The Navy Needs Hybrid Crews for Warships

Nearly half a century ago, Military Sealift Command (MSC) began a modest set of experiments that would fundamentally alter the Navy’s auxiliary fleet, converting the oiler USS Taluga (AO-62) to operation by government civilian mariners (CivMars). These pioneers were known as the Taluga Tigers, and the extraordinary success of Operation Charger Log II transformed the combat logistics force from exclusively military in 1972 to exclusively civilian by 2003.

The ability to operate ships with less expensive and more efficient civilian crews has been copied to other platforms, including all auxiliaries, command ships, and—most recently—expeditionary mobile bases. Some civilian-manned vessels retain their commissioned status, operating under a hybrid crewing model with active-duty commanding officers. Now, with personnel costs and ship readiness more critical than ever, is time to explore the final frontier of hybrid crewing: surface combatants. 

A Brief History of Hybrid Crews

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1970 to 1974, had to confront a problem that had been put off for two decades: recapitalizing an antiquated Navy in an era of declining defense spending. He attempted to do so with what he called the “high/low” mix. Zumwalt sought to balance a few highly capable but expensive warships with a large number of inexpensive, lower-capability vessels.¹

Zumwalt applied the same principles to fleet replenishment, splitting auxiliaries into three tiers of vessels. On the top auxiliary tier were purpose-built combat support ships (AOEs) that could keep pace with carrier task forces. These were multiproduct vessels manned by Navy sailors. The bottom tier were product tankers (AOTs), indistinguishable from civilian tankers and operated by MSTS (renamed Military Sealift Command [MSC] in 1970). These AOTs shuttled fuel from the United States to forward fuel farms.² 

Occupying the middle tier were oilers that collected fuel from the farms and delivered it to the AOEs (or directly to warships, if an AOE was not available). It was these ships, operating closer to rear areas, which Zumwalt wanted to transfer to civilian operation. To test the feasibility of civilian mariners manning oilers, MSC began a series of experiments collectively known as Charger Log.

Charger Log II began in 1972. Unlike Charger Log I (which tested a concept—“tankers of opportunity”—that was ultimately abandoned), the second test’s aims were ambitious: man a Navy oiler with a civilian crew. The aging Taluga, a veteran of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, was selected for conversion to civilian operation. Her weapon systems were removed and her berthing significantly improved, thanks to a reduction in crew from 300 to just 106.³

Warships are optimized for combat, not comfort, and only officers could expect to have a stateroom, and even that was often shared with one or more roommates. Enlisted sailors sleep in open bays of up to 100 sailors. Civilian mariners of any rank (but especially watch standers) expect to have a private cabin, which creates substantial space demand for any vessel selected for civilian operation.

Once the conversion was completed, the Taluga was placed “in service” as a United States naval ship (USNS). She was stationed in California and practiced underway replenishments until being deployed to the Vietnam coast. Off Vietnam, she supported carrier task forces that were flying combat sorties ashore. The Taluga would deploy five times before being withdrawn from service in 1979.

In addition to the 875 individual refuelings the Taluga made, valuable lessons were gathered about civilian operation of auxiliaries. The most significant was the reduced crew size. Not far behind was increased operational readiness. Civilian mariner–manned ships rotate individual crew members, in theater, while Navy sailors remain with the same ship for up to four years, spending much of that time in port for maintenance and training.

The Taluga set the pattern for the future combat logistics force. A steady conversion of older oilers to civilian mariner operation began, and only two more classes of replenishment ships designed for commissioned service were built: the Cimmarons and the Supplys. Like many auxiliaries, the Cimmarons were casualties of the post-Cold War peace dividend, and the Supplys were all transferred to MSC by 2003. 

The conversion of support ships to MSC did not stop with oilers. Submarine tenders were next, although they retained their commissioned status, with active-duty Navy commanding officers. Command ships followed the tenders, saving hundreds of billets for other ships. These hybrid crews laid the groundwork for even more ambitious hybrid crews that would operate the first afloat forward staging base, the USS Ponce (AFSB-15).

AFSBs are motherships for other ships/boats, helicopters, or special operations forces. As an AFSB, the Ponce operated with a mixed crew of civilian mariners, reservists, and joint personnel, all under a Navy commanding officer. This ensures the ships’ legal status as a warship, as they have the potential to conduct offensive operations. The civilian mariners (on any commissioned U.S. Navy ship) are considered civilians accompanying the armed forces and are not combatants under the Geneva Conventions.

Like the “Taluga Tigers” of four decades ago, the Ponce’s “Proud Lions” showed what an old ship given a new mission could accomplish, with the vessel remaining on station for five years until relieved by the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-3), a reconfigured mobile landing platform ship. Applying lessons from the Ponce, AFSBs were reclassified as Expeditionary Mobile Bases (ESBs), and the Lewis B. Puller received a Navy commanding officer. 

The Lewis B. Puller’s commissioning marks the first instance of a vessel designed for civilian mariner operation being transferred to the battle force. All other ships were either former warships (like the Taluga) or retained their commissioned status while gaining a hybrid crew (like the submarine tender Emory S. Land [AS-39]). The extent to which civilian mariners are incorporated into the Navy has never been higher, but there is still room for growth.

