From their landing craft, thousands of Australian and U.S. troops surge through the surf onto a South Pacific beach. Overhead, allied aircraft fight for local air superiority, prosecute ground targets, and deliver an airborne brigade deep inland. As the difficult task of establishing logistics over the shore begins, the force faces the daunting challenge of clearing a well-equipped, well-prepared, and resolute enemy.
This scene played out time and again at places whose names are written in U.S. and Australian blood, such as Lae, Bougainville, and Borneo. But the past can serve as prologue, for although the threat has changed, the geography that defines Australia’s strategic circumstances has not.
Australia’s vital connections to the world run through some of the busiest sea lanes and densest archipelagic waters on earth. The region encompasses both rapidly developing nations and fragile states, is home to an array of terrorist groups, and experiences frequent natural disasters. It also is an area that a rising China seeks to dominate. As the U.S. National Security Strategy assesses, Chinese maritime ambitions may “endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability.”1
The need for a strong Australian amphibious capability would seem obvious, but for more than a century Australia’s interest in amphibious operations has ebbed and flowed. Recently, however, the nation has entered an amphibious renaissance.
A ‘Great Forgetting’
Australia’s first joint deployment as a nation was amphibious. In 1914, Germany’s East Asia Squadron threatened Allied sea lanes from Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, and numerous other bases of operation. Hastily assembling an amphibious force including 1,500 ground troops, Australia conducted a series of amphibious lodgments and raids to seize key enemy communications nodes and logistics hubs.2 These operations, in conjunction with the deployment of the Australian Fleet, secured Australian territory and supply lines.
Also taking operational lessons from the Gallipoli landings, Australia would end the war with a strong amphibious capability. Financial pressures and other strategic demands, however, drove a rapid decline in the capability, which would have to be regenerated when another major power threatened Australia’s near north some 20 years later.3
After the 1942 fall of Singapore to Japan, newly appointed South-West Pacific Commander General Douglas MacArthur planned an offensive island-hopping campaign combining land-based air power with littoral maneuver.4 His problem was a lack of an amphibious force. From 1942 through early 1944, the majority of his ground and naval forces were Australians who lacked amphibious experience or equipment.
Australia rapidly grew an array of amphibious schools, watercraft manufacturing and heavy repair facilities, and large amphibious training facilities. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) soon would join the U.S. Navy VII Amphibious Force with the landing ships HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla, and Westralia alongside landing craft, destroyers, and support ships. The success of these developments became apparent in the New Guinea and Borneo campaigns of 1943 and 1945, respectively. With U.S. support, Australian forces would successfully plan and execute four divisional amphibious assaults, dozens of battalion landings, and countless amphibious transport operations against a well-prepared, well-equipped enemy. By 1945, the Australian Armed Forces had developed a level of amphibious and joint capability the equal of any in the world.5 But again, as the war wound down, so did Australia’s amphibious capability.
The postwar pursuit of an expeditionary strategy—the basis of Australian involvement in Korea, Vietnam, and other conflicts—eventually sapped support for amphibious forces in the nation’s Cold War policy.6 By the mid-1980s what little remained of the Australian Amphibious Squadron was disbanded, leaving only the 5,800-ton landing ship HMAS Tobruk.7 The strategic limitations this would create were revealed during the May 1987 coup against the government of Fiji.
With intervention or rescue of the deposed Fijian prime minister deemed unfeasible, even the evacuation of some 4,000 noncombatants challenged the Australian Defence Force (ADF). For three frustrating weeks, an ad hoc light infantry force was crammed into supply ships and destroyers off the coast of Fiji. With almost no amphibious vessels and “inadequate doctrine, poor communications between services . . . and the absence of operating concepts, Australia was unable to even conduct non-combatant evacuation operations without permissive conditions.”8
The Fiji experience and subsequent challenges deploying to Rwanda and Somalia led to the 1994 decision to acquire two 8,500-ton tank landing ships, former U.S. Navy Newport-class vessels redesignated as landing platforms amphibious (LPAs). Commissioned as HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla, these vessels entered service too late to support Australia’s initial intervention in East Timor in 1999. By 2000, however, the two LPAs along with Tobruk formed Australia’s first amphibious ready group (ARG) since World War II. In 2006, when the ADF had to reenter Timor without control of a port, the ARG was able to deploy a battalion across the beach in three days.
Recognizing both the utility and shortcomings of the amphibious force, the 2000 Defence White Paper set out plans to acquire two new amphibious vessels. This was the genesis of the 27,500-ton landing helicopter docks (LHDs) HMAS Canberra and Adelaide, the largest vessels the Royal Australian Navy has ever operated.
Australia has a long tradition of developing amphibious excellence in conflict, then promptly losing interest (and capability) when peace returns. As the current Chief of Defence once said, “Australian ‘amphibiousity’ suffered from a great forgetting, and so we are learning it anew.”9 Today there are indications the ADF will not repeat this mistake.
An Amphibious Renaissance
The Joint Force. The ADF is committed to becoming a truly joint force, an aspiration that began with the establishment of a Joint Operations Command in the late 1990s to unify command and control of all operations and overseas deployments. ADF officers are trained in joint academies and colleges from initial employment to War College, and recent changes to the Defence Act have transitioned the ADF from a federation of single services into a joint chain of command. These changes are reflected in the way the amphibious capability, a fundamentally joint enterprise, is commanded.
The Amphibious Task Group is an integrated headquarters with both a commander, amphibious task force, and a permanent commander, landing force (CLF), who share a fully integrated staff. As the Army’s senior amphibious commander, the CLF is under command of the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, in which elements of the Navy’s Fleet Battle Staff also are habitually embedded. This “joint force by design” represents levels of integration previously achieved only toward the end of long campaigns.
