Chief Boatswain’s Mate Null has raised the long-standing issue of an unresolved boundary at the entrance to the Bay of Fundy, which adjoins the Gulf of Maine in the North Atlantic. The issue centers on fishing and other potential natural resource rights in and potentially under the 277-square-mile disputed region (shown in gray on the article’s accompanying map).
The author’s theory is that the natural resources—fish stocks, in particular—belong to the United States and no one else. In this, Chief Null denies that Canada has any entitlement to such stocks and potential resources, despite the existence of two small islands (North Rock and Machias Seal Island) within the disputed area. Since 1832, Canada has maintained a staffed lighthouse on Machias Seal Island, an important aid to navigation in a heavily traveled marine area. The United States denies the importance of the lighthouse or the length of Canadian presence with respect to the issue of ownership of the island.
Chief Null dismisses the relevance of sovereign Canadian land territory immediately adjacent to and within the region, whereas the closest U.S. lands are located farther away, in and along the coast of Maine. Neither the United States nor Canada have taken any legal action before the International Court of Justice, although that court dealt with a sea-bottom boundary to the south in 1984. In that case, the court divided the continental shelf sea bottom in the Gulf of Maine between Canada and the United States.
Both countries permit the harvest of lobsters in the disputed area and adjacent waters, albeit in slightly different seasonal periods. Navigational aids are provided as well. Scientists of both countries conduct environmental and fisheries studies there, often together.
The obvious solution is an agreement for joint access by Canadian and U.S. fishermen for harvesting lobster and other fish species in the gray region. In addition, the national boundary of the sea bottom could be settled by extending the line of demarcation established by the International Court of Justice in 1984 to the boundary of Canada’s territorial seas adjacent to Machias Seal Island and Grand Manan Island. Regulations for harvesting lobster and other species could then be harmonized for the benefit of regulatory efficiency; however, that may be difficult, given different food regulatory conditions in each country.
It is time to put the rhetoric away and negotiate a solution.
—COL Brian K. Wentzell, Canadian Army (Reserve) (Ret.), Life Member
Chief Null discusses the practice of handing off Coast Guard enforcement actions to the NOAA General Counsel for judicial action. My only quibble with the chief’s assessment is that he sees NOAA’s role as superfluous, whereas I believe it is deleterious—although I hasten to add that the professionalism of NOAA special agents is not only welcome, but crucial.
There is an adage, variously attributed to Napoleon, Frederick II, and Earl Grey, that “Diplomacy without force is like an orchestra without instruments.” So it is with seaward presence, as Chief Null articulates. And let me add that—in terms of deception, intelligence and warnings, counterintelligence, illegal flight, sophisticated surveillance equipment, and elusive tactics—illegal fishermen have nothing on drug runners.
—CAPT Raymond J. Brown, USCG (Ret.)
If It Stops Floating, It Stops Fighting
I agree with many of the points Lieutenant Commander Dennis makes. Consider 16 April 1972, when the U.S. Air Force achieved a mission kill on the USS Worden (DLG-18) in the Gulf of Tonkin. Apparently, some Air Force pilots took our AN/SPS-48 radar for a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile site and attacked it with Shrike antiradiation missiles. These left hundreds of holes in the unarmored superstructure, along with 1 sailor killed and 11 wounded. Our fire-control radars absorbed most of the shrapnel that otherwise would have killed many more.
In 1982, I was an exchange officer in the Ministry of Defence in London when Argentina invaded the Falklands and the British Fleet set sail. Later, my team had the opportunity to debrief Captain Sam Salt, commanding officer of HMS Sheffield. His description of the damage done by the relatively small Exocet to the unarmored ship was interesting.
Regarding the sinking of the General Belgrano: Following my London tour, I was at prospective executive officer school in Newport, Rhode Island. Also there was an officer who had been an exchange officer on the Argentine cruiser. During discussions/sea stories, he said that, before the war, when Argentina modernized the ship’s electronics, workers ran the cables through the hatches instead of making proper penetrations. This meant the hatches could not be closed, and the General Belgrano was not able to set watertight integrity. The ship was doomed to sink once the hull was penetrated.
—CDR Tom Krupp, USN (Ret.)
Demise of the Cutterman, Part II
Lieutenant Commander Monacelli returns our focus to a flare popped six years ago by then–Lieutenant Commander Brian Smicklas, who argued that the abundance (and specialization) of shore assignments would lure potential cuttermen to land-based careers.
