom we fought the Vietnam War. The myth that an all-volunteer force isolated the American people from the war does not take into account the mobilization and deployment over time of virtually the entire Army Reserve and National Guard, units deeply woven into the fabric of local life across the United States.
There is ample responsibility to be shared for Afghanistan. Let us not forget that Navy admirals, as well as Air Force and Marine Corps generals served as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, Commanders of Central Command, and ground force commanders in theater—and even, in the case of General James Mattis, as Secretary of Defense—during the past 20 years. Presidents of both parties and their cabinet secretaries and staffs made the critical decisions about how the war would be fought, what the goals were, and under what limitations. They also collectively misled the American people about the prospect of “winning” or at least making decisive progress in achieving a successful conclusion of that conflict.
—COL Charles D. McFetridge, USA (Ret.)
Washington and Aristotle Can Restore the Military’s Professional Ethos
Colonel Gordon’s article is disappointing in its lack of balance and suggests hypocrisy.
Whom does the author chiefly blame for the lack of professional ethos among members of the military? He blames a lieutenant colonel, other field grade military officers, and senior enlisted leaders. He missed a few.
In particular, he missed flag and general officers. One senior general allegedly claimed he would contact his counterpart in China in the event the previous commander-in-chief was planning to attack China. Imagine General George C. Marshall claiming he would contact his respected friend Adolph in the event the volatile President Franklin D. Roosevelt was planning to attack Germany. Numerous retired flag officers publicly and too often criticize commanders-in-chief. Does Colonel Gordon consider any of that behavior consistent with professional military ethos?
Professional military ethos is certainly critical. More critical is our military’s capacity to fight and win wars, which we have done too little of since World War II. The author does get that part right. The disgrace of Vietnam
was corrected by the resounding victory of Desert Storm, a reflection of the Weinberger Doctrine. What, one wonders, will correct the disgrace of the disaster in Afghanistan? Will that also take two decades?
Opinion offered as opinion is judicious. Opinion offered as scholarly research is ill advised.
—Scott K. Gibson III
A Warfighting Imperative: Back To Basics For The Navy
Captain Roncolato’s emphasis on a warfighting culture and its primacy over administrative and organizational requirements is on the mark. I would draw two additional insights from the two surface actions that are highlighted—24–25 January 1942 and 12–13 November 1942.
First, both actions were fought with a clear mission imperative, but they offer contrasting views of interwar doctrinal employment. The former had clear commander’s tactical intent and resulted in disciplined initial actions and tactical success. Commander Talbot made best use of the capabilities in his small force (Destroyer Division 59). In the latter, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan in the USS San Francisco (CA-38), Rear Admiral Norman Scott in the USS Atlanta (CL-51), and their ship commanders understood the mission imperative. Despite heavy losses, it was the heroic courage and aggressiveness of individual units against superior Japanese forces, not doctrine, that resulted in a vitally needed operational success.
Second, the 12–13 November Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was just one of many surface actions in the Solomons Campaign from the 9 August 1942 Battle of Savo Island through the Battle of Cape St. George on 25 November 1943. This period offers important parallels to the present, in which the need for a renewed warrior culture is only one lesson. Commanders at all levels today grew up during a lengthy period of relative peace with limited at-sea experience with expansionist and emboldened near-peer opposing naval forces, a paucity of extant ships and aircraft in general, precious few closely husbanded capital assets, competing global commitments, and rapid technological change and close technological parity with potential adversaries.
There is also a key difference. By mid-1943, the Navy was benefiting from prewar force structure growth initiated in 1934 by the Vinson-Trammel Act. No such plan exists today. There is an imperative for additional efforts that go beyond the article’s correct emphasis on the warrior culture.
The actions of naval leaders in the Solomons Campaign illuminate other vital lessons for today. This retired officer offers the following actions if we hope to succeed in a future war at sea and strike operations across the spectrum: 1) a restructured and better-defended naval program for manned and unmanned platforms, 2) new and agile doctrine that focuses on wide-area, offensive employment of non-carrier-centric integrated surface and subsurface task units with organic and non-organic multimission, sensor, and multidimension unmanned platforms; and 3) back-to-basics for commanders must include greater emphasis on fundamental navigation, maneuver, and seamanship equal to that on theory and complex combat systems employment.
—CAPT Frank B. Guest III, USN (Ret.)
70 Years In The Taiwan Strait
In the middle of 1965, I was assigned to the USS O’Brien (DD-725) when we were on Taiwan patrol, one week patrolling the straits and one week in Kaohsiung port over a six-week period.
One night, we received an urgent message that a two-ship patrol of the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) was under attack by a swarm of People’s Republic of China torpedo and gunboats in the middle of the Taiwan Strait. We rang up flank speed and proceeded to the area not knowing what we would find. We arrived at dawn to discover one of the patrol boats had been sunk and the other damaged, with many survivors and deceased sailors in the water. We proceeded to help recover the sailors in the sea.
Once rescue efforts were completed, we sailed with the ROCN patrol boat to its naval base, where we offloaded the survivors. We learned later that the press release by Nationalist China (Taiwan) indicated that the People’s Republic’s news release had stated that the battle at sea was because the ROCN patrol boats had entered communist fishing grounds off Fukien Province “on their usual mission of sabotage.”
Yes, Taiwan patrols are not new.
—CDR Charles St. Laurent, USN (Ret.)
Modernize Training for the U.S. Merchant Marine
In her commentary, Lieutenant Commander Mantz briefly refers to the role of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy in World War II. It is important to note that 142 of the Academy’s midshipmen bravely gave their lives at sea during the war, leading to the U.S. Congress issuing a battle standard flag to Kings Point, making it the only one of the five federal academies to receive such an honor. Hundreds of the Academy’s midshipmen survived Atlantic sinkings, including my late father, Lieutenant James Hoffman (USNR), who later served as a naval officer in World War II and the Korean Conflict.
—Clay Hoffman
Erratum
In the March issue of Proceedings, the photo of Rear Admiral Kristin Acquavella, Special Assistant, Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, on p. 114 is incorrect. This is the correct photo.
