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To Understand Russian Submarines, Think Outside the Box
(See N. Polmar, pp. 22–24, October 2019)
Russian submarines exist mainly to launch weapons, obviously, and Russian weapons—torpedoes and hypersonic cruise missiles—are super fast, accurate, and deadly. U.S. Navy weapons are often slow, smaller, and less lethal by comparison.
The Russian version of “think outside the box” is similar to Texas’s—“Build them BIG!” The U.S. Navy could learn from Texas how size does matter. For instance, if the analogy is that the MH-60 is an M9 pistol, then a Russian sub is a 7.62mm PKM machine gun. It’s no match. The Seahawk is too slow and too limited to hunt for a sub that will fire fast and furiously once in position.
Underwater sound surveillance is key to tracking Russian subs, as are unmanned vessels and magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD). P-8s are another valuable option, as are satellites. But this is a kind of guerrilla war in which one Russian sub with hypersonics can wreak havoc because its weapons load is so deadly.
So “think outside the box” then. With advances in robots, drones will be able to linger underwater for longer periods. (After all, the X-37B stayed in orbit for years without landing.) Detection doesn’t require complex nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Antisubmarine drones can be the “eyes and ears” of the U.S. Navy. Cable-laid detection across the ocean could be another viable option for hydrophones or MAD sensors.
If the quest is to stop the Russian “PKM machine-gun” submarine, then what must be done? A sniper is the best option—take out the PKM machine gunner before it gets in range of a strike group. The 6–15 mile range of antisubmarine rockets won’t cut it. A Tomahawk or other cruise missile carrying a Mk 50 torpedo for 250–1,500 miles might, especially if equipped with sonobuoys for automatic target detection once in the area of a suspected threat. Since a missile flies faster than a submarine can swim, in theory, this would be a good system to test with the new Virginia Payload Module.
—Peter Ong
The October Proceedings
The entire issue was filled with excellent articles packed with interesting information and opinion about the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem facing the U.S. Navy. But I have a slightly different view of the problem than that presented by many of the authors.
The real threat from Russian submarines is long-range, airborne attack against both land targets and surface ships by Kalibr missiles.
We will never have enough unmanned underwater vehicles to track every Russian or Chinese sub at all times and report their positions in a timely manner, not to mention having attack assets close enough to attack them in case of war. That means that we will never be able to break the kill chain “left of launch.”
However, organic sensors and attack weapons should allow us to track or neutralize any sub within torpedo range of U.S. Navy ships (if not, God help us!). And, of course, major asset high-value units have torpedo defensive systems.
Russian and Chinese sub captains must know that and will attempt to avoid the inner ASW fight by attacking at long range with missiles, using multiple threat bearings, saturation attacks, and possibly tactical nukes. They will not close to torpedo range until after missiles have distracted us with damage control.
That means that the real solution to the ASW problem is antiair warfare. We do not need to locate every sub at all times, but we do need to defend against their missiles all the time. This applies not just to surface ships but also to ports at home and in allied countries. Somebody in Bremerhaven should be asking for air defense assets!
Every possible tactic should be employed in this defensive endeavor. Previous generations of naval leaders have faced—and hopefully would have neutralized—the missile threat from Soviet aircraft and the Echo-class submarines.
Previous Proceedings have reported the “depth of magazine” issue and cost-effectiveness problems, but I believe we can solve those issues by concentrating on them. If we are able to defeat the missile threat, two things will have happened. First, a launching sub will have revealed its position, allowing time to track and attack him with assets outside the targeted ship or strike group. Second, he has lost the element of surprise, and if he closes to torpedo range, we will have better information to manage the engagement.
The solution to the ASW problem is defensive antiair warfare.
—CAPT Fred Furtek, USNR (Ret.)
The Navy Needs a Culture of Innovation
(See D. Moore and G. Smith, pp. 42–46, August 2019)
In the late 1960s, the USS Leahy (DLG-16) was equipped with four AN/SPG-55B missile radars, labeled #1, #2, #5, and #6. Each was an incredibly complex machine with 900 vacuum tubes, analog technology that required constant maintenance, adjustments, repairs, and testing. I was a missile fire-control technician assigned to Radar #5.
We had heard about a test in which another ship fired a missile that successfully engaged and destroyed $3.47 worth of tinfoil, thereby saving the government thousands of dollars in target drone. This dubious achievement was not going to be repeated by the Leahy!
