The United States would benefit from reframing the way it employs forces globally to remain relevant in great power competition, particularly in light of persistent competition with China. Partnerships set the conditions for mutual operational success. The Australian and U.S. alliance, in particular, can offer both countries relative advantage by increasing training and operational opportunities in pursuit of shared security objectives.
In July 2020, civilian leaders from both nations’ diplomatic corps and militaries came together at the Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2020 to discuss complementary concerns and interests. The result was a clear articulation of the areas in which little daylight exists between the two. Specifically, participants reaffirmed that China cannot assert maritime claims in the South China Sea (SCS) “based on the ‘nine-dash line,’ ‘historic rights,’ or entire South China Sea island groups, which are incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.” This was a significant departure from Australia’s previous position of neutrality regarding claims in the SCS and exposed Australia to anticipated retribution from Chinese policies. The Brookings Institution’s assessment of AUSMIN found that as “another sign of Canberra’s determination to deal more seriously with Beijing, Australia’s new Defense Strategic Update commits to $270 billion Australian in defense investments over the next decade and refocuses the military around efforts to ‘shape, deter and respond’ to grey zone challenges and high-end aggression.” The Strategic Update refocused the primacy of operations in the southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia and relegated global campaigns to a lower priority. Both sides agreed to restart the bilateral Force Posture Working Group, providing an opportunity to achieve strategic objectives through combined tactical actions and operational planning. Greater amphibious force cooperation can be achieved by the use of three factors: space, time, and force.
FACTOR OF SPACE
Dr. Milan Vego articulates the near-infinite possibilities of space as a factor in this way: “The factor of space encompasses not only the physical environment and weather/climate but also the so-called ‘human-space.’ Among other things, the human-space includes such elements as the political system and nature of government, population size and density, economic activity, transportation, trade, ideologies, ethnicity, religions, social structure and traditions, culture, and technology.”1
Citizens of Australia and the United States share much of the same cultural space, heritage, and values to base trust on and reduce friction for further integration. Establishment of the Marine Rotational Force–Darwin (MRF-D) in 2012 served to reenergize movement in attempting to balance space with time and force.2 The MRF-D concept of employment is to train with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in northern Australia and to conduct bi- and multilateral security cooperation activities, exercises, and training outside Australia with Asia-Pacific region partners to increase theater security cooperation while expanding partner capacity.
The imperative is on setting the conditions to lessen the space between the militaries so that time and force are advantageous to the alliance if conflict arises.
FACTOR OF TIME
By coordinating partnered training and operations in and around Australia’s area of operations, leaders on both sides of the alliance overcome the tyranny of distance and gain increased time for decision-making. By working in concert, both nations’ naval forces access the opportunity to gain time by establishing enhanced working relationships—before the fight starts.
A major time gap would be caused by U.S. and Australian mobilization and transportation of U.S. personnel to Australia. Partnering at the military-to-military level ashore and at sea, in part through maritime presence, reduces that gap. Geoffrey Till identifies that “a forward and sensitive maritime presence can help not only deter malefactors from malign actions or compel them into benign ones; it can also provide a means of signaling interest in a region’s affairs, monitoring events at sea and ashore, and of contributing to the development of a sense of international community through a policy of active maritime consensus building.”3 The time gained by having forces familiar with each other and their operating environments—be they ship or shore—is invaluable when the need arises.
MRF-D positions U.S. forces ashore in the Top End of Australia for six months a year. Instead of accepting a lack of presence in the region the other six months, the United States and Australia should explore options for additional operations and deployments to be better postured to respond in a crisis or contingency throughout the Indo-Pacific when called upon. Having combined Australian and U.S. amphibious forces paired throughout the calendar year would allow senior leaders and commanders more rapid response options in the face of hostile actions, as well as for humanitarian assistance and disaster response, in a region where the former is increasingly likely and the latter near certain. While counterintuitive, an ability to respond rapidly provides greater decision space to both civilian and uniformed leaders. Prepared and prompt response options—with reduced complexities from speed and distance before employment—support preservation of the precious commodity of time and best posture the force.
FACTOR OF FORCE
The purpose of increased interaction is to maximize combat potential by being capable of generating force. Effective force aggregation permits greater freedom of action for the commander, which regular deployment of U.S. Marines through MRF-D contributes to. Further gains are possible through cooperative engagement for the remainder of the calendar year in Townsville, Queensland, or at sea in Australia’s near abroad.