Monacelli is correct that the service can address this issue through means other than incentive pay, but we have to start with the why. Why are there fewer officers interested in careers afloat today? It all revolves around the daunting initial decision to serve in the cutter fleet—a decision junior officers are forced to make too early.
Cadets and junior officers quickly discover that to be a (successful) cutterman, one typically has to serve an afloat tour at every officer rank. This expectation forces a young ensign or junior grade to make a significant choice very early in his or her career—because cutter life certainly affects one’s ability to date, to start a family, and to plant roots within a community. Yet forcing that decision so early could be avoided if the service would allow more flexibility in the cutter assignment process.
I would like to see the Coast Guard offer its officers—who mostly have strong foundations in nautical science, particularly after that requisite first afloat tour—the ability to join a cutter crew when the time is right for them. Maybe an O-3 with little or no sea time joins a crew not in an assignment for which he or she is unqualified, but instead as deck watch officer with significant collateral duties. Maybe that female O-4 who missed her O-3 afloat tour because of graduate school and starting a family returns to sea as an operations officer (typically an O-3 billet).
The service could employ similar flexibility with the command cadre and disassociate hulls from required ranks for command afloat. This might allow a high-performing and qualified O-5 to compete for command of a national security cutter against O-6s. Or a late-blooming O-5 cutterman might take command of an expeditionary fast response cutter.
Increased flexibility in traditional rank-associated cutter billets would create more opportunities for more officers to go to sea, as well as generate healthy competition for these jobs.
—CDR Brooke Millard, Cutterman, USCG
Lieutenant Commander Monacelli accurately details the dire situation with recruiting and retaining top talent within the cutter fleet, but I would ask: Is the solution just for leaders to lead better?
The recommendations seem to point to failures within the wardroom and senior leader corps without describing anything more concrete than mentoring and “prioritizing leadership at sea.” While I would agree that wardrooms and signals from the top are a key component of the solution, this problem—and the standards required of this journal—demand more than just “better leadership.”
First, increase use of the Direct Commission Officer program to open a pipeline of officers with maritime experience. Fill O-3 operations or combat system officer jobs with prior-Navy officers or even merchant mariners holding second-mate licenses. Qualified surface warfare officers have the skills to act as tactical action officers for interoperability with the Navy and will provide better warfare knowledge for cutter crews. Likewise, civilian merchant mariners have the navigational prowess to train new junior officers in celestial navigation, shiphandling, and voyage planning as well as any Coast Guard officer.
Second, create relief crews at districts and areas to help cutters exercise some of the resiliency policies that have been put in place, allowing officers time off to attend important events (weddings, births, family celebrations, etc.) when able. This will offset some of the negative elements of being away from home for half the year, and it could help heal the toxic climates that sometimes come from an overworked group of department heads and command cadre members.
Third, stop forcing O-2s and O-3s to choose between being a major cutter CO or sector commander at the beginning of their careers. Create more “on ramps” to sectors at the O-5 and O-6 levels and encourage cuttermen to help staff them, especially for sectors that manage multiple cutters. This will help retain midgrade officers in the community who are afraid that they will not compete for promotion past O-4 without committing all-in to serving on cutters for the rest of their operational tours—and spending a significant portion of their time away from family and friends.
The service’s current trend of throwing money at the problem does not address the root cause of sea-duty unattractiveness at the mid-level pay grades: greater career risk and time away from home. Officers applying Commander Smicklas’s risk-vs.-reward calculus will quickly see that a life at sea is all risk, limited reward. I agree with Lieutenant Commander Monacelli that there is a problem, but his proposed solutions miss the mark.
—LT Christian P. DiBari, USCG
Examine a wide-angle photo of a parade or meal formation at the U.S. Naval Academy, and the most striking thing you see will likely be the uniforms. Thousands of uniforms, in rank and file. Uniforms that unmistakably designate their wearers as being in the service of the nation, subject to the highest standards of personal honor, professional competence, and physical stamina. Uniforms that—by design and definition—make their wearers all look the same.
The significance of the uniform seems to be lost on Ensign Frankenberg. By lamenting, in her critique of Reef Points, that a nonwhite midshipman might “see a chain of command in which no one looks like them,” she implies that a sense of being different would be inescapable for a newly inducted, nonwhite plebe.
