During the Cold War, the Department of Defense (DoD) focused almost entirely on the Soviet Union as the nation’s primary adversary. Junior officers were expected, as a core component of their professional development, to study the strategy, goals, operations, and ethos of those who opposed the United States. But after the Soviet Union fell, initial training on foreign competitors for submarine junior officers decayed to near zero. This lack of investment is difficult to reconcile with the objectives in the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (NDS), which pivots the defense enterprise away from transnational threats toward countering global strategic competitors.
With the reemergence of strategic competitors, Navy units—particularly submarines—suffer from new officers’ lack of knowledge on the nation’s key adversaries. Former Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated at the outset of his short tenure that the primary focus of DoD was “China, China, China.”1 The NDS focuses on Russia as the second strategic competitor, citing examples of its growing menace and coercion of neighbors, threats to NATO, and new hypersonic missiles.2 If a Sino-U.S. conflict is possible before the course of the 21st century is determined, then why do many junior officers report to their first submarine without even rudimentary knowledge on topics such as western Pacific geography? Why do they report to their first commands lacking an understanding of Chinese and Russian national goals, strategies, tactics, and orders of battle?
The NDS reaffirms that without a long-term view, the United States will lose its military advantage rapidly, allowing China and Russia to undermine international order, particularly with regard to the freedom of common domains such as the sea, cyberspace, and space. DoD must focus on sustained investment in long-term capabilities, including personnel expertise on Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. Leaders must be developed who can out-think adversaries in the absence of communication with major command centers. This is of particular concern in the undersea domain, where submarines spend much of their time out of contact with headquarters. In essence, personnel must have the knowledge, capability, and will to make major decisions regarding opponents in a compressed timeline.
The Chief of Naval Operations’ version 2.0 of A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority draws from the NDS in its premise that in this changing world, the United States is competing to control global lines of communication. It warns that for the past two decades, China and Russia have been analyzing U.S. strategy and operations to counter them and define a new international order.3 Providing junior officers with knowledge in adversary operations, strategy, and goals is a foundation that can no longer be neglected.
A Clear Example of Reform
In early 2017, the USS Ohio (SSGN-726) Blue crew realized that—despite concluding a nearly two-year series of deployment cycles out of Guam—wardroom officers lacked a basic grasp of U.S. competitors’ strategy, national goals, ethos, operations, and orders of battle. More alarmingly, the Ohio wardroom had little understanding of its role in the national defense architecture. The officers’ inability to relate their daily tasks to their place in the national defense enterprise contributed to low retention, reduced operational capability, and ineffective or irrelevant training programs. To correct these deficiencies, the Ohio’s senior leaders enacted three key reforms: Designate a collateral duty intelligence officer with a significant command-supported mandate; provide weekly intelligence briefs to the officers and shorter briefs to the crew; and hold Naval War College–style war games for the officers as part of predeployment training.
The effectiveness of these reforms is reflected in the shore assignments that junior officers pursued after their Ohio tours—billets that allowed them to learn more about the nation’s security challenges and further their education on global strategic competitors. Their professional identities had grown to encompass not only submarining but also the business of national defense. Many Ohio junior officers were detailed to high-visibility positions, including White House duty, on the Navy Staff in the Pentagon, and as flag-officer aides.
The Role of the Submarine Intelligence Officer
The commanding officer must designate the intelligence officer in writing, while treating the collateral duty with the same importance as that of the operational safety officer (OSO) or quality assurance officer (QAO). Often considered the most significant collateral duties, those of the OSO and QAO are given to experienced, high-performing submarine junior officers. The intelligence officer must be held in the same regard. In addition, a person serving as intelligence officer must report directly to the executive officer, as does the QAO.
The intelligence officer’s duties include collecting information from organic sensors and through off-hull means (including classified and open sources) and presenting the intelligence at operations briefs and during the planning process for operations. This officer must provide substantive intelligence briefs during officer training, providing executive and commanding officers with information appropriate to brief the entire crew at appropriate venues.
Weekly Intelligence Briefs and Wardroom War games
During the one to two hours of weekly officer training, the intelligence officer should provide a brief on relevant information gathered during the previous week. This includes not only specific military information but also the latest political and economic news on a near-peer competitor. For example, at this moment in history, discussions about the status of U.S.-China trade negotiations and the effects of talks on current and future operations are warranted. Concerning the crew, each week at all-hands call or as a weekly general military training topic at sea, the intelligence officer or designated representative should provide shorter updates that are particularly pertinent to strategic competitors.
Based on war games held by the Naval War College and other organizations, such as the Center for Naval Analyses, the Ohio conducted war games on a particular flashpoint or campaign in the submarine’s deployment area of responsibility. Blue and Red forces were assigned division officers and a department head in charge of each side. The executive and commanding officers adjudicated results. The game’s goal was to expose division officers and department heads to strategic-level decision making and give them a clearer understanding of competitor order of battle, strategy, operations, economic goals, and U.S. efforts to counter all these. Through the war games, officers also better grasped their submarine’s role in the U.S. diplomatic, industrial, military, and economic enterprise.
A Fleet Solution Is Needed
The Ohio reforms took significant time away from other training sessions and opportunities. They required direct senior leader involvement and took preparation time from other predeployment milestones and inspections. These effects on the submarine could be mitigated if the force invested in such reforms during junior officers’ initial training pipeline. With some basic education on global strategic competitors using the NDS and Design 2.0 as guidelines, junior officers would report to their first submarines ahead of the game in terms of their knowledge about not only other nations and their militaries and goals, but also how their submarine duties fit into the national defense enterprise.
It will take time and creative thinking to restructure current training programs given the submarine pipeline must deliver junior officers to the fleet as quickly as possible. Furthermore, jamming another time commitment into the Submarine Officer Basic Course with little thought about pipeline throughput, expeditiously filling sea billets, and accounting for other secondary effects will not work.
To help submarine junior officers develop knowledge about the national defense strategy and threats from global strategic competitors, higher echelon commands such as squadrons, groups, and type commanders must support submarine leaders in this endeavor. In addition, training centers such as the Submarine Learning Centers and Trident Training Facilities must provide war gaming rooms. Collectively, the fleet at all echelons must foster a culture that develops submarine officers into tactical, strategic, and theater experts.
Providing junior submarine officers with training regarding global strategic competitors likely will improve retention and allow them to understand the necessity of their roles to national defense. Beginning this training at the start of officers’ careers will help develop them into true national defense professionals instead of just operators. If the Navy, particularly the submarine force, is to triumph in the global competitions of the 21st century, junior officers must be developed into strategic thinkers who will one day lead the force.
1. Patrick Shanahan, “Assumption of Acting Secretary of Defense,” speech presented to staff in Washington, DC, January 2019.
2. James Mattis, Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, May 2018, 2.
3. ADM John Richardson, USN, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, version 2.0, December 2018, 3.