The ADF has recognized the need for an amphibious force and, since 2006, has been in the process of developing and employing forces and securing new amphibious vessels for amphibious force operations. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has welcomed two new amphibious assault ships (LHDs) and one amphibious transport dock (LSD) to Fleet Base East in Sydney. A major expansion of the Port of Townsville occurred to accommodate berthing the L-class ships as well as the embarkation of troops and equipment based there. To modernize infrastructure and enhance capability across Australia, the Department of Defence (sic) Force Structure Plan 2020 calls for added port facilities in New South Wales as well as consolidation and expansion of the Australian Army’s watercraft fleet in Northern Australia.
As a result, amphibious operations are finally coming of age in Australia and will play a more crucial role in the nation’s defense policy for the “Asian Century.” The time for active experimentation is now from the U.S. Marine Corps perspective. U.S. participation in these developments would provide the opportunity for more joint efforts in the littorals, where the greatest training and execution opportunities exist.
From the Sea
The Marine Corps seeks every opportunity to go to sea, and there exists a natural cooperative opportunity with the RAN’s amphibious forces. The Australian Department of Defence has written: “Defence’s strategic objectives are to deploy military power to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with credible military force.” Given both countries’ desire to innovate and experiment, the impediments lie in those wedded to the past and happy with the status quo. One may argue that the ADF must bear the exclusive burden of generating combat potential, but that belies the spirit of cooperation advocated for here and creates risks in time, space, and force that civilian leaders have thus far sought to mitigate.
As both countries look to refine their amphibious forces, there is ample room, and planned resourcing, for growth in achieving shared objectives. One may logically question the need for the development of an expeditionary strategy by the ADF—or U.S. amphibious force contributions in furthering their development. Peter Dean from the University of Western Australia offers the following: “In particular, an ‘expeditionary strategy’/‘Defence of Australia’ distinction obscures the requirement for Australia’s military forces to operate in the zone between the continent itself and far-off deployment zones—that is, notably, in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. This region has long been characterized by Australian strategic policy as the nation’s ‘area of direct military interest’ or ‘primary operating environment.’” The need for creative force design between the two nations is then clear. This is perhaps the most important operational factor, as development of combined force application through shared space has the potential to yield greater time in decision making and response vis-a-vis China. For the operational commanders at their level of war, this may be seen as operational art.4
The ability to work routinely along sea lines of communications within non-lethal environments assists in asserting sea control through combined naval power and cooperation with maritime powers in the region. The totality of the current force available to both nations may not be equal to what armed conflict might call for, but this is beside the point. It offers a launching point, not a terminus.
The Australia–U.S. alliance has been strengthened in recent years through the shared recognition of competition with China. Both members of the alliance recognize the need to ensure freedom, prosperity, and security in the region. Top civilian leaders in each government and military recognize the opportunity to achieve greater advantage by redesigning forces to achieve these objectives.
The reimagined deployment of U.S. Marine Corps and RAN amphibious forces beyond MRF-D and joint naval exercises would provide both countries an opportunity to achieve relative advantage in competition with China. Embarkation of U.S. Marines on Australian ships and vice versa (regardless of the class) supports a greater understanding of the region, responsiveness in the region, and enhanced security for both nations. Viewed through U.S. joint doctrine, partner forces would be better served in all warfighting functions by pursuit of this enhanced relationship. Commandant of the Marine Corps General David Berger’s force design guidance says: “With the shift in our primary focus to great power competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region, the current force has shortfalls in capabilities needed to support emerging joint, naval, and Marine Corps operating concepts.” Australia’s littorals and her near abroad are the fertile territories to experiment with like-minded partners who reside in the region. Doing so before China’s influence is too severe to overcome is imperative if the desired future objective to maintain freedom, prosperity, and security in the Indo-Pacific region is to be achieved. Through creative employment of U.S. and Australian forces in the southwest Pacific, both countries gain the opportunity to set the conditions for successful follow-on operations, be they in cooperation or competition, with China.
1. Milan Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, reprint, 2009), III-4.
2. John W. Black, “Marine Rotational Force-Darwin,” Marine Corps Gazette Quantico 97, no. 3, (March 2013): 60–62.
3. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the 21st Century, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, Taylor, and Francis, 2018), 39.
4. CJCS JP 5-0 Operational Planning (2019): P I–5.: “Operational art is the application of intuition and creative imagination by commanders and staffs. Supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment, commanders seek to understand the OE, visualize and describe the desired end state, and employ assigned resources to achieve objectives.”
