The Coast Guard . . . shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times.
14 U.S. Code 101
The U.S. Coast Guard has a long and proud tradition of punching above its weight class. Today, it is more ready, relevant, and responsive than ever before, and its junior members embody that responsibility well. However, there is a culture of dangerous comfort that hinders the service’s defense mission. Many Coast Guard members view defense readiness, much less war or armed conflict, as hyperbolic paranoia. At best, they believe harm will not visit the organization. At worst, they believe it will not visit them as individuals.
But today there are two maritime regions where near-peer competitors are engaging in dangerous brinkmanship, raising the possibility of large-scale conflict. Coast Guard members at the deckplate level need to take these threats seriously, and Coast Guard leaders need to promulgate training to the fleet with these threats in mind. The service cannot rely indefinitely on its white hulls to protect it.
Tyranny of the Present
Former Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen frequently referenced the “tyranny of the present,” describing it as being too focused on where you are instead of on the course ahead. The Coast Guard is an outstanding lifesaving organization, but this and other peacetime missions distract it from its military roots. This is the tyranny of the present.
A lack of attention to conflict response will likely be a dangerous impediment to the Coast Guard achieving unity of effort with its sister services if the worst does happen. Fortunately, training for conflict response would not be a heavy lift, as the planning framework exists.
In 2000, for example, Coast Guard Activities New York planned and executed Operation Sail (OpSail) and the International Naval Review 2000. Approximately a year later, 11 September required large-scale mobilization and response. “We mentally dusted off everything we’d done and all the lessons learned for how to support a huge influx of Coast Guard personnel; how to support the [port security units], how to berth people, how to transport people, and how to fuel them,” noted Admiral Richard Bennis, Captain of the Port and Commander Activities New York at the time. “All of those essentials . . . were things that seamlessly on 9/11 we transitioned into from the two years we had spent preparing for OpSail 2000. 9/11 gave us no time for preparation, so we just made it happen.”1
Preparation through Training
Undoubtedly, most Coast Guardsmen cringe at the thought of more training, but training to patch a hole in the hull from debris is scalable to patching a hole from a projectile. Training to render first aid to a distressed mariner can be scaled to a mass casualty and triage event. First, however, the Coast Guard needs to acknowledge the real possibility of those larger events occurring.
Mass triage and casualty evacuation should be practiced at shore units, and cutters must plan and train for a sinking event on the scale of the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) or USCGC Tampa tragedies, as undersea threats are part of enemy antiaccess strategies. Currently, the Coast Guard does not track all members’ ability to render basic care.
Health services technicians (HSs) could develop aggressive training plans to ensure their units are well prepared for different types of medical scenarios. Even just performing annual or semiannual large-scale medical drills would greatly improve a member’s confidence in initial response. HSs or those certified as emergency medical technicians should be allowed to train and certify members as local unit medical first responders.
The service also should expand training for active shooter and active threat events, as these are scalable to even larger events. The Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) was prepared to respond to the Naval Yard active shooter event in September 2013 because of an aggressive training plan. Its 2015 after-action report explained: “Over the years, the members of MPD . . . have trained extensively for the possibility of an ‘active shooter’ incident. The Department did so with the hope of never having to respond to such a tragedy, but . . . recognized the importance and necessity of those preparations.”2
Many shore units rely heavily on outside departments or agencies for response, but first responder services may not always have availability or capacity, especially in a threat environment. The Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces community frequently plans for, trains, and works through these conflict scenarios, but it cannot be everywhere at all times, nor should it be. All Coast Guardsmen must train to be the first responders, not only for others, but also for themselves.
Gunners mates (GMs) and maritime enforcement specialists (MEs) could attend training such as the Navy’s Security Force Readiness Training course to improve active shooter response. The infrastructure and curriculum already exist, the service just needs to take advantage.
Weapons training is another area that could be improved. The Coast Guard employs weapons for defensive purposes relatively rarely, but small steps such as more dry fire practice could boost readiness. There also is a persistent mind-set that expending more than a limited amount of ammunition is never a good thing. Onboard most cutters, only the few gun crew members receive ammunition with which to train, and then only a strict small amount.
Coast Guard gunners mates should be allowed to participate in a Department of Defense (DoD) exchange program to give them better knowledge of defensive weapons employment and tactics, so they can begin performing in a “train-the-trainer” role for other Coast Guardsmen. Top-performing firearms instructors should be allowed to achieve Advanced Marksmanship Instructor qualification then use their own discretion to advance competent members at their units past basic levels of small arms employment.
Spending more time at the small arms range or in gun crew gear is not comfortable, but it builds proficiency. Rarely can an individual be over trained, especially in the profession of arms.
The Coast Guard also could develop new training teams composed of MEs, GMs, HSs, and damage controlmen that travel to and inspect unit readiness to respond to different casualty events. All units should develop antiterrorism force protection readiness review teams with local DoD and civilian partners to review unit-level tactics and procedures to respond to a wide array of terrorist threats.
Physical Fitness
The Coast Guard must put greater emphasis on physical fitness. Most members are allowed to simply sign a piece of paper pledging to be active. And because the service has deemed that maintaining weight standards and not actual fitness to be most important, there is a culture of extreme dieting and weight loss for the month or two before weigh-ins then a swift return to less healthy habits right after. The service seemingly has forgotten the camaraderie and esprit de corps that is gained by turning up the discomfort just a little on the path toward physical readiness.
To further promote physical fitness, members excelling in physical standards should be rewarded with points toward advancement, similar to the Marine Corps’ physical fitness test scoring system. This would provide greater motivation than current practices.
Ensuring the physical fitness necessary to save a mariner will help ensure the physical readiness a conflict environment would demand.
Small Steps
To fortify itself against threats, the Coast Guard can take small steps. Coasties need not try to emulate soldiers or Marines, but without wide dissemination of personnel well trained in self-preservation, its new platforms and equipment may not amount to much. The Coast Guard always performs at higher levels than expected; its leaders should take steps to ensure it still can in a conflict, whether at home or abroad.
1. CPO P. J. Capelotti, USCGR Rogue Wave: The U.S. Coast Guard on and after 9/11 (U.S Coast Guard Historians Office, 2003).
2. After Action Report, Washington Navy Yard, 16 September 2013, Internal Review of the Metropolitan Police Department (Washington, DC: Metropolitan Police Department, July 2014).