The littoral combat ships (LCSs) have had a rough start to their careers. Criticism concerning construction, manning, propulsion, and, finally, a lack of firepower has been widespread since the ships first arrived. Maintenance issues and a suspension of deployments have done little to enhance their reputation and have given more ammunition to critics. Nonetheless, Navy leaders have stoically held to the claim, “We’ll make it work,” and doubled down on promises to make the maligned but increasingly numerous ships viable members of the fleet.
Perhaps just in time to rescue the LCS comes a new operational strategy that may be suited for the corvette-sized craft that have had a hard time fitting into the blue-water Navy. In the face of challenges posed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in the South China Sea and other potential near-shore conflicts, the Navy and Marine Corps have returned to the notion of a protracted battle in an enemy’s shallow waters and islands. The LCS, with a little reimagining, could flourish in such a gritty strategy in several needed roles.
The New Littorals: Countering the Near-Peer Threat
Watching the explosive growth of the Chinese Navy in the Pacific and the resurgent Russian fleet again underway in the European theater, the United States has assumed the age of large-scale high-seas fleet engagements has returned. This is needed, but countering China and Russia in practical terms will require fighting in coastal and near-shore regions as part of the expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and littoral operations in a contested environment concepts.
Among the missions the LCS could be configured for in these new 21st-century island-hopping and coastal operations are:
Rapid troop incursion. Among the lessons of the southern Pacific campaign of World War II is the need to move small tactical units into remote or enemy occupied areas for intense, limited operations. The general category of “raid” is appropriate for these short and likely violent battles, although they may serve a wide range of purposes: point target destruction, rescue in a non-permissive environment, and extractions among them. (Marine Lieutenant James A. Winnefeld proposed something along these lines in 2019.) As the Solomons and Philippine campaigns showed, a ship just big enough to transport and support a landing force and fast enough to surprise a superior local enemy is a necessity. The LCS, with its ample mission bay, a fleet-level command-and-control suite, and a large flight deck, can provide a modern take on the capabilities vested in World War II’s destroyer-transports.
Surface strike. Protecting the naval force attempting to operate in the contested waters of the South China Sea will require a small high speed surface combatant with an offensive punch. And the LCS is growing into a potent antisurface combatant now that it can employ the Naval Strike Missile. Other modularized antiship missiles also exist and could help make the LCS a viable threat.
Presence patrols and counter-aggression operations. Conflict in the waters China claims will not begin with the shooting war; it is ongoing, with the U.S. Navy as the lead national element to counter China’s grasping and thwart its hegemonic ambitions. Despite its flaws, an LCS is a U.S. warship, and deploying one forward would allow it to make frequent and short-notice freedom of navigation (FON) patrols and routine operations in disputed waters. The fanfare with which these operations are undertaken reflect the United States’ commitment to free and open international waters. But—particularly from the perspective of regional allies—regular, more frequent patrols would be at least as helpful. Large ships and task groups’ FONOps must be crammed into already ambitious deployment schedules; forward-based LCSes would be available for frequent and impromptu ventures.
In addition to the presence mission, forward-deployed LCSs can perform a critical role in expanding our influence. This is particularly needed in the South China Sea and within China’s self-described nine-dash-line claims. Regional navies can train with LCS-led detachments and conduct combined operations that not only bolster their own claims but reinforce U.S. policy.
Quick response in crisis situations. A key element of U.S. deterrence and allied support in remote littorals and archipelagos will be the country’s ability to support allies and potential friends in a range of missions short war. These can take on a variety of forms including search and rescue, disaster relief, and quick response to criminal activity or state-sponsored violence. The LCS has the potential to be an effective participant in these operations. Its speed will allow it to deploy rapidly, and its internal capacity can be configured on the fly to support just about any need a crisis mission might demand—from relief supply distribution to medical team embarkation. Its aviation capability will enhance it in any of these crisis scenarios envisioned, from carrying patients to facing down pirates or other seagoing “bad actors.”
Small advanced base support. Island chain fighting will require staging and supporting small forces forward in the operating area, often for short periods and with specific limited objectives. Moving and supporting these forces, from combat forces, to engineer groups, to small medical and rescue units, will require a platform that can move quickly, store material, and handle personnel movements with both surface and air transport. With its large mission bay and flight deck, the LCS can support a wide range of limited but critical operations. The expeditionary sea base “mothership” concept has proved itself effective for supporting a variety of peacetime and military missions. In a more limited way, an LCS could support expeditionary missions in austere littoral environments—mine countermeasures, explosive ordnance disposal, special warfare, and intelligence gathering are just a few examples. Not all are suitable for the LCS to perform, but the ship can act as a hub enabling them all.
Recasting LCS Capabilities and Support
Fitting the LCS to the fight forward will take some new operating concepts and systems. These include:
Reconfiguring and rearming. An almost universal criticism of the LCS has been its lack of offensive punch. The initial plan to build the meagerly armed hulls and backfit capability has been uneven in execution. But the Navy is making progress. In addition to the Naval Strike Missile, Harpoon and Longbow/Hellfire missiles have been tested and the Navy is beginning to purchase launch systems for the ships. The Navy also has declared its intention to equip the LCS with the new Long Range Antiship Missile (LRASM), as well as the full production and deployment of the Surface-to-Surface Mission Module, although funding is a question. In the knife fight that will characterize operations in contested littoral regions, offensive power will be king, and matching the LCS’s speed and sophisticated command and control with a potent antiship capability will make it the threat it needs to be.
Deployable support. It will take an on-scene tactical organization that understands the new missions the LCS can perform and provide direct supervision of the ships to employ them properly. LCS squadrons or divisions need to be developed to deploy with their assigned ships and oversee these operations. The PT boat units of World War II or the PG squadrons in the Mediterranean in the 1960s and 1970s should be the model for this forward, expeditionary structure.1
The Navy has learned a lot about maintaining and caring for LCSs in forward ports. It has developed facilities at Singapore to maintain LCSs in theater. To be sure, maintaining them is a challenge, in both coordination and execution. To support an LCS deployed to combat areas as envisioned here, the support facilities now sitting in a major port will need to be condensed and configured for quick movement to unimproved beaches and islets in the thick of the battlespace. Keeping the LCS in the expeditionary fight means moving its support forward with it.
It is easy to see the above ideas as minimalist and perhaps further substantiation of the LCS’s shortcomings. For example, missing above are two high-visibility missions the LCS has been traditionally associated with—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare. The omission is deliberate: The challenges of EABO and the Navy’s stated policy of operating in the enemy’s backyard should drive the service to seek other roles more in demand for the next conflict. Despite the ships’ shortcomings and the controversies they have spurred, LCSs have the potential to sit squarely in the middle of our emerging naval strategy. Reshaping the LCSs’ mission and the approach to deploying them may not only satisfy some of the unfortunate ships’ critics, but also give the Navy a suitable return on the investment made in them.
1. The current LCS squadrons and two divisions are CONUS based and focused on LCS support and tactical development. Whether these organizations can be reconfigured to manage deployed groups of LCSes is a matter that could be studied.
