(See P. Neal, online, October 2020)
With regard to Mr. Neal’s fine article, let me add a few thoughts. I cannot forget Victor Krulak, because he was my father. More important, he was a touchstone on which I relied until his death (and beyond)—but especially during my tenure as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The author discussed many important issues facing our Corps but, in my opinion, failed to place enough focus on the real answer my father gave to “Why does the U.S. need a Marine Corps?” He begins by noting “memories of Pacific campaigns and the flag raising on Iwo Jima were fresh in people’s minds” and then speaks about our excellence on the battlefield and readiness before finally hitting on what I feel is the key point my father wanted to make.
As Commandant, I spoke to my father every day at noon. The call might last 5 minutes or 50, but it always ended with his admonition that if he had the opportunity to write his answer to the Commandant’s question again, he would have made some slight alterations and ended his letter with the following:
We exist today . . . we flourish today, not because of who we know we are or what we know we can do, but because of what the grass roots of our country believes we are and believes we can do. The American people believe that we are downright good for the country; that we are masters of a form of unfailing alchemy which converts unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant citizens, citizens into whose hands the Nation’s affairs may safely be entrusted. And, likewise, should the people ever lose that conviction, as a result of our failure to meet their high, almost spiritual standards, the Marine Corps will quickly disappear.
My father’s point to me—every single day—was that although we Marines are, in fact, the world’s finest fighting organization, our sister services are a close second in many respects. At the same time, to the American people we remain a “breed apart.” We are like the Spartans at Thermopylae or Caesar’s Tenth Legion at the gates of Rome, defending the Republic against the barbarian hordes. We represent something very special—strength and determination wrapped in the best qualities of our nation. Against all odds, we will exist if we keep our hands firmly on the twin touchstones of valor and values.
The day-to-day challenges we face as a Corps have not changed over the years. Budget battles wax and wane. Our relationship with the Navy normally follows the same pattern, for obvious reasons. Our view of warfare changes as we deal with advances in technology, the rise and fall of threats, our national strategy, the will of the people, etc. The Marine Corps will always have alligators nipping at its heels—this is what gives us our healthy sense of paranoia. Yet, at the end of the day, we will survive and thrive as long as we maintain our “high, almost spiritual, standards.”
—Gen Charles C. Krulak, USMC (Ret.),
31st Commandant of the Marine Corps
Going to War with China? Ignore Corbett. Dust Off Mahan!
(See M. Suarez, pp. 48–53, December 2020)
Lieutenant Suarez is correct about the PRC’s dependence on Indian Ocean–western Pacific maritime commerce. Please consider the following:
Most dry cargo is carried on about 11,000 PANAMAX-size container ships. Some 6,000 operate in the Indo-Pacific, and about half support Chinese trade. Another 1,000 ships in this trade are large tankers.
A PANAMAX container ship is 950 feet long, with a 106-foot beam. It has a full-load draft of 39.5 feet and 52,500 deadweight-tons displacement. It can hold some 5,000 20-foot equivalent units (shipping containers). It cruises at about 24 knots.
Each PANAMAX container ship is as large as an Iowa-class battleship, and just two of them can carry about the same cargo capacity as a late–World War II 50-ship convoy—at double the speed. These ships do not lend themselves to convoying. They do lend themselves to protected sea lanes. And they can accommodate containerized combat systems.
My conclusion is that no nation can seriously interdict modern ocean commerce by sinking PANAMAX or larger ships. None has enough torpedoes and antiship cruise missiles to eliminate even 10 percent of them in a timely manner.
The way modern ocean commerce can be efficiently interrupted is by preventing it from loading and unloading—by the application of precision-guided conventional missiles against container and oil terminals using complex target-deactivation modeling to choose specific targets. That technique has been practiced by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center for some 35 years.
—Jim O’Brasky
Sustainment Will Be Contested
(See E. Limpacher and W. Mills, pp. 29–33, November 2020)
The authors inspired me to put some thoughts down about clandestine logistics capabilities. The use of amphibious aircraft, small boats, and low-profile vessels will certainly be key, but submersible supply pods could add a capability to reach even the most difficult and compromised expeditionary advanced base.
