Define Naval Integration

“We must communicate with precision and consistency, based on a common focus and unified message.” — The Commandant’s Planning Guidance

In 2019, Marine Corps General David Berger published The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) to provide the service strategic direction for the coming years. Since then, the Marine Corps has grappled with the degree of institutional change that will be required to meet such a farsighted vision. The CPG describes the current situation in bold terms—difficult fiscal realities and increasingly aggressive competitors demand an effective Navy–Marine Corps team. But, despite its importance, the hurried movement toward naval integration ironically has slowed much-needed institutional change. The problem is that “naval integration” does not convey precise meaning in either doctrine or common vernacular; it neglects varied operational requirements and minimizes institutional implications.¹ It will take a nuanced understanding of the term to allow the Sea Services to move out with a common focus and a unified message.  

Imprecise Words, Varied Meanings

Words describing a concept must be as clear as possible. Yet, as retired Lieutenant Colonel John Berry has noted, current Marine Corps practice sacrifices understanding for speed of execution. He claims there is “a propensity to embrace the Commandant’s terms without fully grasping the ideas inherent in them.”²

Naval integration is not a one-size-fits-all concept, but Marine Corps leaders now use the term naval integration in so many ways it is difficult to know what is being communicated. As a description of Navy–Marine Corps relationships, it could mean: attachment, assignment, operational control, tactical control, coordination, general support, direct support, interoperability, interdependency, codependency, integration of effects, integration of fires, reinforcing, teaming, or mere collaboration. Without a precise, clear meaning for the term, leaders will be unable to achieve anything but frustration. 

Such imprecision is only exacerbated by naval integration having divergent meanings at different command echelons. A recent proposal in the Marine Corps Gazette called for the abandonment of adjacent Navy and Marine Corps service components for the creation of integrated naval components to better plan, direct, supervise, and assess maritime campaigns.³ But the authors called for integration at the service component-level, while retaining Fleet Marine Force headquarters elements to support the numbered fleet commanders, reinforcing the idea that naval integration will vary according to echelon. 

The term’s meaning also is informed by the time horizon being discussed. At the service level, discussion focuses on the long-term vision of enhanced cooperation with the Navy. But within operational headquarters, naval integration is used to mean near-term actions that support an improved operational relationship. 

Operational Requirements

It is important to acknowledge that current and future operational requirements demand different scopes and depths of naval integration. Even well-defined, a single approach will not account for the varied missions across the globe or even within the western Pacific, where so much of the Marine Corps’ focus has been over the last year. Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs) especially must remain adaptable in their operational role. Just as MEFs will be tailored to their assigned missions, so too must they customize their operational relationship with adjacent Navy formations. Said differently, “customization, not uniformity, is the most important societal trend the naval force of the future must adopt.” The MEF’s flexibility demands multiple methods of naval integration. Indeed, a universal, prescriptive dose of naval integration does not allow for customization according to specific requirements, whether facing China within the first island chain or conducting humanitarian-aid/disaster-relief operations on a storm-damaged archipelago. Those two examples also raise the issue of a requirement to align with allies and partners’ militaries. It is not only a question of joint operations (with the Navy and Marine Corps as well as the other armed forces), but multinational ones.

DOTMLPF Impacts

Service-level transformation requires doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) changes, all of which can flow only from a clear definition of naval integration. While Headquarters Marine Corps does recognize the DOTMLPF implications inherent in Force Design 2030, a broader understanding of  naval integration implications is not yet complete.

To date, doctrine and concepts have made the most progress enhancing partnership between the Navy and Marine Corps. Navy Doctrine Publication 1, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority: Distributed Maritime Operations, and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations show the development of the services concepts for how the Navy–Marine Corps team will fight in a future conflict. 

According to a recent study, “composite warfare is seen by some as the embodiment of and pathway to greater naval integration.”⁴ Many within the services have already decided that the composite warfare construct (CWC) is the best way forward, despite only limited discussion, experimentation, and wargaming and the lack of clear definitions of the type of integration required.  

Adopting CWC as the de facto representation of naval integration would require a paradigm shift, forcing the Marine Corps to view all lethal and nonlethal effects through a purely functional lens. Composite warfare may generate timing and tempo of effects within a peer fight, but it also narrows the flexibility inherent in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and the traditional, doctrinal “single battle concept.” In addition, while the Navy supports an enhanced partnership with the Marine Corps, Navy leaders may not desire complete Marine Corps integration within CWC once all the long-term implications become evident.⁵

The Way Forward

The call for naval integration is appropriate, but professional military officers must be precise in both word and deed when working toward the changes outlined in the CPG. Three recommendations will help bring clarity to the discussion.  

First, demand precision. So long as naval integration describes nearly everything affecting the Navy–Marine Corps team, it lacks precision. At the service-level, an even more generic term such as naval partnership will continue to provide latitude for various methods and depths of integration. At  the tactical and operational level,  interoperability, interdependence, and integration of effects should be used to convey a more precise meaning, while still allowing for the requisite flexibility in rapidly changing operational environments. Interoperability (how Navy and Marine Corps communication, targeting, and other systems maintain compatibility) facilitates optimized command and support relationships. Interdependence describes how MEFs and numbered fleets work in an adjacent, supporting relationship given geographic proximity. Integration of effects outlines the synergy that exists when systems are interoperable and proper command and support relationships are established. When this occurs, the Navy–Marine Corps team can mass lethal and non-lethal fires at a decisive space and time. This is the ultimate objective of a naval partnership.   

Second, the two services must moderate the desire to integrate as that term is currently understood. Although they must strengthen this partnership, they must also recognize that each has its own core competencies, each of which has distinct value in an operational environment. The CPG recognizes that, “the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) cannot be our only solution for all crises,” but it must be recognized that the MAGTF offers flexibility. With improperly executed naval integration, the flexibility at the heart of the MAGTF could be nullified.

Third, a bold vision should never be restrained by current realities, but it must account for them—especially when those same realities represent the future. Just as China will remain on what it calls the “Road to Rejuvenation” for decades to come, so, too, will its overall national strategy and operational approach include maintaining an active defense and fighting “local informationalized wars.” Joint force contingency plans not only provide a continuity of logic given the enemy’s long-term threat approach, but also describe durable operational designs that will remain valid for many years. The Marine Corps must ensure that such plans inform institutional debates, including those associated with naval integration.   

The CPG’s vision has rightfully awakened the Marine Corps from its recent past of landlocked wars, bureaucratic malaise, and a confused value proposition. Thoughtful discussions about naval integration alone almost justify the cost of the friction caused by such gargantuan organizational change solely for that awakening. However, it has become painfully obvious that naval integration terminology is not clear enough. Loose language does not accurately reflect current and future operational requirements or account for DOTMLPF implications. Only with precise language, a balanced approach to a naval partnership, and recognition of current operational requirements will we strengthen the Navy–Marine Corps team and, thereby, the nation.