I carefully reviewed the system diagrams and found an interesting feature. The radar computed a voltage known as range rate (abbreviated DMr) that the Mark 119 analog computer used for solving missile-guidance ballistics. Eureka! After doing a little math and a quick trip to the local electronics hobbyist store for a center-scale meter, a project box, some calibration potentiometers, and miscellany, the box was installed next to my station.
With this device, when a radar operator acquired a target, the meter would deflect to the left if the target was inbound. If it didn’t deflect, it might not be a real target. I showed it to my master chief, who gave me the expected chewing out about installing “Midnight OrdAlts” (unapproved modifications to ordnance equipment). He then asked if I could build three more.
These started sprouting fleetwide. The USS England (DLG-22) inherited four in the early 1970s. Later, when the radar went to digital technology fleetwide, the range-rate data were provided to radar operators right on the scope.
I became a limited duty officer, but, in today’s Navy, I wonder if I would have been court-martialed.
—LCDR William Berry, USN (Ret.)
The Coast Guard Belongs with DoD
(See G. Sanial, pp. 64–67, September 2019)
My first reaction to Captain Sanial’s article was, “What, another ill-reasoned argument in favor of moving from a department where we have some weight, to get devoured by the DoD behemoth?” But as I read on, I recognized that Captain Sanial offers some cogent arguments. Especially viewed in today’s “democratic process,” they make more sense than ever.
Shortly after my commissioning, the Coast Guard transitioned to the newly created Department of Transportation (DoT). I had a front row seat throughout my career. It certainly sounded great, as the Coast Guard’s mission set had long deviated from Treasury’s customs mission. While not a perfect alignment, it looked as if we would get a new lease on life in DoT as the largest entity (by personnel size). Well, no. We discovered that we didn’t have the largest budget; others did—and with big grant bucks to spread around. The Coast Guard spent much of its time in DoT robbing Peter to pay Paul, only receiving budget plus-ups when something went really bad (for example, the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
Being in a domestic “discretionary” area of the federal budget, we were subject to one budget reduction after another. Subsequent to the National Performance Review’s “better government at less cost” initiative, the Coast Guard took a horrific 12 percent budget reduction, being told to “do more with less.” Inevitably, it did less with less.
Then along came the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—and some of the same initial euphoria as with joining DoT. The budget struggles related by Captain Sanial find the Coast Guard not only in a shrinking part of DHS but also again a donor to other “higher priority” needs. And on top of this, the move to DHS, with its emphasis on security vice safety, almost got the marine safety mission extracted from the service and placed into another agency.
We all witnessed the travesty of this year’s government shutdown and its impact on the Coast Guard’s men and women, the only members of the five armed services to go without pay. This did not and would never happen in DoD. Despite much rhetoric to fix this in the future, no remedy has been enacted.
Captain Sanial is right: The time to “change assignments” is upon us.
—RADM Fred L. Ames, USCG (Ret.)
I disagree with Captain Sanial. While he is correct that Homeland Security is not the best place for the Coast Guard, in my view the service should never have been moved from Treasury in the first place. The transfer to the then-new Department of Transportation in 1966 was largely due to the ego of President Lyndon Johnson.
However, transferring to DoD—particularly under the Secretary of the Navy—would probably result in the Coast Guard’s eventual extinction and total absorption by the Navy. Attempts have been made at least a dozen times since 1796, the most serious following World War I, when Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels resisted returning the Coast Guard to Treasury. Congress overrode him with good reason, despite some Coast Guard officers supporting the takeover because they had enjoyed temporary promotions during the war (and faced reduction to their permanent grades away from the Navy).
The idea that the Coast Guard could be a distinct service under the Navy Department similar to the Marine Corps is unrealistic. The two services are too similar in form to preclude an eventual total takeover, with the Navy poaching Coast Guard assets for national defense missions and the Coast Guard’s traditional peacetime missions left to be overseen by a few passed-over lieutenants in a converted cleaning-gear locker in some obscure corner of the Pentagon or contracted out to a variety of private companies with varying degrees of competence.
Also, the Coast Guard Academy would likely be an early casualty. After all, Marine officers are sourced from Annapolis, so why not Coast Guard officers? That, among other closures, was one of Secretary Daniels’ justifications for takeover following World War I, by the way. If the Coast Guard were to go to DoD, probably the least objectionable way would be for it to go as an independent service with its own Secretary of the Coast Guard under the Secretary of Defense, not two Cabinet tiers down as a stepchild of the Navy.