Such pods would capitalize on existing technologies to transport and deliver supplies and maintenance items. Traveling underwater would make detection difficult and—depending on the materials and propulsion system used—could render the pods all but undetectable. They would be reusable. They potentially could even evacuate casualties to a rendezvous point for pickup.
—Maj A. Rey Estrada Jr., USMC (Ret.)
Stop Calling It a Patrol Boat
(S. Baldovsky, pp. 66–70, November 2020)
Though I have been retired for a while, Lieutenant Commander Baldovsky’s observations resonated with my experiences operating cutters supported by the Coast Guard’s Surface Effect Ship (SES) Division in Key West, Florida, and Patrol Boat Squadron One in Miami, as well as my headquarters assignment managing the Coast Guard’s patrol boat fleet. While he raises several excellent points about the new fast-response cutters (FRCs) and their differences from legacy patrol boats, his concerns are similar to those expressed by early 110-foot patrol boat commanding officers, who also experienced limited shoreside support scaled for smaller, less complex legacy patrol boats.
During the 1980s, the Coast Guard established the SES Division to support three SESs operating with four crews and established Patrol Boat Squadron One, with six single-crewed 110-foot patrol boats so the assigned cutters could achieve a higher operating pace than typical patrol boats. These organizations mostly succeeded at meeting the goals, but the SES’ commercial design limitations made them difficult to sustain.
Lieutenant Commander Baldovsky appears to start from a different premise: that FRCs in general will not be able to sustain their expected operating pace without additional shoreside support. This indicates potential deficiencies in the service’s process for modeling FRC crew and shoreside maintenance personnel.
Establishing a few squadrons of clustered FRCs with dedicated support would likely solve the shoreside maintenance and crew burnout problem and allow the FRCs to operate more like medium-endurance cutters than patrol boats. But it would raise two concerns: Would independently homeported FRCs be expected to operate at a less demanding pace than squadron FRCs? And what happens if a future Coast Guard budget crisis leads to the elimination of the squadron support personnel (which happened to Patrol Boat Squadron One)?
Coast Guard leaders must balance many competing needs, and increasing personnel support for the FRC fleet would mean fewer personnel for other mission needs. Fortunately, Admiral Karl Schultz, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, is uniquely suited to consider this issue. He is one of the few—perhaps the only—remaining active-duty officers to have been assigned to both SES Division and Patrol Boat Squadron One cutters.
—LCDR Jim Sartucci, USCG (Ret.)
Surviving the Shipyard Requires Grit and Grind
(See P. Kotlikoff, pp. 72–76, October 2020, and A. Battenburg, p. 89, December 2020)
I spent 27 years in the Navy, all on submarines or in submarine-related jobs. The problems noted by Lieutenant Kotlikoff concerning submarine shipyard work periods were present decades ago and apparently have not been corrected.
Some of the issues my subs experienced were: work expanding (to fix problems discovered when systems were opened); new work added by the type commander; duty section overload; divisional overload; long periods of shift work with no time off; continuing requalification requirements (thanks to schedule slippage); and loss of experience as sailors and officers transferred.
I encountered the three significant types of submarine shipyard period—new construction, decommissioning, and midlife work. The new construction problems experienced in the 1970s and 1980s seem to have been resolved with Virginia–class subs. Decommissioning is a relatively simple process and can be done on time—if the shipyard is competent. But the Navy still has not solved the problem of a six-month (or longer) shipyard work period in the middle of a ship’s operating life.
My first submarine (and I) entered the shipyard for an 18-month refueling overhaul in early 1977; 35 months later, I transferred with the ship still in the yard. (It finally left after 42 months.) This was not unusual.
Prior to my executive officer tour (in new construction), in 1988 I spent a few months in Norfolk Naval Shipyard. At the time, there were eight or nine fast-attack boats in the yard for overhaul. All were over cost and behind schedule. Prorate this over the five other shipyards doing nuclear work then, and you can see the magnitude of the problem for the operating forces. My commanding officer tour included a decommissioning. The only tour I had on a submarine that did not involve time in a shipyard was my department head tour, as engineer on the USS Ohio (SSBN-726), beginning in 1982.
My oldest son recently transferred to shore duty after a bit more than four years on the USS Michigan (SSGN-727). During that time, the boat spent two periods in the shipyard. His descriptions sound very similar to those of Lieutenant Kotlikoff.
