Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper caused considerable consternation in the naval aviation community late last year when he proposed a future fleet of 8 to 11 large aircraft carriers (CVNs) and up to 6 light carriers. It has been apparent for several years that the continued construction of 100,000-ton nuclear-powered carriers should be questioned.
The latest “super carrier,” the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), has cost more than $15 billion and is several years behind schedule. At the same time, now-operational surveillance systems can provide a potential enemy with continuous tracking of carriers, with China having long-range, anticarrier ballistic missiles.1
Secretary Esper also called for an analysis of the large carrier design in 2021 that could impact the design of subsequent carriers. The carrier issue occurred as the Biden administration entered office with the promise of reduced defense budgets because of the COVID-19 pandemic relief package and the related massive civil spending programs. At the same time, the formation of a new military service—the Space Force—and increased procurement requirements from the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps will make more demands on the reduced defense budgets. Within the Navy’s procurement budget, the future Columbia (SSBN-628)-class strategic missile submarines—production units no. 2 through 12—are each expected to cost at least $9 billion, further stressing the Navy’s shipbuilding budget.
In this environment, an objective review of the carrier picture is necessary. Looking at the options, the design of a new light carrier probably will require a decade or more before the first ship could be delivered.
However, the Navy is already building light carriers—the 45,000-ton LHA/LHD amphibious ships. There are nine in service, carrying helicopters, AV-8B Harrier very short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft, and F-35B VSTOL aircraft. During the Gulf War in 2003 three LHA/LHDs each operated 20 to 24 AV-8B Harrier VSTOL aircraft. No significant problems were encountered.
While an LHA/LHD could accommodate only 15 to 20 VSTOL aircraft (plus helicopters), they also can carry more than 1,000 troops in addition to aircraft flight crews and maintenance personnel. The feasibility of VSTOL operations from these ships means that the new cargo version of the CMV-22B Osprey will easily operate from their decks (replacing the C-2 Greyhound in the carrier-on-board delivery role).
Furthermore, there have been studies of the feasibility of operating the Osprey in the antisubmarine and airborne early warning (AEW) roles. The British, Chinese, and Russian navies have flown helicopters in the AEW role with success. And, of course, long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) based ashore or afloat could support light carrier operations.
It is unlikely the United States will afford a force of 11 or more large aircraft carriers. Even if the Gerald R. Ford’s final cost does not exceed $15 billion, the follow-on CVNs will cost some $12 billion per ship. Four or five LHA/LHDs could be constructed for that amount. Indeed, with a commitment to such a program, the costs probably could be reduced sufficiently to procure six light carriers for the cost of one CVN.
More aviation ships could provide more “coverage” of ocean areas of interest to the United States. Further, while a 100,000-ton large carrier with a 4,500-person crew could provide far more capabilities, such force is not always necessary. For example, during a recent deployment to the Persian Gulf area, a CVN’s air wing flew 2,054 combat sorties, expending 1,598 pieces of precision-guided ordnance to degrade ISIS resources and leadership. But that occurred over about seven months (some 200 days) in theater—the carrier’s combat sorties averaged ten per day with an average of about 0.78 pieces of ordnance dropped per combat sortie. Those ten combat sorties per day, each dropping less than one weapon per sortie, were flown from a 100,000-ton, nuclear-powered warship manned by almost 5,000 men and women.
Today, the Huntington Ingalls Industries shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, is building the LHA/LHD “carriers” while the firm’s Newport News yard is building the CVNs. Thus, the latter yard could easily be involved in the LHA/LHD production to maintain the firm’s employment and income.
The bottom line might be to ask a combatant/theater commander—who is responsible for employing naval forces—if he would prefer a single CVN or five and possibly six LHA/LHDs with advanced VSTOL aircraft as well as helicopters and space, each with space for 1,000 troops. Indeed, in this month’s Proceedings, Kyle Mizokami details the efforts of some navies with regard to light carriers, and in the June 2020 issue of the Proceedings, Navy Ensign J. P. Bunyard made the case for these ships in the Navy’s distributed maritime operations concept.
The Navy must not dispose of its large nuclear carriers—they are important and highly capable. But it is time for an objective and comprehensive look at the overall carrier situation—and the potential roles of light carriers.
1. The Soviet Union had earlier developed a submarine-launched, anticarrier ballistic missile, the R-27K (NATO designation SS-NX-13).