Except that when a freshly shorn plebe leaves the barbershop on I-day and falls in with his or her platoon mates, the overwhelming sensation is not one of difference, but of sameness. The same haircut, uniform, “Dixie Cup” covers, and laundry bags overloaded with uniforms, towels, and blue-rim T-shirts. This sameness compels new plebes to step away from their individual identities and toward incorporation into the Brigade of Midshipmen, becoming newly formed links in the Navy’s cable, in which they will be judged not by the color of their skin, but by how they bear the strain of service and sacrifice. In other words, the new plebe will look around to see that, in fact, everyone looks like them.
Ensign Frankenberg may well be correct to question whether the Naval Academy fails to sufficiently educate midshipmen on the ways in which racism has affected the Navy throughout history. The Academy—situated on idyllic grounds less than 30 miles from the District of Columbia—by and large promotes a rosy view of America, and it would likely be beneficial for midshipmen to understand that not all their future sailors will share that impression.
But the way forward is not to reintroduce racial identity as a defining characteristic of an officer, as the author’s goal of increasing nonwhite representation in senior ranks necessarily requires. It is precisely the Navy’s progress—institutionally and individually—toward seeing not black officers or white officers but only U.S. naval officers that has carried the Navy out of its dark days of segregation and discrimination and into a new era of fellowship in arms.
An awareness of the Navy’s past may help us to understand our present, but it should not define our future.
—LCDR Bryan Lingle, USNR
On the Importance of Diversity and Inclusion
The Naval Institute’s statement implies that the 1972 race riot on board the USS Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) is an example of what happens when trust breaks down. Trust is certainly essential in any organization, and the Navy has routinely done an excellent job creating trustworthy environments in ships and squadrons in recent years. The military has been at the forefront of providing equal opportunity and inclusion, which builds trust, compared with almost all other major organizations in our society, with outstanding results—albeit with some exceptions. One exception was Project 100,000; another was entrance test “misnorming.”
Project 100,000 (1966–71) was a program intended to provide upward mobility to young men who tested near the bottom on standard military entrance tests, who would normally have been ineligible. A large percentage had no high school diplomas. Several sources estimate that about 40 percent of the 300,000-plus admitted to military service through the project were black. About 10 percent of the total joined the Navy.
They signed up for two-year commitments, but they were provided no meaningful training and reported to their units with minimal skills. This put them at a serious disadvantage, with most experiencing low performance or even failure, regardless of race. Unfortunately, a too-high percentage of the black sailors in this group chose victimization—“because I’m black”—as an excuse for failure (something white sailors could not do). A person who accepts “victimization” as an excuse for failure—even if justified to some degree—is very likely to experience continued failure.
Accepting these low-performers was a key factor in the racial disturbances on the Kitty Hawk and the Constellation (CVA-64), as well as on other ships. I served in an attack squadron on board the USS Enterprise (CV-65) in 1972, and a major racial disturbance almost happened in our squadron’s main berthing compartment. Because of the quick thinking and action of the squadron executive officer, the ship’s master-at-arms, and others, it did not happen, but it was a very close call.
A special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee investigated these incidents and found, among other things, that the Navy’s “lowering of standards for enlistment . . . has created many of the problems the Navy is experiencing today.” Elsewhere, it noted that “the ‘riot’ on Kitty Hawk consisted of unprovoked assaults by a very few men, most of whom were of below-average mental capacity.” These acted as a group, and the report questioned “whether they should ever have been accepted into military service in the first place.”
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s 14 November 1972 Z-Gram, no. 117, seems to have been a response to these disturbances but does not address the challenges of introducing tens of thousands of far-below-average sailors to military standards of behavior.
A few years later, from January 1976 to October 1980, another 400,000 well-below-average individuals of all races were allowed to enter military service, because the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test was somehow “misnormed” (i.e., raw scores were incorrectly converted to percentiles). Accepting low-quality individuals again resulted in a multitude of problems. I witnessed two situations, one in 1977 as commanding officer of Attack Squadron 22 on board the USS Coral Sea (CV-43), and another in 1980 as executive officer of the Ranger (CV-61), that could have led to serious racial disturbances. Lightning-fast responses from the Bureau of Naval Personnel defused both situations.
The bottom line is that today’s Navy is far different from that of the 1970s and 80s, with much higher standards for entry. Keep the standards high. Diversity and inclusion are important, but not nearly as important as equal opportunity and merit.
—CAPT Lee Cargill, USN (Ret.)