An Integrated Future

The time has arrived to consider the next logical step in Navy shipboard manning: warships. Amphibious assault ships would be a logical fit for conversion to operation by civilian mariners. Dock landing ships (LSDs) in particular, with their spacious hulls and straightforward configuration, would be an excellent starting point. Every demonstrable data point that could be gained in a hybrid-crewing model of a surface combatant could be made by an LSD. But to make a challenging test, an even better platform would be a guided-missile cruiser (CG).

The average CG, like the average LSD, has more than 20 years of commissioned service, and many are reaching the end of their useful lives, making them excellent platforms for experimentation. CGs have seasoned commanding officers, to help lead through the challenge of standing up a hybrid crew. Several are undergoing substantial overhauls at present to squeeze out a few more years of service life. These shipyard availabilities are the perfect opportunity to perform the considerable habitability upgrades required to house civilian crews on board small warships. Most important, using a CG as a test ship would demonstrate the feasibility of hybrid crews on all types of surface combatant platforms, where the most change could be realized. 

Proposed Manning Model

A Ticonderoga-class CG has on its activity manning document 407 billets (although the ship will receives a higher or lower percentage of that number based on the current Navy Manning Plan). These personnel are broken down across six main departments, each containing several divisions.

To comply with international law, all warfighting must be carried out by members of an organized military.⁴ This means the weapons department functions must remain Navy. For combat systems, the AEGIS radar system would be a Navy function. Civilian mariners could perform some related tasks, however, such as maintaining navigational radars and the combat information center’s navigation functions. The executive department’s navigation division would also no longer be a Navy responsibility.

In the operations department, the entire deck division could be converted to civilians. Some radio functions could be turned over to civilians, but given the large amount of tactical data flowing on these circuits, it might be better to follow the example of other hybrid ships and keep all functionality Navy. Medical services could be provided by either civilian or Navy personnel, along with administration and religious programs. (The accompanying table shows the proposed disposition of all divisions.)

Table 1. Disposition of divisions.

Shifting the operation of a typical CG to hybrid manning would save approximately $4 million per ship, per year, based on the pay and allowances associated with the structure of the affected divisions and their civilian counterparts. Extrapolating for all 114 cruisers and destroyers and small-deck amphibious ships, this would save the Navy approximately $456 million per year. Aggressive implementation with “could convert” divisions and missions would easily push savings numbers above $500 million per year. 

Financial savings are not the only incentive. During the original Charger Log experiments, it was determined that civilian-manned auxiliaries were cheaper to operate and also capable of remaining on station longer than their active-duty sisters, thanks to ad hoc crew rotations that happened in theater, as opposed to rigid deployment cycles. As the Navy struggles to grow the fleet beyond its current numbers, an ability to squeeze the most on-station time from each hull becomes ever-more critical. In the original littoral combat ship (LCS) concept of operations, crews were supposed to swap out overseas, eliminating transit time to and from the United States. 

The surface navy has a checkered history with multicrew vessels. Although pioneered with the ballistic missile submarine fleet as a matter of pragmatism, the rest of the Navy has not embraced it, even as it was tried on LCSs, patrol craft, mine countermeasures ships, and, in one notable instance (Operation Sea Swap), on a DDG. With hybrid crewing, however, it may be possible to overcome the cultural hesitations that made crew swaps a failure and be able to simply rotate out the “can’t convert” divisions identified. 

Designing the Experiment

The Charger Com[batant]) experiments should be executed in phases to test both the concept and its limitations.

Charger Com I—hybrid manning of a CG’s “should convert” divisions—would serve as a proof of concept of a hybrid crew to complete the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, the outcomes of which should only be measured after a full 36-month cycle. Success criteria should include: reduced manning costs, successful deployment/operations, and improved material condition of the ship.

Charger Com II—hybrid manning of “could convert” divisions—would test when civilians could no longer successfully be integrated into warships. They would set the maximum boundaries to which efficiency gains could be realized from manning. Pushing to a point of declining operational effectiveness, this series would identify when the military/civilian mariner ratio had gone too far.

Charger Com III—crew swapping of “cannot convert” divisions—would test whether the warfighting divisions could be swapped out in theater, as multicrewed ships have attempted to do before, while retaining most of the civilian mariners. Success would be measured in on-station time and operational effectiveness.

Charger Com IV—Navy manning of “should convert” divisions at civilian numbers. A similar experiment was originally intended to be carried out in the Charger Log series, but never ran. Charger Com IV would test if Navy sailors could more cheaply operate ships if they were crewed with fewer, more experienced personnel. If successful—if reduced numbers of Navy sailors match the manpower costs and operational effectiveness—it would offer the Navy the hope of rolling out the Charger Com in large numbers, because it could be done with current personnel. 

Overcoming Headwinds

There would be countless known and unknown obstacles to overcome. Striking the right balance of qualifying surface warfare officers on a ship with civilian watch officers and handling civilian MSC employees who are not interested in working on a warship are just two. The Navy, MSC, unions, and individual civilian mariners all would need to have a seat at the table in crafting a way forward. 

Success should not be preordained. Experimentation must allow for the possibility of failure. The Navy has a well-known history of manning initiatives with mixed results. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Gilday, was even the commanding officer of the USS Howard (DDG-83) when she participated in Sea Swap. This has not dulled his desire to innovate with the Navy, and Charger Com could do just that. It may even come to pass that, in another half century, the “Ticonderoga Tigers” will have proven to be just as revolutionary as their Taluga cousins.