The Coast Guard probably isn’t going anywhere anytime soon. But if it does, it should go back to Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury is a very powerful and senior Cabinet officer, and that is where the Coast Guard would have the kind of advocacy it would never get in DoD.
—CDR David A. Desiderio, USCG (Ret.)
Climate Change Is Coming for Annapolis
(See P. Paterson, pp. 62–65, October 2019)
A reply to Commander Paterson’s article cannot be adequately addressed in only 500 words. Sea level is relative to the land surface. Many land regions express land subsidence, and the amount of subsidence can vary within a region. At Annapolis and other sites in the Chesapeake Bay region, more than half the sea-level rise is due to land subsidence. There, a combination of ocean-level rise of 3–4 mm per year and land subsidence of about 7 mm adds up to about 1 cm.
The rates in this region are indeed the highest on the East Coast, but the major cause of subsidence is aquifer system compaction, as a result of extensive groundwater pumping. This factor can be slowed by changing groundwater practices. Two recommendations are: 1. move pumping away from the high-risk areas, and 2. reduce withdrawal rates in low-lying areas.
Regarding the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet: The west coast of Antarctica holds a dense string of almost 100 active volcanoes about 2 kilometers below the surface, extending along that continent’s coastline. Their eruptions are melting the ice and decreasing the sheet’s volume. At the same time, other ice sheets in Antarctica are showing signs of rejuvenation, as are Greenland’s.
The effect of greenhouse gases (CO2 is a very minor one) on the rate of sea level increase is very small, if not negligible, and it has virtually no impact on rates of extreme weather such as hurricanes, drought, and sea level rise. In fact, today’s CO2 levels (as reported in the journal Nature in 2017) are some of the lowest in the history of the planet. However, CO2 does have a major positive impact on plant growth.
—Howard R. Lowe, retired geologist and Professional Engineer (petroleum)
Commander Paterson addresses a problem that almost certainly does not exist. Based on reliable evidence, perceived climate changes are natural; not human-caused. Seas have been rising about seven to eight inches per century for eons, starting well before any “widespread large-scale human activities.” The author seems to attribute the one-degree-Celsius global temperature rise since the late 18th century to the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century. On the contrary, the rise occurred because of the ending of the “Little Ice Age” around 1850 and a subsequent temperature rise until 1940 when it leveled off.
Since then, the global temperature has experienced a series of ups and downs. In 1978, satellite measurements of the temperature of the lower troposphere became available; if greenhouse gases, mainly CO2, are raising the global temperature, it would be evident in the measurements. In the early 2000s, I performed a regression analysis of the data from 1978 to 1998 and obtained an increase of about 0.1 degree C per decade.
In later years, research by other investigators has showed a nearly constant global temperature except for El Nino/Southern Oscillation events. Natural variability is the norm, caused by variations in the sun (ultraviolet emissions but mainly magnetic fields that indirectly influence cloud cover, and natural oscillations in the ocean/atmosphere system).
The bases for the climate alarm are two in number. The first is surface measurement of local temperature taken mainly in poorly distributed urban areas and at airports—and thus contaminated by local heat sources that are impossible to correct for.
The second are the outputs of general-circulation computer models that suffer from numerous limitations. They are incapable of realistically simulating the ocean/atmosphere thermal-circulation system or cloud cover (to name just two flaws). To get around some of these limiting factors, the models include feedback mechanisms that enhance the greenhouse effect of water vapor, for which there is zero evidence. Unfortunately, space limitation does not permit me to go into more detail.
As for flooding—the main concern of Paterson’s article—the location of the Naval Academy at the confluence of the Severn River, Spa Creek, and Chesapeake Bay can result in mutually reinforcing storm surges and flooding of the campus. In addition, much of the current Academy real estate consists of landfill that has displaced adjacent waters. Waters once flowing in a particular area will seek to return.
The dikes of Holland offer an excellent example of flood control that could be employed at the Academy. The U.S. Naval Academy is not likely to sink if proper steps are taken!
—CDR Robert C. Whitten, USNR (Ret.), and research scientist, NASA (Ret.), Golden Life Member
Let SWOs and Sailors do their Jobs
(See R. Brodie, pp. 58–60, February 2019)
I was commissioned in the Aviation Officer Candidate Program, where I received ground school training before I was ever allowed near an airplane. I had to qualify in stages long before receiving Navy wings of gold. I was grounded fairly early in the process and assigned to aviation support, which was a career stopper, so I transferred to the surface navy (before “SWO” existed).
