Fighting (and Deceiving) to Get to the Fight

The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) faces its biggest challenge since the concept was established in 1963: penetrating peer defensive networks like none the Marine Corps has ever faced to land in a contested environment. The Navy–Marine Corps team must develop deception methods and modernize its air and sea connector capabilities to thrive and succeed inside complex and challenging environments that will be more and better defended than those of the past. Otherwise, amphibious forces will fail, taking the expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept with them. Three possible solutions will help generate and sustain combat power inside the enemy’s weapons-engagement zone.

First, the Navy and Marine Corps should develop a deception platform to confuse enemy defenses. Second, the services need to produce a more effective connector fleet. And third, the Marine Corps should modernize assault support for today’s joint force to prepare MAGTF pilots, commanders, and aircraft for the future fight. All three will be essential to generating and sustaining amphibious combat power forward.

All Amphibious Warfare Is Based on Deception

Naval and military peers are capable of identifying, tracking, and striking naval forces at ranges of more than 1,000 nautical miles.¹ A peer adversary’s antiaccess/area-denial (A2AD) network will be tough to defeat entirely through cyber attack. It will be resilient and will maintain failsafes, redundancies, and points of decentralization that can be expected to remain operational. If an A2AD network’s sensors cannot be defeated, then they should be confused: The Navy and Marine Corps should develop highly capable deception platforms to enable amphibious force maneuver.

The amphibious force–deception (AF-D) system is a concept that would consist of low-cost, high-signature (radar/electromagnetic), and expendable platforms that replicate the signatures of a U.S. naval forces to deceive enemy sensors about the position, track, and intentions. AF-D systems would require U.S. forces to develop new high/low-signature operating concepts in which they would be able to “douse” their own signals as AF-D signals increase. U.S. forces will need to train to a high standard of emissions control; gone will be the days of constant chatter. AF-D devices also must be cheap enough to be expendable; it is hoped they might draw fire, causing the enemy to waste surface- and air-to-surface antiship missiles on decoys. This, in turn, would allow the joint force to identify concealed targets and further degrade the A2AD network.

AF-D platforms could be delivered by a number of means: aircraft, the maritime prepositioning force, international shipping, surface action groups, and submarines. Small and capable of autonomous operation, the platforms would inflate or extend masts and reflectors to increase their electromagnetic and radar signatures. They would require high-endurance, weatherproof power sources (fuel, battery, or solar) and navigation controls that could be managed autonomously or under active control  remotely by pilots on ships or in aircraft. 

For every U.S. ship allocated to an operation, an AF-D platform also would have to be assigned, one capable of replicating the behavior and mission profile expected by the enemy. If the adversary expects 25 ships over the horizon, a dozen AF-Ds will not produce the signature expected, and the deception will fail. For these reasons, an AF-D platform must cost a small fraction of an actual warship. 

Raytheon’s Miniature Air Launched Decoy (MALD) is a good example of the type of deception to be practiced. The company says MALD is a “low cost, programmable craft that accurately duplicates the combat flight profiles and signatures of U.S. and allied aircraft.” Platforms such as the AF-D, the MALD, and others should enable the Navy–Marine Corps team to penetrate the A2AD environment. Once the breach is open, getting Marines ashore with antiquated connectors will be the next challenge.

Connectors That Will Fail

The U.S. Navy’s elderly landing craft are ill-equipped to deliver Marines and material in EABO and littoral operations in a contested environment. These landing craft include the 1610-class landing craft, utility (LCUs)—introduced in 1959; the landing craft, mechanized (LCM) 6 and 8—the late 1960s; and the landing craft air cushion (LCAC)—1987. (The amphibious assault and amphibious combat vehicle gators are not included here, as they have been considered extensively elsewhere, and are too Marine Corps–specific for this team-focused discussion.) 

There are only 71 LCACs in service. They deliver a payload of 60 to 75 tons—one M1A1 Abrams tank or 150 Marines—and are capable of launching from 50 miles offshore and transiting at more than 40 knots. In 2000, the Navy started the LCACs’ service life extension program, increasing the connectors’ planned life from 20 to 30 years. Sixty-eight will have received a life extension by 2021. By 2034, 72 Ship-to-Shore Connectors (SSC) will have replaced the LCACs. With the ability to carry 145 Marines or 74 tons at 35 knots from 50 miles over the horizon, the SSC promises no appreciable difference in capacity or capability.² 

The 1610-class LCUs travel at 8 knots and can carry 450 combat-loaded Marines or two M1A1 tanks. In 2022, the 1700-class will begin replacing the 1610s. Although newer, the LCU-1700 is another replacement platform lacking increased performance.³

These surface connectors not only suffer from slow speed and limited capacity, but also are visible to radar and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. The future connector fleet—what comes after the SSCs and 1700s—must include low-observable surface, semisubmersible, and submersible connectors. These must be long-duration and capable of over-the-horizon approaches with sufficient maneuverability to reduce exposure to A2AD defenses. Considering load weight and purpose, not all would have to be high speed, but timely maneuver is essential. 

