In a war with China, achieving sea control would require defeating or degrading the surface and submarine forces of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to reduce the cruise missile threat to U.S. Navy ships. Today, however, the Navy lacks sufficient platforms to conduct long-range antisubmarine and surface warfare strikes at the scale that would be required.1 Until the Naval Strike Missile, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and improved SM-6 missiles arrive in large numbers, surface combatants also lacks a credible long-range surface warfare capability. F/A-18s, F-35s, and the P-8 Poseidon carry a relatively limited number of antiship cruise missiles and are hardly adequate for the task.
China currently has between 313 and 342 warships—including some 70 attack submarines and 115 destroyers, frigates, and corvettes—concentrated in its near seas within the umbrella of antiship cruise and ballistic missiles.2 As of 2018, the U.S. Navy had 285 “deployable battle force ships” spread across the globe.3
In short, the U.S. Navy cannot win this fight alone.
The Air Force B-1B has been proposed as a potential maritime strike platform.4 This concept should be expanded. Pairing the B-1 with the P-8 in maritime strike sensor-shooter teams would be a more effective solution for sea control than employing either platform alone. The P-8 has the sensors, data links, range, and experienced aircrews to perform maritime search and targeting, and the B-1 has the ability to carry large numbers of the long-range antiship missile (LRASM).
HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
During World War II, patrol bombing squadrons played an integral, if unheralded, role in victory over the Axis powers. Navy and Army Air Forces (AAF) land-based aircraft conducted sea control operations in both the Pacific and European theaters. Patrol bombers found, targeted, and sank more than 1,500 maritime targets.5 Initial Navy patrol planes lacked strong self-defense capabilities, so the service eventually acquired faster and more heavily armed AAF B-24s.6 Redesignated PB4Y-1 Liberators, these aircraft were further adapted for the sea control role with better armament and sensors, resulting in the PB4Y-2 Privateer.
U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive
Postwar drawdown, interservice rivalry, new technology and platforms, and a changing threat landscape led the Navy to abandon the patrol bombing squadron as an instrument of sea control. Facing a burgeoning Soviet threat, patrol squadrons shifted focus to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).7 The freshly minted U.S. Air Force grappled with the advent of the jet age and requirements for air superiority and nuclear strike. Land-based air maritime strike capability atrophied.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the advent of over-the-horizon (OTH) cruise missiles such as Harpoon and Tomahawk necessitated third-party-targeting solutions, and land-based aircraft for sea control reemerged. The Navy armed the land-based P-3 Orion with the Harpoon antiship missile, making surface warfare (SUW) a primary mission.8 In addition, the P-3 began serving as an OTH battlespace awareness and third-party-targeting platform.
During the first Gulf War, the Outlaw Hunter and subsequent Over-the-Horizon Sensor Information System (OASIS) proved that a P-3, using onboard sensors coupled with improved GPS, satellite communications (SatCom), and data links, could enhance battlespace awareness and provide OTH targeting for a carrier battle group.9 Today, updated technology, communications, and data links continue to allow the Navy P-8 to serve in battlespace management and OTH targeting roles.
BRING BACK VPB
In a potential conflict in the western Pacific, where China has sortied its surface and submarine forces into the waters of the first and second island chains, the U.S. Navy could need to find and sink or mission kill as many as 350 enemy naval forces in the first days to gain sufficient sea control to sail into the area of operations.10 Is the U.S. Navy capable of such a feat? Possibly, but only if the patrol bombing squadron (VPB) construct is considered.
The P-8A Poseidon has a mission radius of 1,200 nautical miles (nm) with four hours on station, or 4,000 nm one way, unrefueled. Its primary mission is ASW. The P-8 can search a volume of water, detect, classify, and track submarines from altitudes between 200 and 40,000 feet. It has robust ISR and targeting capabilities, with radar and an electro-optical/infrared camera for detection and classification of surfaced submarines and ships. With its electronic support measures suite, the aircraft can passively detect and geolocate emitters at long range. The Poseidon carries up to five Mk 54 torpedoes and four AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, making it a credible sea control aircraft.
The B-1B is a long-range supersonic bomber capable of aerial refueling. Its massive weapons bay has capacity for up to 75,000 pounds of ordnance and can carry up to 24 standoff weapons like the LRASM and a variety of gravity weapons, including the Mk 65 mine.11 The aircraft has a ground-mapping radar and can be fitted with the electro-optical Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod, allowing B-1 crews to search for and classify targets at range.12 As good as the B-1 radar is overland, however, it is not optimized for the maritime environment.