It Is time for the United States to Ratify UNCLOS
As a Coast Guard lieutenant (junior grade) stationed at Governors Island, New York, in 1979, I had the opportunity to attend an officers’ association luncheon at which Elliot Richardson spoke about the virtues of the newly drafted United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At the time, Mr. Richardson was the head of the U.S. delegation for the convention’s drafting.
Fast-forward to today: As a civilian, I now serve as a U.S. delegate to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and must carefully navigate the U.S. position any time IMO documents make reference to UNCLOS, because the United States has never ratified it.
Although such matters are not in my portfolio to decide professionally, I agree personally with Ensign Malaver that U.S. ratification is long overdue.
Whatever the perceived barriers were 40 years ago, the benefits to ratification in today’s maritime world are clear. The UNCLOS project came to Mr. Richardson at the end of what was a long and distinguished career in government. I am persuaded now, as I was then, to take his wise counsel: Ratification is in the best interests of the United States.
—LCDR John J. Hannon, USCG (Ret.)
Lieutenant VandenPlas writes: “By delegating responsibility, he raised the bar on his expectations.” I submit that Captain Morton did not delegate responsibility; he delegated authority. He thereby allowed his junior officers to issue orders in atypical circumstances. But the overall responsibility remained Captain Morton’s. This might be considered a nitpick, but I submit that it is a distinction that needs to be made.
—SCPO Paul H. Sayles, USN (Ret.)
Extend Air Wing Range with Seaplane Tankers
It is unfortunate, though perhaps appropriate, that an out-of-the-box proposal for a significant Navy problem comes not from someone in the fleet, but rather the Air National Guard. Kudos to Second Lieutenant Alman!
He hit the nail on the head in identifying that lack of striking range (as opposed to the size of carriers) is the true source of the aircraft carrier’s vulnerability and potential irrelevance.
Big Navy has touted the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray tanker as the answer, but with its depressingly small amount of “give,” the Stingray really does not bring enough gas to the table to justify its expense. However, the answer might not be to build from scratch a new generation of seaplane tankers (not to mention the training and logistic infrastructure that would come with such an effort).
Instead, the Navy should purchase secondhand “big-wing” tankers for itself. In a major shooting war, the Navy will not be able to rely on the Air Force to provide the fuel the Navy’s air wings will need to fight a maritime-centric, theater-spanning campaign of dynamic maneuver and range. The air tasking order process is not sufficiently flexible, and the Air Force will be hard-pressed to provide the resources in the face of an aggressive enemy with advanced capabilities.
Using the author’s numbers regarding fuel capacity, it seems a fleet of about 15 to 20 Navy-operated KC-10 and KC-135 tankers would meet the Navy’s needs. This solution has the added benefits of using existing, mature platforms with established training and parts pipelines. Navy crews and mechanics can train at existing Air Force facilities to keep costs down and avoid duplication of effort.
—CAPT Pete Pagano, USN (Ret.)
Mahan’s Illusory Command of the Seas
I have been reading Proceedings for almost 40 years. In my opinion, this article is undoubtedly the worst article ever printed during all those years.
I am embarrassed to admit that I have never read Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, but Mr. Ullman’s declaration that command and decisive sea battles are “illusory” is nonsense and sophistry.
For example, the author tells us that, in the Napoleonic Wars, naval victories might have been necessary, but alone were “insufficient.” The author mistakes victory in a naval battle for the actual contribution of the navy—sea denial.
The author notes how many years of land combat it took to defeat Napoleon, but he misses the point. Had Napoleon been in control of the English Channel for a week, England would have been in real trouble. The Napoleonic Wars might have ended with England defeated and Napoleon in control of the continent. This did not happen, because the Royal Navy prevented Napoleon from invading England. Therefore, because of England’s navy, its small army was able to stand for years against Europe’s most dangerous land power until events led to final victory. There is nothing “illusory” about that.
—Robert T. O’Gara
Impact of Proceedings
I am a high school junior in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and a Naval Institute member. I have been reading Proceedings since last summer. I am interested in a career as a Navy officer (and will be applying for admission to the Naval Academy for the class of 2026).
Proceedings has given me a much clearer understanding of the technical and strategic aspects of naval warfare. I have been able to use some of the online research materials for an essay contest. I particularly enjoy the articles on strategic capabilities and the nuclear triad.
An article about the littoral combat ship prompted me to watch several YouTube videos on the Independence class, but I am most interested in reading about competition with China and peer-to-peer warfare. Reading Proceedings has been a valuable and enlightening experience for me, and I always look forward to receiving the next issue.
—Samuel D. Everson