My first time on a destroyer, I had absolutely no idea of the necessary shiphandling skills or the expectations for division officers, even though I was the same rank as some of them. Fortunately, I had become a member of the Naval Institute, which published [Editor’s note: and still publishes] books on watchstanding and division-officer skills. I purchased these and proceeded to learn by reading. Then I discovered in the ship’s library the Naval Institute Press books on shiphandling and rules of the road.
This was the type of education I had not been exposed to but badly needed. They helped me qualify as an underway officer of the deck. These books could serve as the basis for preshipboard classes for newly commissioned SWO-track officers. They contain a wealth of information that could easily form the basis of a class curriculum.
When I eventually qualified for command at sea in a reserve destroyer, Admiral William Mack’s Command at Sea became my bible. The Naval Institute’s “Blue and Gold Library” should be introduced to young officers early on.
—CAPT Robert Bruce, USNR (Ret.)
Book Review
(See R. Cassidy, p. 92, September 2019)
Doctor Cassidy’s review of Michael J. Mazarr’s Leap of Faith suggests that “men of zeal with a dearth of wisdom and humility got soldiers killed” in an unjustifiable war. Pinning much of the blame on Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Mr. Mazarr (and Doctor Cassidy, who clearly agrees with Mazarr) seems to ignore—or, at best, slough over—a number of critical facts.
It was the official policy of the United States, through the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, to support the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Not only U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; so did those of other nations, among them Israel and the UK, both of which were considered to have better intel on Iraq than did the United States. And U.S. troops repeatedly encountered chemical weapons (as The New York Times reported on 14 October 2014 and other occasions)—admittedly, most were old ones—throughout the war. This is to say nothing of all the other reasons for war stated in the Iraq Resolution of 2002.
So the question Mazarr and Cassidy must answer is, what should President George W. Bush have done when Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet thumped his fist on the President’s desk and said, “Mr. President, it is a slam dunk that there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq”?
There is no question that the aftermath of the war was grotesquely mishandled. The original strategic vision was undoubtedly intended to result in the occupation of Iraq, the center of the Middle East, with 100,000 or more coalition troops for a long period of time, not only influencing—not to say dominating—the entire region, but also remaking Iraqi society as was done in Germany and Japan. When “American Military Government” signs did not go up on the government buildings, I knew the concept had been lost. And I haven’t the slightest doubt that, somewhere in the bowels of the Pentagon, the second half of the plan to liberate Iraq lies gathering dust on a shelf.
—Mitchell R. Miller
Tomcats on Midway
(See R. Stuart, p. 45, September 2019)
I was on the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) in the Reactor Department when this event occurred. The aerographer chief (weather guesser) told the Chiefs Mess about the morning meeting that had led to the decision to divert the planes to the USS Midway (CV-41). One of the senior officers had looked to the chief and said, “You have to find us a hole to get those planes down.”
The chief replied, “I’m not the one who put them up in this weather!”
—MMCM Edward Leach, USN (Ret.)
Spontaneous Responders Add Value
(See B. Milliken, p. 14, September 2019)
The Coast Guard had something similar to the Cajun Navy once upon a time—the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Two things degraded its capability.
First, the privatization of non-emergency on-the-water assistance. “Aux” used to be full of people who owned boats, liked to get under way, and were happy to help out. Now, the non-emergency stuff is handled by Vessel Assist, and Aux is forbidden to get involved.
Second, unification of regular Coast Guard and Auxiliary qualifications, which probably seemed like a good idea at the time: Aux members would be fully qualified to step into a regular Coast Guard job.
The problem has been that the qualifications and currency requirements are more time-consuming than the old Aux standards. Then there is physical fitness. The average age of an Auxiliarist is about two or three times that of a regular. Now, about that mile and a half run. . . . So, between diminished demand for Auxiliarists under way and more stringent crew requirements, the Auxiliary’s surge capability has pretty much ceased to exist.
I have suggested in the past that the Auxiliary should accept Coast Guard civil and merchant marine licenses. So, a motorboat operator (6 pack) with an assistance towing endorsement should be coxswain qualified. An ordinary or able seaman should be crew qualified. The problem, of course, is that people with those tickets are probably out earning a living with them not volunteering their time like Auxiliarists.
—Charles Warren, USCG Aux. (Ret.)