Although both the P-8 and B-1 could do SUW alone, lethality is maximized when their sensors, experience, and weapons are combined.13 A VPB force could strike enemy surface ships from outside the range of ship-based surface-to-air missiles. The LRASM is precision guided, carries a 1,000-lb warhead, and has a range of 200-plus nm.14 The Harpoon employed by the P-8 is fire-and-forget and carries a 500-lb warhead in excess of 67 nm.15 Together, the P-8 and B-1 pack a considerable OTH SUW capability. Table 1 shows a weapon loadout example.
A VPB VIGNETTE
A notional vignette highlights the utility of the VPB concept. Assume the U.S. Navy must sink or mission kill 300 PLAN surface combatants and 50 submarines in the first three days of the conflict. U.S. surface and submarine forces and carrier aircraft together account for 25 percent of red surface attrition, and ship-based ASW helicopters (MH-60Rs) attrite 10 percent of red submarines. In this vignette there are 60 P-8s and 30 B-1s available to mission kill the remaining 225 ships and 45 submarines.16 Using the Exocet missile as a surrogate weapon, two LRASMs are required to mission kill each surface target.17 Assume two Mk 54s are required for each submarine. In total, the VPB needs a minimum of 450 LRASMs and 90 Mk 54s to achieve the desired number of mission kills.18
VPB planes would operate loosely together in designated areas between the first and second island chains, notionally around 15–100 nm apart. The P-8s’ primary responsibility would be ASW, but they also would search for enemy ships while transiting and on station. With B-1s taking on the primary SUW strike role, additional P-8 flights could be dedicated to surface surveillance. For every P-8 sensor, there would be one or two B-1 shooters. The B-1 would remain at best altitude and use radar and Sniper pod for surface search and cross-cueing with the P-8.
Table 2 highlights the significant decrease in the number of sorties required by using the VPB construct, allowing P-8s to focus on ASW while freeing additional P-8s to serve as dedicated surface targeting platforms for B-1s. Mixed loads are possible but reduce sortie generation efficiency. Maximum sortie efficiency occurs when the P-8s, with Mk 54s, prioritize submarine strikes and the B-1s prioritize LRASM strikes. Based on the assumptions regarding mission kills and weapons capacity, the VPB would have to generate a total of 13.75 sorties a day for three days.19
This vignette takes place outside the first island chain, beyond the range of integrated air defense, and also assumes a moderately contested environment, with combat air patrol providing cover from long-range enemy fighters as needed. In addition, VPB assets would mitigate ship-launched antiair threats by striking maritime targets at long range. In fact, one of the primary benefits of the VPB concept is that with LRASM, VPB can detect and strike enemy ships outside the range of ship-based surface-to-air missiles.
The range of both aircraft could be significantly extended with aerial refueling. With or without refueling, the P-8s and B-1s would not necessarily have to be collocated—although being at the same base would be helpful for coordination and planning. Coordination and targeting between the P-8 and B-1 would be done via Link-16 or secure line-of-sight (LOS) and/or SatCom voice circuits. Loss of voice coordination nets would require VPB crews to fall back on Link-16 and prior coordinated training doctrine.
The platforms would require Link-16 connectivity or LOS radio to pass targeting and coordination information. High-frequency and SatCom radios are other options. Jamming LOS communications and data links would degrade coordination, but jamming would be mitigated by range from land-based jammers and the ability of the P-8 and B-1 to search for and strike surface targets independently if required.
While far from a comprehensive review, this notional vignette shows that the VPB force has the capability and capacity to mission kill or sink enough PLA ships to get other joint force assets into the fight. Three times as many sorties are required when only P-8s are used than with the P-8/B-1 VPB construct. The joint force would be far more effective working together in a war-at-sea scenario than working as individual services. A more comprehensive study of the VPB concept is warranted.
CONSTRUCTING VPB SQUADRONS
There are two possible courses of action for forming VPB squadrons. The first is a “virtual VPB” construct. The Air Force would keep B-1s in service and allocate flight hours to training in the maritime environment with P-8s. In return, the Navy would purchase a percentage of LRASMs for the B-1. The Navy and Air Force would work jointly to improve survivability and countermeasures for both aircraft, including improved towed decoys and sensors. The B-1 would benefit from an infusion of Navy money toward improved survivability, while the P-8 could be fitted with something like an Air Force–provided AN/ALE-50 towed decoy system. The B-1 and P-8 weapon schools would coordinate closely. A permanent B-1/P-8 weapons and tactics instructor billet exchange could be established between the respective schools.