Across and Under the Waves

Some existing platforms and prototypes outside the U.S. Navy show the way to improved connectors. The prototype Ghost would offer the MAGTF options for high-speed, over-the-horizon insertion of battalion- and regimental-size landing teams. The Ghost, developed by Juliet Marine Systems, is capable of traveling at 50-plus knots and carrying to 15 combat-loaded Marines.⁴ With its high speed (in surf up to 10 feet) and low-observable profile, the Ghost could be a viable starting point for future connectors. The insertion of 15 Marines is far from optimal, but similar platforms could be developed to carry larger, platoon-sized elements for EABO. 

When the ground combat element needs more firepower, a more robust landing craft would be required. France currently operates the L-CAT (landing-catamaran), capable of carrying 88–110 tons, with speeds ranging from 30 knots empty to 18 knots with a full load; thanks to its catamaran hull form, better on both counts than the flat-bottomed LCU.⁵ If it were upgraded with radar-absorbing low-observable materials and shapes, the L-CAT could offer a viable force-projection platform.

When a toehold has been established inside the A2AD zone, sometimes heavy equipment, combat engineers, and additional firepower must be brought ashore. Existing and prospective LCUs, including the Army’s LCU-2000, are slow or carry too little. Neither the LCAC nor the air-cushioned SSC replacement is capable of receiving direct fire larger than a rifle round without considerable risk to the platform. And transporting a single heavy vehicle at a time is insufficient. 

The Turkish-built landing craft, tank (LCT) from Anadolu, on the other hand, is capable of sprinting at 18 knots with three M1A1s. It would allow the MAGTF to bring heavy firepower ashore—more than 200 tons of antiship missiles, surface-to-surface and -air missiles, rockets, tactical vehicles, and so on.⁶ Although the length and height of the LCT make it unsuitable for carriage on board U.S. amphibious assault ships, the LCT is capable of a stern-gate marriage with LHAs/Ds, LSDs, and LPDs. Forward deploying LCTs in advance of open conflict could make the connectors a valuable rapid response vessel to support MAGTFs in EABO. 

Any surface connector—even a low-observable one—is potentially susceptible to surface- and air-to-surface radar detection and targeting. Over the past 20 years, drug runners have had mixed results trying to evade the U.S. Coast Guard, but their use of unorthodox semisubmersible and submersible craft has been proven to work. Modern navigation and mine countermeasures could make “narco-submarines” a viable if unconventional option for penetrating the A2AD environment.⁷

Upgrading the MV-22 and CH-53

Calls for more capable assault support are nothing new, and improvements roll out from time to time. Ongoing upgrades to the MV-22 Osprey, including to its avionics, and production of the CH-53K King Stallion are steps in the right direction, but these will not be enough in the future fight.⁸ Not enough upgraded MV-22s exist to meet the needs of the joint force and the Marine Corps—and they must meet Marines’ needs first. At the same time, supporting requests from Special Operations Command (SoCom)—and upgrading aircraft to meet those requests—will give MAGTF commanders, pilots, and planners experience and capabilities to succeed in a future contested operating environment.

The future MV-22C must match the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force CV-22.⁹ Although visually similar to the Marine Corps aircraft, the CV-22 has a greater range thanks to two inboard wing tanks that increase fuel capacity. In addition, the Air Force says the “CV-22 is equipped with integrated threat countermeasures, terrain-following radar, forward-looking infrared sensor and other advanced avionics systems that allow it to operate at low altitude in adverse weather conditions and medium- to high-threat environments.”¹⁰ Air Force CV-22s support SoCom missions, but the service has very few of them. Unless Marine Corps MV-22s are upgraded, they will continue to be an alternative for SoCom that carries greater risk. 

Installation of Networking On-The-Move–Airborne Increment 2 (NOTM-A Inc. II) in MV-22Bs is a good start, but improvement cannot stop there.¹¹ The same must be applied to the CH-53K. Plaftorm testing should be conducted not only in training, but also in the real world, where the threat is significant. By matching the MV-22C capabilities to those of the CV-22, the Marine Corps would gain an advantage, allowing Marine aviation to progress from being great to being the preferred force not only on land but also in the air when fighting a peer.

In Many a Strife

The Navy–Marine Corps team must take the lead in developing a deception platform that enables the amphibious forces to maneuver and surprise the enemy. But deception alone is insufficient. Once the A2AD zone has been breached, moving Marines and material quickly, unpredictably, and safely is the job of the gators and connectors. Today’s connectors—not to mention tomorrow’s—are insufficient and obsolescent. Although Marine Corps assault support is some of the best in the world, the environment is changing, and this support must change with this environment at an increased pace. 

The time to invest in these technologies and prepare for the coming fight came yesterday. The Navy and Marine Corps must move out!