A lot of lip service has been given to the problem of lost operational time over the years, and many changes have been made to maintenance procedures and schedules. But the problem does not get better. With two-thirds of the submarine force older than 23 years, the problems will only get worse. Older subs require more maintenance to remain operational.
Until the Navy admits that naval shipyards are overloaded; that initial submarine overhaul schedules are more dream than reality; and that adequate funding and people are necessary to address the problem, nothing will change.
—CAPT Carl D. Olson, USN (Ret.)
Reflections on the Loss of the Thresher
(See J. Geurts, pp. 54–55, September 2020; N. Thunman, p. 9, November 2020; and
B. Gabbert, p. 88, December 2020)
As a postscript to Vice Admiral Thunman’s comments regarding the USS Thresher (SSN-593) incident, I can state unequivocally that there was no Russian or foreign submarine in the area at the time of the tragedy.
I was the navigator of the brand-spanking-new USS Harry E. Yarnell (DLG-17), and we were conducting sea trials in the adjoining operating area. Among other things, the ship was asked to test the latest and hottest forms of navigation, including Loran-C. During some downtime, I wandered into the radio shack and started reading message traffic, including from the ship that was shepherding the Thresher.
Messages about having lost contact with the sub became increasingly frantic. I brought them to the skipper’s attention on the bridge, and, since we were next door, he ordered me to set course closest to the edge between op areas. Almost simultaneously, we received orders to break off and conduct search-and-rescue operations.
We were on site within minutes of the message and began conducting a sweep of the entire area. Our sonar operator never discovered the presence of another submarine then or when we were in our own op area next door.
At the hearings conducted on the loss, Vice Admiral Lawson P. Ramage summoned me as a witness to enter all my navigation findings and charts into the record. I was later informed that it was that information that led to the subsequent discovery of the Thresher’s remains. I had a number of friends from the Naval Academy on board the Thresher at the time. Their loss still saddens me today.
—CDR Selig Solomon, USN (Ret.)
Physical Fitness Fuels Greater Cognitive Power
(See M. Posey, pp. 78–79, November 2020)
As a cardiologist, I am always quick to extol the virtues of exercise. However, care is needed before prescribing daily vigorous exercise to build intellectual prowess, as Lieutenant Colonel Posey proposes.
First, because there are only 24 hours in a day, expanded exercise requirements will almost certainly come at the expense of sleep. No quantity of exercise or caffeine can counter the cognitive decrements of reduced sleep. Sleep—not bicep curls—makes brains physically fit and resilient.
Second, it cannot reasonably be asserted that an hour every day at the gym or track will pay more intellectual dividends than spending those hours in the library.
Third, exercise cannot overcome three widespread brain-impairing conditions more deserving of priority attention: unrecognized sleep apnea, alcohol excess, and cigarette smoking. Smoking is a significant risk for Alzheimer’s disease, which begins long before it becomes obviously apparent.
Fourth, exercise is not risk free. Over-exercising risks orthopedic injury and lowers resistance to environmental stresses such as cold, immersion, and food scarcity. Coincidentally, in the same issue, two other authors dramatically highlight the risk of food scarcity.
As in all things, balance is necessary. To reap the benefits described by Lieutenant Colonel Posey, for 20 years I have simply walked an hour each afternoon, taking a clipboard (or iPad) filled with material to read for work. On weekends, I take a book. Without robbing sleep time, this practice dramatically enhances concentration, creativity, conditioning, and vascular health, while providing effortless weight control.
—Col. John Sotos, California ANG
Where Will the Next War Be Fought?
(See J. Lacey, pp. 64–65, November 2020)
Dr. Lacey doesn’t make much of a case for the role of navies. His central fronts from history are all examples of continental powers, and he largely ignores maritime power.
The central front in World War I was a stalemate—it was the economic impact of the blockade that defeated Germany. In the American Civil War, the central front was in Virginia, but it was Sherman’s March to the Sea, which destroyed the South’s economy and logistical system and split the Confederacy by capturing Atlanta, that defeated secession.