In addition to the standing CLF and their staff, the Army has invested heavily in amphibious force elements, supported by a rotational landing force. Establishing a marine-like force was not a realistic ambition given the service’s small size; however, the Army has re-roled one of its seven conventional full-time infantry battalions into a dedicated Pre-Landing Force (PLF).10 The PLF provides specialist skills in small boat operation, littoral and riverine reconnaissance, and a myriad of ship operation skills. The core of the Amphibious Ready Element (ARE), the PLF also ensures integration of the rotational landing force.
Given that the PLF comprises only one rifle company, the Army uses a rotational approach to generating ground combat elements. Over a three-year cycle, different battalions will undertake a series of amphibious training events. Although most soldiers will experience amphibious activities just one year out of three, the majority of the Army will have some familiarity with amphibious operations. This blend of dedicated and rotational embarked forces underpins a tiered amphibious capability. The higher readiness ARE, centered on the PLF, can expand to an Amphibious Ready Unit (ARU) with up to 2,200 troops, two LHDs, the LSD, 9 LHD landing craft (LLCs), and as many as 13 helicopters.
The Platforms. The centerpieces of Australia’s amphibious force are the LHDs Canberra and Adelaide, and the RAN is in the process of providing capability assurance for the LHD scheduled for completion in 2025. This program will significantly enhance amphibious capability by improving ship survivability and integration with Australian and coalition assets (including the future frigate, air warfare destroyer, and a suite of land projects).
In addition to six helicopter spots, each LHD carries four integral ship-to-shore connectors, LLCs originally capable of landing a 32-ton load. In response to growth in combat vehicle weights, the RAN reevaluated and tested LLC load-carrying capability to 65 metric tons. LLCs now have the capacity to carry all in-service and programmed vehicles in the Army’s inventory, including the M1A1 main battle tank.
The LHDs are complemented by the landing ship dock (LSD) HMAS Choules. A rapid acquisition in 2011 to fill a capability gap between the previous fleet and the introduction of the Canberra class, Choules has proved invaluable on regional operations and signals a realization of the indispensable nature of amphibious capability by policy makers.
Force of First Resort
The amphibious enterprise is an integral part of Australia’s strategic posture. The ARE and ARU provide the ability to project a medium-weight force deep into the region during all phases of operations. Already amphibious elements have proved their ability to provide humanitarian assistance, such as the disaster relief provided to Fiji in the wake of Cyclone Winston in 2016.
The ADF also is undertaking significant regional engagement, with the ARU at its core. This includes training exercises and port visits in Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea. As recently as September 2018, Australia hosted 3,000 personnel and observers from 27 nations for Kakadu 2018, its largest maritime security and disaster relief exercise.
In late 2018, an LHD provided a high-profile component of Australian government support to the government of Papua New Guinea during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2018. The LHD provided a secure base for specialist capabilities to partner with local security forces in planning, maritime and airspace security, and other niche support. Although a visible reminder of Australian support, the LHD provided a low onshore footprint while maintaining command-and-control and contingency capability. The ARU also is beginning to demonstrate its warfighting capabilities and ability for coalition integration, as evidenced in Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2018.
Canberra recently embarked on Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019, her longest and most distant deployment to date, including visits to India, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia.
Australia’s amphibious capability is making significant contributions to engagement, relief, and security operations, but much remains to be done for the ADF’s ambitions to be fully realized, in particular, its high-end warfighting capability. The demand for greater protection and lethality in land material will tax the capacity of landing ships and craft. The Army’s M1A1 tanks, combat reconnaissance vehicle (under acquisition), and infantry fighting vehicle (in planning) provide world-class mobility and lethality, but the ability to deliver these assets across the shore is yet to be fully tested. Likewise, much time and expense will be required to translate the commitment to joint command and control into the complex systems that will underpin it. Greater integration with coalition partners and the Royal Australian Air Force also is vital, as is proofing against emerging threats and threat tactics. Some of these questions will be addressed during future exercises; others will take longer to resolve. However, Australia can now claim to be the premier amphibious force in the South Pacific.
1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017.
2. See Russell Parkin, “Sailors and Seaborne Soldiers in the Defence of Australia, 1914–2001,” in John Reeve and David Stevens, The Face of Naval Battle: The Human Experience of War at Sea (Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 92–112.
3. See David Horner, “The Army, the Navy, and the Defence of Australia and the Empire, 1919–1939,” Chief of Army History Conference, Canberra, 2 October 2013.
4. “Defensive and Offensive Possibilities,” GHQ G-3 Journals & Files box 566 (no 1), April 1942–30 May 1943, Record Group 407 98-GHQ1-32, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
5. Australian forces did serve at the Inchon landings but this was limited to naval support from HMAS Bataan and HMAS Warramunga participating in the blockade. Australian War Memorial, “Out in the Cold: Australia’s Involvement in the Korean War,” 20 March 2017.
6. Australian War Memorial, “Out in the Cold.”
7. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), 145. Michael Evans, “Unarmed Prophets: Amphibious Warfare in Australian Military Thought,” Journal of the Australian Naval Institute (January/March 1999): 14.
8. Peter J. Dean, “Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian Defense Policy,” Naval War College Review 67, no. 4 (2014): 9.
9. LGEN Angus Campbell, AA, Address to the RAN’s Sea Power Conference, 6–8 October 2015.
10. See Australian Army, “Amphibious Capability.”