Replacement air group instructors from Fighter Squadron 121 established the Navy Fighter Weapons School (better known as TOPGUN) in 1969 to improve fighter aircrew lethality.1 Operating the same F-4 Phantoms they would fly above Vietnam, students and instructors refined tactics and doctrine while building more effective fighter teamwork. Over the following decades, various aviation communities established weapons and tactics instructor (WTI) development programs, training aircrew to better employ existing airframes and weapons, develop tactics, and return to the fleet as trusted tactical experts. On 9 August 2015, the surface warfare community followed suit and established the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC).2 It has since steadily built a cohort of WTIs currently serving throughout various ship classes.
Despite the significant differences among the various WTI syllabi, they possess a singular commonality—the proper valuation of human capital. In other words, well-trained individuals, billeted to ships and leveraging their knowledge of tactics and weapon systems, make ships and squadrons more lethal and capable. Why then does the centerpiece of the Navy’s carrier strike group, the aircraft carrier itself, not have its own WTI development program?
The easy response is that the primary responsibility of the aircraft carrier—resourcing fixed- and rotary-wing sorties—operates under well-defined processes and procedures that do not require tactical innovation. A slightly more considered negative endorsement is that the existing WTI model is aligned to functional mission areas vice platforms. TOPGUN does not develop F/A-18E WTIs; it produces strike-fighter tactics instructors, much as SMWDC develops antisubmarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, and amphibious operations WTIs. The carrier enables warfare commanders to execute their missions; it does not execute them itself.
Neither response adequately considers the impacts of anti-access/area-denial weapons on tactics for carrier employment, the scope of tactical decisions made within the skin of the ship, and the complexity of the networks, sensors, and weapon systems that influence those decisions. Carriers do not need WTIs to improve sortie generation. They need WTIs to increase their survivability during peer conflict to generate sorties.
The Carrier Combat Direction Center
Under the current model for tactical decision-making, the carrier’s commanding officer delegates the authority to “fight the ship” to qualified tactical action officers (TAOs). The combat direction center officer (CDCO) is charged with training and leading the TAOs, under the supervision of the ship’s operations officer and as the commanding officer determines. Ultimate responsibility for tactical decisions resides with the commanding officer. On an organizational flowchart, the tiered levels of responsibility for tactical decision-making appear similar to, if not the same as, any other combatant. Unfortunately, none of these officers, except for the commanding officer, is likely to have experience with the tactics, systems, and networks used during combat decision-making.
Carrier TAOs are pilots or naval flight officers (NFOs) on their disassociated sea tours, aviation operations chief warrant officers (CWOs)/limited duty officers (LDOs), or operations technician chief warrant officers. None of the officers drawn from naval aviation (pilots, NFOs, and aviation operations LDOs) or from the surface warfare community (operations technician LDOs/CWOs) typically have carrier experience. The carrier’s combat direction center officer (CDCO) is usually a commander with an aviation background and is unlikely to have a previous tour as a TAO. The operations officer is a post-command aviator who is equally unlikely to have a previous tour as a TAO or significant experience with the ship’s self-defense system (SSDS) and tactical networks. Only commanding officers, leveraging experience gained during preceding command tours of deep-draft ships, may have had experience with SSDS and the host of systems used to make tactical decisions. But their level of experience will vary greatly, depending on the operational employment of their deep-draft command.
That the current manpower model has “worked” to date is both a testament to the efforts of carrier TAOs and CDCOs and a by-product of several decades of carrier operations in relatively permissive environments. Yet, while the increasing operating environment challenges are widely acknowledged (a Google search of “China A2/AD” generates 192,000 results), the discussion of impacts and mitigations can be broadly characterized as strategic and technical. In the event of war, tactical execution will be just as important. Creating a carrier WTI program and career path would offer significant benefits to a carrier engaged in major combat operations.
Mitigations and Solutions
While a carrier WTI program is the goal, there are interim options available immediately to enhance carrier fleet combat readiness. SMWDC has trained amphibious operations WTIs since 2015, generating officers whose tactical expertise extends to SSDS operations and tactical networks. Assigning these instructors to carriers would offer a near-term (if imperfect) solution, whether on a temporary basis or through permanent assignment as tactics officers on second department head tours.3
There are also ways to better take advantage of the experience of officers already assigned to carriers. The current “hull agnostic” detailing process for operations technician CWOs/LDOs can yield well-rounded personnel when major combat operations will likely require focused technical and tactical expertise. These TAO-qualified operations technicians should serve multiple tours on the same class of ship to deepen their knowledge. Additional carrier tours for them also would generate a significantly greater return on investment for the fleet. These CWO and LDO communities already serve as the ideal candidate fields from which to select future carrier WTIs. A specialty career path for carrier TAO-qualified unrestricted line officers would broaden the field of candidates for both WTI selection and subsequent follow-on assignments as CDCOs.
The suggested changes to officer career paths are substantially more complex than the development of coursework and evaluation criteria for carrier WTIs. Technical and tactical data already exists, and the curriculum in use for SMWDC SSDS and network classes could serve as an appropriate point of departure. Officers with prior experience as CDCOs and a small cadre of carrier TAOs could develop an initial carrier WTI syllabus and conduct the inaugural class within a year of establishment.
Once established, the carrier WTI program would provide aircraft carrier commanding officers with trusted tactical advisors, enhance the quality of training for combat direction center watchstanders, and significantly contribute to the lethality and survivability of the carrier fleet. In addition, carrier WTI staff instructors would be a focal point for carrier tactical development. Finally, these officers would be available to lecture at both the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center in Fallon, Nevada, and SMWDC.
Retrospect or Prospect?
TOPGUN was established after naval aviation leaders recognized its failure to properly train aircrew for the war they were fighting. How many combat losses and lost engagement opportunities could have been prevented had it been established prior to the Vietnam War? The SMWDC WTI program was established to ensure the surface navy is prepared for a high-intensity fight. WTI programs provide forces with a tactical advantage in combat. The Navy cannot afford to be reactive in providing that same advantage to the carrier fleet.
1. CDR David Baranek, USN (Ret.), “TOPGUN: The Navy’s First Center of Excellence,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 145, no. 9 (September 2019): 20–25.
2. U.S. Naval Surface and Mine Warfare Development Center.
3. SMWDC trained amphibious operations WTIs, while experts on the technical and tactical operation of SSDS, do not have equivalent experience with carrier operations. Carrier operations in a contested environment likely pose a number of complex, platform-specific tactical problems in addition to whether to employ a defensive system.