There are challenges with this option. The Navy and Air Force would have to agree on funding priorities for training, flight hours, and weapon procurement—no small task in any budget environment. Disagreements would jeopardize the virtual VPB construct. The need to close the maritime strike gap, coupled with the relatively inexpensive cost and speed with which the construct could be employed, should be enough to overcome interservice rivalry.
The second course of action would be for the Air Force to turn over the B-1s to the Navy, which then would create Navy VPB squadrons, with help from dedicated Air Force personnel for a defined transition period. The Air Force would save money that could be used for B-21 procurement or B-52 modernization and could focus on its traditional missions. The Navy would significantly increase long-range maritime strike capability and would have control over the training and efforts of the VPB squadrons. Shifting the B-1s to the Navy would cost money, but it would provide a maritime strike capability within the joint force faster and at less cost than buying a new platform.
The downside of this second option is sizable. A significant reprogramming of money would be required to shift B-1 manning, training, and maintenance responsibilities to the Navy. Funding for the B-1 would be at risk during budget negotiations as the Navy and Air Force buy future weapons such as the B-21, Columbia-class submarine, and future surface combatant. In addition, the learning curve for the Navy would be steep, as aircrew would have to be recruited, trained, and sustained.
Of these two options, the best course of action is the virtual VPB. The cost of maintaining the B-1 for 15 or 20 more years is relatively small when viewed in light of the importance of sea control in a high-end war at sea. The virtual VPB concept should be formalized and employed in Composite Training Unit Exercises, as well as in exercises such as Valiant Shield. The P-8 and B-1 weapon schools should take the lessons learned and publish tactics, techniques, and procedures for the virtual VPB. A critical requirement is continued procurement of long-range missiles to outfit VPB squadrons. Using P-8s and B-1s in virtual VPB squadrons would significantly and immediately increase the lethality of the joint force.
BRIDGING THE GAP
The U.S. joint force faces a serious gap in maritime strike. New technology, platforms, and weapons eventually will fill the gap, but they are years away from hitting the fleet in meaningful numbers. Establishing virtual VPB squadrons would be a cost-effective solution until those future systems and platforms can be fielded.
1. David Axe, “U.S. Navy Nightmare: The Chinese Fleet Doesn’t Have 300 Ships, It Has 650,” The National Interest, 30 January 2019.
2. Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific,” The New York Times, 29 August 2018.
3. Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Numbers Game: Understanding and Responding to China’s Three Sea Forces,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 28 January 2019.
4. Ross Hobbs and Will Spears, “A Bomber for the Navy,” OTH Journal, 16 April 2019.
5. Alan C. Carey, Above an Angry Sea: United States Navy B-24 Liberator and PB4Y-2 Privateer Operations in the Pacific, October 1944–August 1945 (Atglen: Schiffer Military Publishing, 2001), 141.
6. Alan C. Carey, The Reluctant Raiders: The Story of United States Bombing Squadron VB/VPB-109 in World War II (Atglen: Schiffer Military Publishing, 1999); and Bryan Clark, The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 8.
7. David Reade, “New Developments: Worldwide P-3 Status Report,” Maritime Patrol Aviation, September 1992, 62.
8. David Reade, “P-3 Operations in the War on Terrorism,” Wings of Gold (Summer 2002): 70–72.
9. David Reade and Rick Burgess, “Outlaw Hunter,” Naval Aviation News, November-December 1992, 20.
10. Sydney J. Freedberg, “U.S. ‘Gets Its Ass Handed to It’ in Wargames: Here’s a $24 Billion Fix,” Breaking Defense, 7 March 2019.
11. Hobbs and Spears, “A Bomber for the Navy.”
12. Kristen Pate, “Sniper ATP-Equipped B-1B Has Combat First,” 379th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, 11 August 2008.
13. Yash Rojas, “Air Force, Navy Join Forces for B-1 Naval Mine Development Training,” 28th Bomb Wing Public Affairs, 10 June 2014.
14. Sydney J. Freedberg, “Navy Warships Get New Heavy Missile: 2500-Lb LRASM,” Breaking Defense, 26 July 2017.
15. U.S. Navy, “Fact File: Harpoon Missile,” navy.mil.
16. Aircraft availability considers total inventory minus a portion of each type down for maintenance or other contingency.
17. Wayne P. Hughes and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 158.
18. Numbers are notional. Actual numbers required would vary based on environmental and operational considerations and likely would be much higher.
19. Numbers are based on weapons required for F-kill and do not account for transit times, search area sizes, and aircraft returning to and from station with unused weapons. Actual weapon requirements are likely much higher. However, based on aircrew turnaround times, the number of sorties per day are fairly representative for this narrow scenario.