He also discounts the advent of nuclear weapons. Does he really think a nation would collapse in total defeat and not use its nuclear weapons? There has never been a war between nuclear-armed powers, and there must never be one. But World War I proved that nations will use inhumane weapons they never imagined they would consider at the outset.
Even if nuclear weapons did not exist, the experience of China in World War II suggests that occupation would be required for the United States to achieve victory. I don’t think that is something the country is prepared to do.
—LCDR Tim Stipp, USN (Ret.)
Tactical Education from Martial Arts
At one time, Richard Heckler of Marin County, California—an Aikido black belt—was a consultant to the Marine Corps.
Aikido is an effective system for dealing with multiple threats. It is similar to dealing with multiple radar targets in a bridge collision-avoidance situation, in that you prioritize and deal with one at a time. At radar school, the idea of reversing the engines is almost never considered, but beginners in multiple person Aikido attack scenarios often default to retreating—a big mistake.
The rules of thumb in Aikido are: (1) Prioritize your targets based on proximity, speed, and threat. (2) Always advance—for each step back you will acquire another attacker. The only “fail” I saw at a black belt test was a candidate who backed up until all three attackers were firmly attached. At that point the student went down under a dog pile. (3) It is usually better to start with one flank of any group of attackers. It is sometimes possible (but trickier and riskier) to find a gap in the center of a line. (4) Waste no time on any single target. Each gets “one shot,” then you move on while the target reacts.
In the dojo, for black belt testing purposes, you may throw an attacker, if possible toward the remaining crowd to create confusion. But on the street, it is better just to move to the next attacker. Should an erstwhile attacker respond to your advance by retreating, move to the next target.
The attackers may think of you as outnumbered, but you should think of them as a target-rich environment.
—Charles Warren, USCG Aux. (Ret.)
Seizing the Cao Yu 6025
(See A. Clift, p. 95, August 2020)
Mr. Clift’s article reminded me of an interesting moment in my career.
I was a young petty officer on board the USCGC Sherman (WHEC-720) in 1993, when we boarded driftnet fishing vessels in the North Pacific. At the time, we were engaging in a new realm, supporting a recently passed U.N. ban on driftnet fishing.
The boarding was tedious, as we “checked all the boxes,” as Mr. Clift noted. We ended up escorting the Dayuanyu No. 206 all the way back to the South China Sea to hand off to a Chinese patrol boat. The fishing vessel claimed to be damaged, which left us literally on a slow boat to China.
—CPO Timothy Graziani, USCG (Ret.)
Optimize Maritime Security Cooperation
(See E. Hovey and J. Hotalen, pp. 44–49, August 2020)
Thank you to Majors Hovey and Hotalen for bringing to the pages of Proceedings the importance of security cooperation to U.S. national security and placing it on a par with military power and equipment. The examples of Senegal and Morocco as successful maritime security cooperation poignantly illustrate the importance of understanding our partners’ respective cultural values and demonstrate the skills necessary to achieve that understanding.
There is more, however. As a recent RAND Corp. study (Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa, 2018) has shown, to develop the lasting partnerships necessary to deter and defeat both great power adversaries and enduring nonstate enemies, security cooperation must be conceived and executed in a context of “long-term commitments . . . a comprehensive political-military strategy, invest[ment] in security governance institutions, and . . . personnel on the ground over long periods of time to offer advice and oversee implementation.”
Moreover, the metrics-based periodic review paradigm is not the best way to assess the impact of security cooperation operations. As the RAND study notes, security-sector assistance “takes time to become effective. There appears to be a lag of at least a couple years before any impact at all is observable.” And as the article’s Senegal case study illustrates, the metrics themselves often prove to be poor units of measure.
Many view “security cooperation” and “security-sector assistance” as synonymous. They certainly are not mutually exclusive. But the former is narrow in scope: to train and equip friendly forces so they may contribute constructively to the common fight, and to maintain those friendships. The latter is broader: to encourage the emergence of and strengthen transparent and accountable security institutions within our partners, and thus foster democratic governance and democracy-leaning states.
The authors identified the key asset necessary to both: a “deep bench” of culturally and linguistically immersed security cooperation operators (also known as cooperants) who recognize our partners’ true values and thus successfully “navigate the red lines.”
—CDR David A. Buzard, USNR (Ret.)
